

THE
CHRISTIAN QUARTERLY.

OCTOBER, 1874.

I.—FORWARD OR BACKWARD—WHICH?

ALL normal life is a gradual development. This is true alike of temporal and spiritual things. We should be careful not to carry analogies too far; but it will scarcely have escaped the attention of the well-informed student that there is a striking similarity between the laws of physical life and those which govern in the moral world. It will at least appear that the law of development is every-where the same. There is always "first the blade; then the ear; after that, the full corn in the ear." Certain stages of development are generally very distinctly marked. For instance, childhood is easily distinguished from manhood, as is old age from either of these. Childhood is the formative period; manhood the period of organization and work; old age the period of mature character. In other words, our youth is spent in gathering materials for our life-work; our manhood in organizing these materials and putting them into active operation; our old age in enjoying the result of our labors, and in transmitting our practical experience to those who are to come after us.

The foregoing facts give us the key to religious movements. We have in these, "first the blade; then the ear; after that, the full corn in the ear;" or the formative period, the period of organization and work, and the period of maturity or full growth. No one can fail to see that something like these periods is marked in the

history of every religious movement. We do not stop now to verify this statement. It would not be difficult to show that this law prevailed in the development of Christianity itself during the apostolic age; but as it is the purpose of this essay to deal chiefly with one of the religious movements of the present, we must hasten to the work before us, without attempting to establish that which we think very few will seriously question.

Let it be assumed, then, that we have so far generalized correctly. Now let us come down to particulars. A few words will suffice to introduce the religious movement some of whose peculiar characteristics we wish carefully to examine.

In the year 1807, Thomas Campbell, a Presbyterian minister from the north of Ireland, arrived in the United States. He soon found that religious society here was in a very deplorable condition. Instead of that oneness which prevailed in the primitive Church, he found numerous religious parties characterized by a spirit of intense hostility to each other, rather than that peaceful spirit which should animate the people of God. Human creeds had usurped the place of the Divine Word; speculative opinions had been substituted for faith in Christ, while denominationalism was asserted to be the normal condition of the Church. Mr. Campbell, and a few who were associated with him, went to work in earnest to bring about a change in religious society; and, to this end, published the following declaration of principles:

"PROPOSITION 1. That the Church of Christ upon earth is essentially, intentionally, and constitutionally one; consisting of all those, in every place, that profess their faith in Christ and obedience to him in all things, according to the Scriptures; and that manifest the same by their tempers and conduct; and of none else, as none else can be truly and properly called Christians.

"2. That, although the Church of Christ upon earth must necessarily exist in particular and distinct societies, locally separate one from another, yet there ought to be no schisms, no uncharitable divisions among them. They ought to receive each other, as Christ Jesus hath also received them, to the glory of God. And, for this purpose, they ought all to walk by the same rule, to mind and speak the same things, and to be perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment.

"3. That, in order to do this, nothing ought to be inculcated upon Christians as articles of faith, nor required of them as terms of communion, but what is expressly taught and enjoined upon them in the Word of God. Nor ought any thing to be admitted as of Divine obligation, in their Church constitution and managements, but what is expressly enjoined by the authority of our Lord Jesus Christ and his apostles upon the New Testament Church, either in express terms or by approved precedent.

"4. That although the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are inseparably connected, making together but one perfect and entire revelation of the Divine will for the edification and salvation of the Church, and therefore in that respect can not be separated, yet, as to what directly and properly belongs to their immediate object, the New Testament is as perfect a constitution for the worship, discipline, and government of the New Testament Church, and as perfect a rule for the particular duties of its members, as the Old Testament was for the worship, discipline, and government of the Old Testament Church and the particular duties of its members.

"5. That with respect to commands and ordinances of our Lord Jesus Christ, where the Scriptures are silent as to the express time or manner of performance, if any such there be, no human authority has power to interfere in order to supply the supposed deficiency by making laws for the Church, nor can any thing more be required of Christians in such cases, but only that they *so* observe these commands and ordinances as will evidently answer the declared and obvious ends of their institution. Much less has any human authority power to impose new commands or ordinances upon the Church, which our Lord Jesus Christ has not enjoined. Nothing ought to be received into the faith or worship of the Church, or be made a term of communion among Christians, that is not as old as the New Testament.

"6. That although inferences and deductions from Scripture premises, when fairly inferred, may be truly called the doctrine of God's Holy Word, yet are they not formally binding upon the consciences of Christians further than they perceive the connection, and evidently see that they are so; for their faith must not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power and veracity of God. Therefore, no such deductions can be made terms of communion, but do properly belong to the after and progressive edification of the Church. Hence, it is evident that no such deduction or inferential truths ought to have any place in the Church's confession.

"7. That although doctrinal exhibitions of the great system of Divine truths and defensive testimonies, in opposition to prevailing errors, be highly expedient—and the more full and explicit they be for those purposes, the better—yet as these must be, in a great measure, the effect of human reasoning, and, of course, must contain many inferential truths, they ought not to be made terms of Christian communion, unless we suppose, what is contrary to fact, that none have a right to the communion of the Church but such as possess a very clear and decisive judgment, or are come to a very high degree of doctrinal information; whereas, the Church from the beginning did, and ever will, consist of little children and young men, as well as fathers.

"8. That as it is not necessary that persons should have a particular knowledge or distinct apprehension of all divinely revealed truths, in order to entitle them to a place in the Church; neither should they, for this purpose, be required to make a profession more extensive than their knowledge; but that, on the contrary, their having a due measure of Scriptural self-knowledge respecting their lost and perishing condition by nature and practice, and of the way of salvation through Jesus Christ, accompanied with a profession of their faith and obedience to him in all things, according to his Word, is all that is absolutely necessary to qualify them for admission into his Church.

"9. That all that are enabled through grace to make such a profession

and to manifest the reality of it in their tempers and conduct, should consider each other as the precious saints of God, should love each other as brethren, children of the same family and Father, temples of the same Spirit, members of the same body, subjects of the same grace, objects of the same Divine love, bought with the same price, and joint heirs of the same inheritance. Whom God hath thus joined together, no man should dare to put asunder.

"10. That division among Christians is a horrid evil, fraught with many evils. It is antichristian, as it destroys the visible unity of the body of Christ, as if he were divided against himself, excluding and excommunicating a part of himself. It is anti-Scriptural, as being strictly prohibited by his sovereign authority, a direct violation of his express command. It is anti-natural, as it excites Christians to contemn, to hate, and oppose one another, who are bound by the highest and most endearing obligations to love each other as brethren, even as Christ has loved them. In a word, it is productive of confusion and of every evil work.

"11. That (in some instances) a partial neglect of the expressly revealed will of God, and (in others) an assumed authority for making the approbation of human opinions and human inventions a term of communion, by introducing them into the constitution, faith, or worship of the Church, are, and have been, the immediate, obvious, and universally acknowledged causes of all the corruptions and divisions that ever have taken place in the Church of God.

"12. That all that is necessary to the highest state of perfection and purity of the Church upon earth is: First, that none be received as members but such as, having that due measure of Scriptural self-knowledge described above, do profess their faith in Christ and obedience to him in all things according to the Scriptures. Nor, secondly, that any be retained in her communion longer than they continue to manifest the reality of their profession by their temper and conduct. Thirdly, that her ministers, duly and Scripturally qualified, inculcate none other things than those very articles of faith and holiness expressly revealed and enjoined in the Word of God. Lastly, that, in all their administrations, they keep close by the observance of all Divine ordinances, after the example of the primitive Church, exhibited in the New Testament, without any additions whatsoever of human opinions or inventions of men.

"13. Lastly, that if any circumstantial, indispensably necessary to the observance of Divine ordinances, be not found upon the page of express revelation, such, and such only, as are absolutely necessary for this purpose, should be adopted under the title of human expedients, without any pretense to a more sacred origin, so that any subsequent alteration or difference in the observance of these things might produce no contention or division in the Church."

Starting with these principles, in little over sixty years the movement has developed into one of the most powerful and influential religious bodies in this country. An insignificant band at first, these Disciples, or Christians, now rank among the foremost religious organizations of the age. Their growth is really without a parallel; and, as they are just now passing an important crisis in their history, they present an interesting subject for study to all who wish to

understand the true idea of religious development and the causes which lead to permanent success.

It will readily be seen that the principles which they advocated were not only in harmony with the teachings of the New Testament, but were precisely what the people needed at the time they were announced. Men had begun to tire of a domineering clergy, who made religion to consist chiefly in either an unlettered superstition or a godless formalism. The plea which the Disciples made stripped the clergy of their usurped authority, and gave to the people again liberty of thought, liberty of speech, and the right of individual interpretation. The principles advocated soon broke the spell of mysticism which had so long hung over the subject of conversion, and gave the penitent sinner the privilege to come to Christ, and be saved upon the terms of the Gospel.

All this was as if a light had shone from heaven into the benighted souls of men. The movement rapidly gained strength in every part of the country where its claims were pressed; and to-day it may safely be said, that the principles of the "Declaration and Address," issued by the Campbells in 1809, have largely leavened all the religious bodies of this country. Hence, the influence of these principles must not be confined to the religious body known as the Disciples of Christ. Still, as this body has made the advocacy of these principles a specialty, we must look to it for the best practical demonstration as to results.

We have already intimated that the Disciples are just now going through a crisis in their history. They have fairly passed their formative period, and are now entering upon the period of organization and work. This is a very critical time with them. Important changes are never made without danger, and it remains yet to be seen whether the Disciples will be equal to the emergency in which they find themselves placed. During their formative period they worked, as was necessarily the case, without much regard to order, system, or co-operation. Every Church has not only been independent, in the ordinary congregational sense, but has carried the doctrine to such an extreme that all effective co-operation has simply been an impossibility. Whatever has been accomplished has been mainly through individual effort, or by the efforts of single Churches. Recently, however, there has been a growing feeling that

something more than this is needed in order to carry forward the work which has been so auspiciously begun. And whether this feeling be right or wrong, the very fact that it *exists* makes the old plan well-nigh fruitless in practical results. It is argued that the Churches have nearly all changed their methods of working in many things, and that these changes make it necessary that there shall be other changes, in order to secure the advantages of those already made. What seems now most to be needed is such an organization as will bring the Churches into active and permanent co-operation. It is believed by many that whatever individual effort may have accomplished in the past, it can not do the work of the future; and that, having arrived at the period of manhood, childish things should be put away, and a thorough organization effected that will enable the Churches, all along the line, to make an energetic forward movement for the overthrow of sin and the conversion of the world. Several efforts have been made in this direction, with only partial success. That which seemed to promise most is the plan of co-operation adopted at the General Convention held in Louisville, in the Autumn of 1869. But the work accomplished under that has not been equal to the public expectation. While some very important and valuable work has been done, it is already apparent that something else is required before an efficient co-operation of the Churches can be reached.

But before offering any suggestions with reference to the future, we deem it proper to look at some of the causes that have unfavorably influenced the present plan in its operations:

I. The plan has met with a persistent opposition from a number of brethren, who declare it to be wanting in Scriptural authority, and entirely opposed to the principles of the religious movement in which they are engaged. These objections have been urged with more or less ability, through several papers of considerable circulation, while a number of preachers have been outspoken in their opposition on the same grounds. Many of the Churches have been ready listeners to these special pleaders; and the result is, that only a portion of the Disciples have given the plan their hearty support. It is never very difficult to convince people that they ought not to do any thing. Opposition is a force so easily engendered that we need not be surprised if we sometimes find that our most cherished

projects have been roughly treated. Some men seem to have been born in the objective case; and it is quite useless to expect of such that they will ever be favorable to any thing. They seem to be living chiefly for the purpose of illustrating the meaning of the word *protest*. The plan for co-operation adopted at Louisville gave all this class of men a fine opportunity to come to the front. And they were by no means slow in making their appearance, and have been busily engaged ever since in trying to show what the plan *is not*. They tell us that it is *not* "the Lord's plan;" that it is *not* in harmony with the "original principles of the Reformation," etc. Now, it may be said that this class should have had little influence on the movement proposed. But these men are generally the most active and busy opponents any worthy movement has to meet, and *activity on the side of established custom is more than a thousand good arguments in favor of change.*

But there were some excellent brethren among the Disciples who heartily opposed the new co-operative system. They felt that it was virtually giving up the whole plea which the Disciples had made—a surrender of the principles for which they had so earnestly contended. With this class we confess to have had considerable sympathy. We know upon what specious reasoning they have been fed. Failing to distinguish between *principles* and *methods*, they supposed that a change of methods involved a change of principles. In other words, when it was proposed to change the *manner* of working, they supposed *the work itself* must necessarily be a different thing. Just here is the fallacy upon which rests that "harp of a thousand strings" whereon so many advocates of "the ancient order of things" have been playing for the last five or six years. These distinguished brethren fail to see that the Churches have changed their *methods* in almost every thing but missionary work. In the beginning, none of the Churches had pastors, or, if you prefer, stationed salaried preachers; now, this is regarded as quite the thing in almost every part of the land. In the beginning, the houses of worship, the hymn-books, the music, the Sunday-school interest, the educational interest, and, in fact, almost every thing connected with Church life and Church development, were as different from what we find these things to be now, as the old stage-coach is different from the steam-car. Have the Churches of the present

surrendered the *principles* of the past? We think not. We go farther. We believe it would be impossible to find an advocate of the general missionary plan who does not accept heartily every principle contained in the "Declaration and Address" issued in 1809. Why, then, is the cry of "unsoundness," "departure from the ancient order of things," "going over to the sects," etc., raised in reference to those who plead for more unity of action and more effectiveness in work? It has never been proved yet, so far as we have seen, that the "progressionists," as they are called, are less devoted to the *principles* of the Christian Church than those who style them thus in derision. If there is any falling away, we think it would not be difficult to show that this apostasy is chiefly confined to those who are insisting that questions of expediency shall be made tests of fellowship.

In order to have a proper conception of this whole matter, it ought to be remembered that, in the earlier days of the movement, the brethren were not much concerned about methods, and consequently gave very little attention to the *manner* of doing things. They stood little upon the *order* of working, but *worked*. They were specially interested in the *principles* which they had announced; and their chief effort was to get these before the world. Hence, some of the questions of order and co-operation that are now agitated among the Disciples were not even thought of in the beginning of their movement. There was no need to discuss these questions then. There was no emergency which called them up. Now they can not be ignored. To shut them out of the present would be just equal to going back fifty or sixty years. And this would be little less than an entire surrender of the plea which has been so earnestly made within the last half-century.

It is doubtful whether Mr. Campbell himself ever thought very seriously of many problems connected with Church organization and government. It is certain that at first he accepted, with slight modifications, the Haldane system. In later years, he was evidently in favor of a much closer organization than that which had grown up in the Scotch-Baptist mold. Still, his mind was chiefly occupied with other things. He was eliminating great principles, gathering materials which were afterward to be brought to bear upon the world through organized effort. The men of his day had their special

work to do; we now have ours to do. They sought for the truth, and found it. It is our duty now to take this truth, and, through the most efficient instrumentalities, bring it to bear upon the world. We can not repeat their work. In fact, there is no need of this. But we can *begin where they left off, and carry forward the work which they committed to our hands.* They brought the work through its formative period; we must now give it organization, and carry it forward to final triumphs.

There is certainly no ground for just opposition here. But this is the very ground upon which many have refused to co-operate under the present plan. True, this opposition has now largely spent its force. But the mischief has already been done. It is too late to rejoice over a fallen foe when we ourselves are mortally wounded. The opposition has largely died out, but the plan itself does not seem to be gathering much strength.

II. Another reason why the plan has not been successful is, the preachers and officers of the Churches have, for the most part, failed to do what was expected of them. Section 6, Article II, reads as follows:

“Each State shall be divided into districts of suitable limits by the State board; the messengers from the Churches of each district shall elect, at their annual conventions, a board and a secretary; and the business of each secretary shall be to visit all the Churches in his district, and, in co-operation with their own officers, induce them to contribute and send to the district treasurer money for the support of missions.”

The object of the whole plan is, of course, to reach the Churches; and it was thought that this could be accomplished in no way so well as through their own officers. Hence, each district secretary is required “to visit all the Churches in his district, and, *in co-operation with their own officers*, induce them to contribute,” etc. It will be seen by this provision, that the *officers stand between the district secretaries and the Churches*; and just here is where the practical difficulty is developed. The districts have been formed, and generally well organized; but the district secretaries have been unable, in a majority of cases, to secure the active co-operation of the Church officials. These officers do not keep the matter before the Churches; and, as the Churches do not act without this prompting, it necessarily follows that comparatively little can be accomplished.

We think that, with reference to this failure, the preachers are

largely to blame. It is useless to deny the fact that the preachers can generally carry their Churches with them in any worthy religious movement; but the difficulty is, in the present case, *they will not do it*. We do not mean to say that they will always find their Churches willing. We understand the selfishness of human nature too well to hope for any large benevolence from even Christian men who have been taught to believe, so far as missionary work is concerned, that charity begins at home, and even ends there. Still, we think that any faithful preacher may, in time, induce his Church to contribute regularly to the cause of missions.

We are not unmindful of the difficulties that lie in the way of preachers. Some of these are very serious, and may just as well be understood. Chief among these difficulties is the uncertain official status of a majority of the preachers among the Disciples. A few of those who are called pastors are elected elders in the Churches where they labor; but by far the greater portion are called from year to year, and have no official relations whatever. There is another class of preachers who have no local charge, but have a sort of roving commission to do itinerant work. These have no official relations anywhere, and are, consequently, powerless every-where to act for anybody but themselves. A curious problem it is to determine the exact status of these two classes of men. They are called "preachers," "pastors," and "evangelists;" but they are, in fact, officially, nondescripts—a sort of officer without official power.

It is not altogether strange that men, situated as these are, should be somewhat timid in urging upon the Churches the duty of a large benevolence. Each man feels that his own relations to his Church are of such a character as that he can not, or ought not, to be active in committing the Church to any movement where money is an important factor. Then, he has heard a thousand times that every Church is in itself a missionary society. This is a very convenient corner in which to hide, whenever he is hard-pressed concerning the duty of co-operative work. He will tell you that his Church is already doing as much as it can do; that it has to look after local interests, and has nothing to give to the support of unscriptural officials called secretaries. We are sorry to believe that frequently, with these men, "local interests" mean their own interests. They are afraid that money taken away from the Church is so

much taken away from them. We do not say that this feeling is to be severely condemned. It grows naturally out of the selfish system of things in which the preacher has been educated. Nevertheless, it is certainly not a very desirable state of things, and must be remedied before any very effective general co-operation can be secured.

Let us now pass from the preachers to the elders and deacons. From these we have a right to expect better things. Their official relations are not doubtful. Their positions are not subject to the same conditions as the preachers. They have official authority to do what the preachers can do only by arguments and motives. But these are frequently less inclined to co-operate with the district secretaries than the preachers are. And if they refuse, the only thing left for the secretary to do is to obtain such individual help as he may readily command. But this is a work that has to be done over and over again, and does not amount to much even when it is accomplished.

It may be said that the Churches would not give anyway. Doubtless, in a few instances, this is true; but *what are leaders for unless they can lead?* Why should men have the oversight of a Church when they do not direct any thing? We believe that, generally, the Churches would come up bravely to the work, if the officers would only do their duty.

If it should be said there is no remedy for this, then the whole plan of Church co-operation had as well be given up. It is useless to talk about any general missionary work to be supported by the Churches, if the Churches can not be reached. And, as they can not be successfully reached, except through their officary, it necessarily follows that if this officary can not be actively enlisted, it is simply certain that no plan, however perfect it may be in itself, can possibly succeed.

III. Another cause of failure is an obvious weakness in the plan itself. In the foregoing discussion we have assumed all the time that the plan is all right. But we can no longer conceal the fact that it contains one feature which, we were satisfied from the very first, would prove fatal to the whole system. Section 7, of Article II, reads as follows:

"Each Church, over and above the sums it may contribute for missionary work under its immediate control, shall give a pledge to pay annually, to its

district treasurer, a definite sum for other missionary work ; and one-half of such contributions may be under the control of the district boards for missionary work in the districts, the other half to be sent to the State board, to be divided equally between it and the general board for their respective works ; but this recommendation is not to be considered as precluding a different distribution of funds when the Church contributing shall so decide."

It will be seen that this section virtually leaves the distribution of all the money raised in the hands of those who contribute it ; and the result so far has been that very little goes to the State boards. Hence, these boards are powerless to meet the pressing calls for help which come up from all quarters. And, to make matters still worse, the State boards can send but little or nothing to the general board ; and, as this is dependent entirely upon an equal division of funds with the State boards, it is easy to see that the general board will not be blessed with a superabundance of means. All this difficulty came from trying to satisfy some extreme congregational tendencies. Several members of the committee that framed the section were strongly opposed to it as it now stands ; but their judgment was overruled, while experience has shown that the objections which they then urged were well grounded.

A little reflection ought to convince the most ardent advocate of extreme congregationalism that we can not make a distributing agent of a general fund out of every one who contributes to it. This at once defeats the objects of such a fund. The whole philosophy of co-operation is in gathering the small contributions, and putting them together, until the aggregate amount is sufficient to accomplish a work that could not be done by a single contribution. Hence, the very moment the respective Churches, or even the districts, retain *at home* all the money raised for missionary purposes, that moment does co-operation cease to be possible. Hence, any thing like a general system, with this feature in it, is simply out of the question.

This very difficulty has been in the way of the Disciples ever since they began to talk about co-operation. It is generally the straw that breaks the camel's back, because it is precisely the turning point between extreme congregationalism and such an organization of Churches as will enable them to work effectively together. Fear of ecclesiasticism has too long been the flaming sword to guard against a re-entrance of God's people into the Eden which they lost

through the apostasy of the Church. Ecclesiastical despotism is certainly a thing to be dreaded; but it is doubtful whether this is any worse than that violent independency that makes progress an epithet, and efficiency a crime.

Having now looked at some of the causes that have operated against the success of the general plan of co-operation, we come to ask the question, What must be done? We feel sure that no more important question than this has ever been propounded for the consideration of that body of religious people known as the Disciples of Christ. They have had, in many respects, a worthy history. Their past is full of glorious deeds, and the memory of a host of noble heroes, who once stood in the foremost of the battle, but have now gone to their reward, comes up to cheer us as we contemplate the present and the future. But what *has been* is of little value, unless what *is* shall be made secure. The Disciples have now reached a crisis; and it is worse than madness for them to shut their eyes to this fact. They can not remain long in the position that they now occupy. They must either go forward or backward, and the sooner they decide which they will do, the better it will be for them and the cause which they represent. That they can not succeed in the position in which they now stand, is simply certain. It would be far better to give up all attempts at systematic co-operation than try to press a system that is wholly impracticable. They have already gone too far to work on the old plan without going back, and yet they *have not gone far enough* to make the new successful. We will try to illustrate what we mean. The time was when the Churches made considerable progress without the aid of regular preaching. Now, the Churches that depend on the old plan are rapidly dying out. The reason of this is obvious to any reflecting mind. The two plans are largely antagonistic, because they introduce unfavorable contrasts; and it is, therefore, better to adopt either one or the other. While we do not believe in the old system, a contingency might arise in which it would be better to go back to this, than to have only about half the Churches adopt the new. We know it may be said that this half, working on the new plan, would do more than all together would on the old. This may be true, and we are inclined to think it is true; but it is because this new plan has in it the unmistakable elements of success. But suppose it was no more successful than

the other, then would it not be better to go back? Now, this is just what we mean by going back to the old plan of missionary work. If the new plan was unmistakably a success, then we would say, Hold on to it; but, as it is, unless something can be done, we prefer to go back where every Church worked in its own way, as best it could. We do not say that going backward is a thing to be seriously thought of; we present it only as an alternative. It is certainly not desirable; but it is better than to stand still: for this is certain death.

But should any one seriously think of accepting the alternative we have presented, it may be well for him to consider what is involved in it. In our view, it means to give up the struggle for a glorious triumph of the principles announced in the beginning of the movement. Every day has its own peculiar work to be done. Hence, while principles remain the same, methods must ever be changing. Just now Providence is opening up great opportunities for pushing forward the plea which the Disciples are making. But this work can not be successfully performed by the old methods. The country has changed, society has changed, and even physical things have changed; and, in view of all this, can any one hope to succeed with the methods of fifty years ago? Formerly the Churches could not have rapid intercommunication. They were largely isolated from each other, and this fact made it necessary for them to rely chiefly on independent action. Now things are very different, and with the different circumstances comes the necessity for a change in the plans of working.

But even allowing that to go backward is desirable, it may be seriously asked, Is it possible? We doubt whether very many have considered this question; and yet it is of primary importance in the present discussion. We can not go back into the past for methods *without accepting all that is there*. There are certain things associated in every epoch of history, and these can not be disassociated without extreme violence. For instance, we can not go back and assume the habits of the aborigines of this country without placing ourselves in their position. But this is impossible; hence, to assume their habits is impossible. Can the Disciples again place themselves in the position of the pioneers of their movement? Can they go back to the old meeting-houses, old hymn-books, uneducated and unpaid ministry, and a thousand other things that were prominent in their past

history? No man, in his senses, will believe such a thing; and yet all this must be done if they go back to their old methods of working. Change in one place involves change in another. This is the law of progress, and it can not be violated without dangerous consequences.

The only thing left, then, for the Disciples to do, is to go FORWARD. And this is precisely what they ought to do. They have already progressed beyond the possibility of working on the plans of the past, and yet they have too much of the past in the present to make their work effective. What is needed now is to cut entirely loose from obsolete things, and adopt such measures as will meet the exigencies of the present hour.

But it may be asked, What shall these measures be? This brings us to the vital point; and just here several answers are suggested:

1. Throw aside all the plans that have been tried, and at once form such an organization of the Churches and ministry as will be strong enough to do whatever is needful to be done. This is suggested by the many resolutions of the past that have been *great on paper*, but could never be executed. Men get tired of being responsible for a work when they have no authority by which they can possibly make it a success.

2. It might help matters very much if such an organization of the preachers only was effected as would bring them frequently together in counsel, and solemnly pledge them to the support of whatever measures are needful for the success of missionary work. This would overcome one of the difficulties that has been prominent in the way of the present plan. We think that such an organization of the preachers would be beneficial in many ways, but it would not sufficiently meet the case before us.

3. We will now briefly present what we believe to be the true idea. We do not propose any different plan from the one on trial. We believe that this is all that is needed, at least for the present. This, we think, would succeed, with the following modifications and suggestions:

First. Let section 7, of Article II, be changed so as to require that all money raised for missionary purposes shall be sent to the respective State boards, instead of allowing it to be disbursed according to the notion of the contributor. This will enable the boards to establish missions in the most important places, and at the

same time leave them something to send to the general board. The general board can then have the means to establish foreign missions—a work that ought to be at once energetically begun, if the Disciples would lay any claim to being a missionary people.

The change proposed would remedy the weak point in the plan which we have already noticed. It would entirely do away with the idea that every contributor can be his own missionary society; and it would, at the same time, greatly strengthen the hands of those who have been appointed to superintend the work. Every contribution would be subject to the unembarrassed direction of the respective boards. This is precisely what should be, and would scarcely fail to give greater efficiency to the plan.

To assist in solving this difficulty, it might be well to do away with the district boards entirely. Many reasons could be given why this is desirable; but we can not state them now. It is sufficient to say that the State boards ought to have direct connection with the Churches. But whether the districts should be abolished or not, it is certain that the money should be disbursed by the State boards. We understand well enough how this proposition will be received in certain quarters. We know that some brethren will regard it as a fearful sin against the freedom of the Churches to deny them the privilege of saying where their money shall be used. But to listen to these men any longer is to compromise success with the unreasonable demands of those who have already too long illustrated the fable of the "dog in the manger," by not eating themselves nor letting any one else eat.

Second. Let the plan, as thus modified, be *formally presented to all the Churches for their adoption*, with the distinct understanding that such adoption fully commits the Churches to its hearty support, and binds them to a faithful observance of all its provisions. Let it be understood, also, that every Church coming into the co-operation shall be held responsible to do its full share in bearing the burdens, whatever they may be, and let *only such Churches as will do this have representation in the conventions.*

This is the only way in which the Churches can be committed to the work. Heretofore they have not felt much responsibility in the matter. They have sent delegates or not, money or not, to the conventions, just as they felt inclined. Having assumed no responsibility,

they have generally acted with great indifference. It is useless to say that the plan was adopted by the respective State conventions, and therefore the Churches are committed to it, when, perhaps, not more than one-third of the Churches were represented in these conventions; and even those that were represented did not feel bound by the action of their delegates. What is needed is to bring the matter before *each Church*, and have it decided *by a vote* as to whether the Church will co-operate or not. An affirmative action will place the Church in the co-operation, entitle it to representation, and commit it to the action of the conventions. Churches voting in the negative *must remain out*, and work as best they can in their own way, until they shall reverse their decision. This, we think, is fair for all. It gives every one the right of choice, but thoroughly binds those to the provisions of the plan who formally agree to work under it. In this way unity and strength are secured; the Churches are reached without any difficulty, while the various boards and officers will have power to carry out the resolutions of the conventions.

Third, and finally. So soon as these changes are made, let discussions about plans cease, and let earnest work begin. The Disciples have spent twenty-five years in considering the plan of general co-operation. This consideration was doubtless necessary; but it has, in some respects, greatly retarded their work. The time has come when they ought to have something settled with regard to this matter, and if they can not settle any thing, they had better stop the discussion at once, and give up the whole case as hopeless. Organization is certainly the normal state of the Church, but active work is essential to its life. Almost any thing is better than the present uncertainty. What is needed is a little brave *doing*. There has been brave *talk* long enough. If the days of babyhood are passed, let the Disciples put away their playthings, and assume the responsibilities of a true manhood. We think the time for decisive action has come. No matter what the result may be, *something must be done*. True, there may be danger ahead. There is danger in every thing. But the worst danger now is to hesitate. To go backward is impossible; to stand still is eternal disgrace; to go forward has at least the promise of victory, with all the inspirations of a glorious contest. Let every faithful Disciple of Christ at once determine as to where the future shall find him.

II.—THE BAPTISM IN THE HOLY SPIRIT.

THERE exists in the religious world a great diversity of opinion as to the real import of the Scriptural phrase, "Baptized in the Holy Spirit." Many have adopted the notion that this expression applies *exclusively* to the two cases of the giving of the Spirit, or Pentecost, to Jews; and, at the house of Cornelius, to Gentiles. They seem to think there was, on these two occasions, a special and peculiar "operation" of the Spirit, which was properly termed a "baptism," and which was wanting in all other cases. Though, perhaps, not entirely agreed among themselves as to the nature of this "operation," they generally agree to group together the miraculous manifestations attending those two cases, and expatiate upon them as in some way constituting or indicating a spiritual baptism, eminently special, distinctive, and real.

There are others who hold that the miraculous accompaniments present at the first descent of the Spirit upon Jews and Gentiles, while entirely appropriate to these occasions, did not constitute what could be called, in any sense, a baptism in the Spirit, but are entirely separable and distinguishable from this; which, in their view was, and is, simply the *impartation of the Holy Spirit*—the promised "gift of the Holy Spirit" to all believers. This view was presented in my recent work on the "Office of the Holy Spirit;" and, although no one has attempted to invalidate any of the evidences of its truth, there are some who seem as yet unable to appreciate them, and who continue to adhere as yet to the opposite notion. I have thought it expedient, therefore, to enter more fully into this particular topic, and to endeavor to show to the satisfaction of all how incompatible with the teaching of Scripture the restricted notion above given really is, and how perfectly the latter view of the matter accords with the inspired Word.

Since the difference between the two views mentioned has respect merely to the application of a particular phrase, it is not, *in itself*, a matter of very much importance. But as it serves to maintain an unnecessary disagreement, and involves some serious misapprehensions

and misapplications of Scripture, it seems to me desirable to have the question settled. I feel well assured that the error involved has greatly tended to check religious progress, and that its correction will not only promote harmony of thought and feeling among those who take the Bible as their only guide, but enable them to take better and more enlarged views of the whole subject of the work of the Holy Spirit in the salvation of men.

If I have correctly understood those who confine "baptism in the Spirit" to the two cases of Pentecost and Cornelius's household, they regard these as cases of *real* and *literal* spiritual baptism. There was, they think, a real and actual immersion; and while some appeal to the fact that a sound of a mighty, rushing wind *filled* all the house where the disciples were sitting, others seek a more decisive proof in the statement that these disciples themselves "were all *filled* with the Holy Spirit, and began to speak with other tongues," etc. They supposed that the human spirit was thus literally immersed or bathed, so to speak, in the Divine Spirit, and that hence it is justly styled a baptism. It is, I confess, a little difficult to comprehend what they really consider either the essence or the *differentia* of the baptism in question; but, so far as I have been able to gather their meaning, they do not consider the baptism here as figurative, but in a *spiritual* sense, as real—an actual immersion in the Spirit, which, they claim, is indicated by the terms to which they appeal. If, after all, it should appear that they regard the baptism here as only figurative, this would lessen considerably the amount of discrepancy which I have supposed to exist; and, as this whole matter must, I perceive, become a subject of discussion, it is high time there should be an *eclaircissement* in regard to this particular.

To the views, then, which I understand to be advocated, I will now proceed to offer some objections which, I think, ought to be met and fairly set aside before the doctrine in question can be admitted in a religious reformation, which professes to receive only what the Scriptures *actually teach*. This view, I fancy, has become somewhat popular, because it has seemed to afford a ready argument against certain sectarian views of "spiritual operations." But the Word of God affords plenty of legitimate weapons for the defense of truth, and it is quite unnecessary to resort to those which do not belong to the armory of heaven; but which, having been

caught up hastily in the heat of the conflict, are, for this very reason, to be regarded with suspicion.

1. The first objection is one which, whether answered or not, may at least serve to develop what is meant by a "baptism in the Spirit." It is this: A baptism, in the New Testament sense, implies not only an *immersion*, but an *emersion*. It requires *both* to constitute a baptism; for in it the individual is both *buried* in the element, and *raised* out of it again. Now, admitting, for the sake of argument, that the person "filled with the Spirit" is *really* immersed in the Spirit, the advocates of this view have no provision for the subsequent *emersion*. According to Scripture, there could be no *emersion*; for those baptized in the Spirit were to continue to "walk in the Spirit," and "live in the Spirit." Hence, upon this showing, there was no literal baptism in the case, since the word is used in only a part of its signification.

2. There is, however, an incongruous and unauthorized jumbling together of the material and the spiritual in these notions, that the being "filled with the Spirit" constituted an immersion, or that this may be found in the fact that the "sound of a mighty, rushing wind" filled the apartment where the disciples were sitting. On the same occasion it was said of the disciples, "These men are full of new wine;" but this does not mean that they had been immersed in wine, but merely that they were under its power or influence.

The visible and sensible tokens attending the descent of the Paraclete, served merely to introduce appropriately that Divine presence which was destined for the hearts of men, and which was to reveal there a kingdom which "came not with observation," but was "righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Spirit." The simple truth is, that a *literal* "baptism in the Spirit," on this occasion, can not be made out at all; that such a thing is, from the very nature of the case, impossible; and that the expression must here, from necessity, be understood in a figurative or metaphorical sense.

3. Furthermore, if we admit that to be "filled with the Spirit" is to be literally "baptized in the Spirit," it will follow that this baptism is designed for all Christians; for they are all exhorted to be "filled with the Spirit." (Eph. v, 18.) Moreover, we find this expressly declared to have been the fact in various other cases than that of Pentecost. (See Acts iv, 31; ix, 17; xiii, 9; etc.) Again, if

the *direct* impartation be urged as the criterion of this alleged baptism, we have this immediateness in Acts iv, 31. Or if the supernatural accompaniments be relied upon as proof, we have these also in Acts iv, 31, where we are told that the "place was shaken where they were assembled," as well as in Acts vii, 55; viii, 17, 18; ix, 18; xix, 6, where miracle as well as the gift of tongues and of prophecy attended the gift of the Spirit. In fact, if any one or all of the accompanying circumstances usually adduced be accepted as proof of a literal baptism, then all the cases to which I have referred must be admitted to be truly baptisms for the same or similar reasons. To attempt to exclude these, and to confine the application of the phrase to the disciples on Pentecost and at Cornelius's house, is therefore clearly inconsistent with a fair and just interpretation of the Word of God.

4. While it is admitted that what is called a baptism in the Spirit took place on Pentecost and at Cornelius's house, there is no Scripture authority for the proposition that these were the only cases of this baptism. If those who adhere to this view, then, believe it, they do so, not from Scripture evidence, but from their own erroneous inferential reasonings. Had these been the only cases of an occurrence so remarkable, it is quite impossible to suppose that there would not be abundant testimony to the fact. Can any one imagine that the few disciples who, according to this idea, received this baptism would not have been thereby marked out and distinguished from all others? It is altogether incredible that the New Testament would have been silent as to the superior claims to consideration of those who *alone*, among the multitude of disciples, had received "the baptism of the Holy Spirit." Were this true, it is impossible that a reference to a distinction so marked should be wanting. But there is absolutely not the slightest trace of any discrimination in regard to these persons, nor the least allusion to the supposed fact that they had been distinguished and honored above all others by a spiritual "baptism." It is scarcely necessary to add that a distinction so invidious could have no place in an institution like Christianity, which, apart from mere official qualifications, establishes among all the most perfect equality as to privileges and blessings. Had it been otherwise, Paul's opponents, when they pronounced his "bodily presence weak" and his "speech contemptible,"

might have added that he had not been present on Pentecost or at Cornelius's house, and had therefore never been blessed with the "baptism of the Holy Spirit." How absurd the hypothesis that a few of the Gentiles at Cornelius's house received the "baptism of the Spirit," and yet that PAUL, the great apostle of the Gentiles, was left destitute of it! He had only received the Spirit through the laying on of hands! Ananias had put his hands on him, "that he might receive his sight and be filled with the Holy Spirit." Yet we are assured that Paul came "behind in no gift," and that it was he who communicated the Holy Spirit to the disciples at Ephesus, (Acts xix, 6,) upon which, as we are told, "they spake with tongues and prophesied"—even as those "baptized" on the day of Pentecost!

These are some of the objections and difficulties which readily present themselves in regard to the notion that the "baptism of the Spirit" was restricted to the disciples on Pentecost and at Cornelius's house. There are others still more serious. But as my purpose is not so much to object as to instruct, I shall allow these to suggest themselves, as I proceed to show the true meaning of the "baptism in the Spirit." It will then be easily seen that the notion in question is contrary to the plain and direct teaching of the Scriptures.

The advocates of the proposition that what is called a "baptism in the Spirit" was *confined* to the two cases of Pentecost and Cornelius's household have never attempted to prove this by any *direct* Scripture evidences. In this they are excusable, however, as the Scriptures do not furnish any. But they are not equally justified in their special pleading, and endeavors to make out a case by dint of rhetoric and ingenious glosses upon passages unfavorable to their views. There is thus evinced a state of mind unfavorable to the perception of truth, and far from that child-like disposition which commits itself unreservedly to the guidance of God's Word. That Word may be made to mean any thing by the help of paraphrases, supplements, and plausible perversions; but I trust the day is far distant when lovers of truth will submit to such a style of interpretation, or cease to respect that faithful and true axiom, "The Scriptures mean what they say."

In this expression it is implied that what the Scriptures say literally is to be understood literally, and that what they say

figuratively is to be understood figuratively. In a word, it means that the Bible is to be interpreted according to the rules of language, just as other books are; and that no one is at liberty to change or supplement its teachings. It requires, indeed, sometimes not only much natural acuteness, but very careful discrimination, to determine what is literal and what is figurative. The difficulty here is enhanced by the nature of the subjects treated in the Bible—a volume which, moreover, abounds in figurative language more than any book in the world; and this is especially true of the sayings of Christ, who employed similitudes and metaphors more than any teacher who has ever appeared. It is precisely for want of this unbiased and just discrimination, that so many Scripture figures are mistaken for literal truths, and so many literal truths incorrectly regarded as mere shadowy, rhetorical figures. It was to the former error that the simple-minded, no less than the prejudiced, auditors of Christ seem to have been peculiarly liable. When he said to his disciples, "Beware of the leaven of the Pharisees," they supposed him to refer to the literal bread they had forgotten to provide; and he reproved them for their want of faith and of spiritual discernment, saying, "How is it that ye do not understand that I spake it not unto you concerning bread?" So, when he said to the woman of Samaria, "Whosoever drinketh of this water shall thirst again; but whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him, shall never thirst," she replied, "Sir, give me this water that I thirst not, neither come hither to draw." (John iv, 14, 15.) Again, when his disciples prayed him to eat, he said: "I have meat to eat that ye know not of. Therefore said the disciples one to another, Hath any man brought him aught to eat? Jesus saith unto them, My meat is to do the will of him that sent me, and to finish his work." The Jews murmured when he said: "I am the living bread that came down from heaven. The bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world." They said, "How can this man give us his flesh to eat?" Upon his saying to the disciples, "Lazarus sleepeth;" they reply, "Lord, if he sleep, he shall do well." Then he said to them *plainly*, "Lazarus is dead." But it is unnecessary to multiply examples of an error so common, and so often reproved and corrected in the Scriptures, that we may well say to many modern expounders as Christ said to the disciples, "How is it that ye do not yet understand?"

The popular error in regard to the "baptism in the Spirit" is of a nature precisely similar to the mistakes to which I have just referred. *The metaphorical use of a word is mistaken for its literal use.* Men, therefore, strain and exaggerate every circumstance connected with the first giving of the Spirit, in vain endeavors to make out a literal spiritual baptism, and fail to realize, amidst the wanderings of their fancy, the simple truth actually revealed. This, I think, will be abundantly evident from various considerations.

1. *The obvious impossibility of a literal baptism in the Holy Spirit.* This is just as inconceivable as that the Spirit of God should be "poured out" literally, or that men should drink of that Spirit as they drink water. As the known or familiar is used to communicate ideas of the unknown, and the material to suggest and shadow forth the spiritual, all such expressions must be at once recognized as analogical and metaphorical—corporeal imagery, adumbrating to man's spiritual apprehension that which may be realized only, subjectively, by a spirit itself intangible and invisible.

2. *The plainly recorded origin of the expression under consideration.* In sending John to baptize in water, God revealed to him that the illustrious ONE, whom he was thus to introduce to Israel, would baptize in the Holy Spirit. He furthermore informed him that the individual to whom this lofty function was assigned would be designated by the visible descent of the Spirit upon him. Hence, prior to this identification, John thus announced to the Jews the advent of this greater BAPTIST, and the higher character of the baptism which he was to administer, and which is here clearly set forth as his distinguishing official characteristic, quite as much as baptizing in water was that of John. "I, indeed, baptize you in water; but he that cometh after me is mightier than I: he will baptize you in the Holy Spirit." The baptism in water, then, is here made the basis of comparison. This baptism was literal, visible, real, and could hence be fitly made to adumbrate and represent the invisible spiritual ministration which belonged to Christ. There was that in the literal which could give a vivid conception of the higher spiritual subjection which Christ came to establish; and it is hence employed for this purpose, being one of the plainest metaphors in the Bible. Christ, accordingly, when he himself subsequently employs it, makes the same direct reference to John's baptism as the basis of

comparison and key of interpretation. "Await at Jerusalem," said he, "the promise of the Father; for John truly baptized in *water*, but ye shall be baptized in the *Holy Spirit*, not many days hence." (Acts i, 5.) In quoting our Savior's words, Peter makes again the same reference to John's baptism (Acts xi, 16); and, if omitted by Paul (1 Cor. xii, 13), it is simply because the metaphor had then become familiar, and because it is here immediately associated with another one, which sufficiently indicated the tropical character of the sentence. "In one Spirit," said he, "we are all baptized into one body, and have all been made to drink of one Spirit"—the first metaphor expressing the impartation of the Spirit on God's part; the second indicating its reception (the drinking of this water of life) on the part of man; and both together implying, simply and unfiguratively, the gift of the Holy Spirit to believers.

3. The clearest proof, however, of the metaphorical character of the phrase "baptism in the Spirit," is afforded by the fact that *this expression is repeatedly interpreted and replaced by the plain literal statement that the Spirit was given or received*. It is used interchangeably with phrases expressing simply the giving or impartation of the Spirit, and is thus clearly shown to signify no more than is embraced in these literal declarations. Thus Peter, in Acts ii, referring to the Pentecostal baptism in the Spirit, says: "THIS is that spoken by the prophet Joel: I will *pour out* of my Spirit upon all flesh," etc. "Christ," continued he, "having received of the Father the *promise* of the Holy Spirit, has *shed forth* this which ye now see and hear." And when those convicted inquired what they should do, he replied: "Repent, and be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and you shall receive *the gift of the Holy Spirit*: for the *promise* is to you and to your children," etc. Here, all that is comprehended in the glowing language of Joel is simply ascribed to the impartation of that *promised* Spirit which Christ had received; and, in conclusion, the penitents are assured that they, too, upon obedience, should receive "*the gift of the Holy Spirit*;" for, said he, the *promise* is to you and to your children, etc. Here the entire *promise*, with all its Oriental imagery, is reduced to the simple and literal statement, "You shall receive *the gift of the Holy Spirit*." There was no discount or rebate to be deducted from the essential fact. Whatever the *promise* was, whatever the *baptism*

in the Spirit was, whatever the effect of the *pouring out* of the Spirit was, all was here clearly comprehended in the declaration, "You shall receive the gift of the Holy Spirit."

When we turn, now, to the first impartation of the Spirit to the Gentiles, we find it written that "the Holy Spirit *fell* on all them which heard the Word;" that "on the Gentiles also was *poured out* the gift of the Holy Spirit;" in evidence of which they spoke with tongues, and magnified God as did the Jews on Pentecost. And Peter said, "Can any man forbid water, that these should not be baptized who have *received the Holy Spirit* as well as we?" Here the Spirit is represented as *falling* on them, as being *poured out*, with similar supernatural accompaniments as on Pentecost; but all this, when reduced to the simplest terms, though embodying the same essential fact, is, in the language of Peter, "They have *received the Holy Spirit as well as we*." There had been in the baptism in the Spirit on Pentecost nothing more than a *reception* or *impartation* of the Spirit, with certain accompanying evidences then appropriate. There was nothing more in the spiritual *baptism* here, as Peter himself further declares in rehearsing the matter, and referring directly to the words of Christ: "John baptized in water, but ye shall be baptized in the Holy Spirit." "Forasmuch, then," said he, "as God gave them *the like gift* as he did unto us who believed on the Lord Jesus Christ, what was I that I could withstand God?" The "*baptism*" here, is simply resolved into "*the like gift*;" and Peter is, at the same time, careful to state the ground or principle on which it was bestowed; namely, "belief on the Lord Jesus Christ"—a principle free to all; the very enunciation of which, in such a connection, shows that this "like gift" was universal, or coextensive with that belief in Christ, which was the only prescribed condition essential to its bestowal.

We have thus, on Pentecost, the foretold "*baptism*," and the "*out-pouring*" of the Spirit equivalent to the "*promise*;" and we have Peter's declaration that the "*gift of the Holy Spirit*" was the "*promise*." As things equal to the same are equal to one another, the expressions, "*baptized in the Holy Spirit*," and "*gift of the Holy Spirit*," must be, hence, precisely equipollent. In Cornelius's case, the evidence is equally plain. "The Holy Spirit *fell* on all who heard." "These," said Peter, "have *received the Holy Spirit* as well

as we;" and all this is otherwise stated thus: "On the Gentiles, also, was poured out *the gift of the Holy Spirit*." In rehearsing the matter, Peter explains the "*baptism in the Holy Spirit*" foretold by Christ, as simply giving the "*like gift*" as unto the Jews who had believed; and in Acts xv, 8, he styles it, "giving them the Holy Spirit, even as he did unto us." All these declarations are thus shown to be precisely equivalent to each other, and to mean exactly what Peter meant when he announced to obedient believers, on Pentecost, that they should receive "*the gift of the Holy Spirit*."

There is often occasion to verify the saying of Hobbes, that "words are the *counters* of wise men, but the *money* of fools." In no case does this oftener occur than when abstract terms are supposed to have some real thing in nature corresponding to them; or where it is imagined that comparisons and metaphors must, in all respects, have their exact counterpart in the subjects they are used to illustrate. As this last is the blunder with which I have here to do, I would observe that agreement is but rarely designed between a comparison or a metaphor and the thing it illustrates, except in *one single point*. To go beyond this is, in many cases, to consume, as it were, the manuscript in the lamp which was intended to illuminate it; or to crush in our embrace the life-like portrait which presents but a semblance to the eye, in the vain endeavor to realize in *it* the substantial form of the one we love. In this respect, then, the utmost caution is to be observed while we are engaged in the study of the Scriptures, if we would obtain a true knowledge of the treasures they contain. They are simply a revelation in *words*. These are incapable of transcending their proper functions. They can merely reveal to us things, but they can not actualize these for us, or become themselves lawfully the substitutes for things. On the contrary, if thus misapplied, instead of enlarging our vision, they serve but to enwrap the soul in darkness. When the dervise, in the Arabian tale, gave to the youth the box of magic ointment, he informed him that if he would rub a little of it upon his eyes he would be at once enabled to see all the gold and precious jewels contained within the bosom of the earth; but at the same time warned him not to apply it a second time. Upon employing it as directed, the youth was so enchanted with the view of the vast riches and gorgeous gems which the earth revealed, that he became filled with

covetousness, and began to think that if *one* application enabled him to *see* these treasures, a *second* one might possibly place them in his *possession*. He, accordingly, again applied the ointment, and instantly became *blind*.

It has been made evident, I trust, that the expression "baptism in the Spirit" is metaphorical, and that it means nothing more than an impartation of the Spirit. The figure can never go beyond the fact; and the fact is never to be explained by the figure, but the figure by the fact. It has been shown that the literal fact is, "the gift of the Spirit;" and the figure, whatever it may be—a "pouring out," a "drinking," or a "baptism"—can never transcend or embrace more than the simple fact itself, however vivid a conception it may give of that fact contemplated in a particular point of view. The question, then, naturally arises, In what respect does a baptism in water represent "the gift of the Spirit?" This is called a baptism; and must be, in some sense, a baptism. That is to say, it must, in some respect, so resemble a baptism in water as to justify its being styled, metaphorically, a baptism. It must have in it one or more of the features of a baptism in order to merit such a designation.

The answer to this is extremely easy. It is obvious that the most striking characteristic of a literal baptism is the *overwhelming*, the *overmastering* of the baptized person by the element in which he is baptized. He is submerged in it, overpowered by it, and brought under its *control*. It is this idea that is always involved in the common metaphorical use of the word baptism, as representing, in some sort, an immersion. Christ himself thus employs the term when he says, "I have a baptism to undergo;" and when he tells the sons of Zebedee, "Ye shall indeed drink of my cup, and be baptized with the baptism that I am baptized with" (Matt. xx, 23); referring to those sufferings which both he himself and his disciples were destined to experience. These sufferings, as overwhelming, subduing, and overpowering, even unto death, were fitly compared to a "baptism" in this one particular, in which alone baptism could represent them. It was precisely so in respect to the Spirit. Its impartation implied the immediate subjection of the receiver to its control. It was to assume the mastery of the person; to govern the thoughts, the words, the life; to rule in the heart; and, in short, to subordinate to itself the entire nature of the individual. Hence, the believer

is said to be "in" or "under the Spirit," to "walk in the Spirit," to "live in the Spirit." He is expected to yield himself up to its influence and its guidance in all respects; and there could not be, therefore, a more appropriate or expressive figure employed to denote this than that of a baptism.

It is just here that a moment's attention should be given to the error of those who imagine that the "baptism in the Spirit" consisted, somehow, in the miraculous gifts communicated. They fail to perceive that these were mere evidences of the Spirit's presence, mere temporary manifestations required in the then existing condition of the Church and of the world, and that while given by the Spirit, they did not and could not constitute the "gift of the Spirit" himself. This existed independently of any and every sort of miraculous manifestation, so that the individual who could simply call Jesus Lord in sincerity, gave sufficient evidence of possessing the Holy Spirit, and might be as completely under the control and guidance of that Spirit as one who had the most showy miraculous powers. The idea of any one being baptized in a spiritual gift or in spiritual gifts, is not only absurd in itself, but quite contrary to Scripture teaching. To speak of one being baptized in a "gift of tongues," immersed in an interpretation of tongues, overwhelmed in a gift of miracles, would be sufficiently ridiculous. The idea of being overwhelmed or overmastered, inseparable from that of a baptism, could have no place or application whatever in respect to the special charisms or spiritual gifts in the Church. It would be plainly inconsistent, indeed, with what is revealed concerning them; namely, that the person who had a spiritual gift simply possessed it, but was not possessed by it; that it was entirely under his control, and not he subjected to it. "The spirits of the prophets" were "subject to the prophets;" the different gifts were to be exercised according to the judgment of those who possessed them, under apostolic guidance. Revelations could be suspended or repressed; the spirit could be "quenched;" the "spiritual gift" could be "neglected." (1 Cor. xiv, 27, 28; 1 Tim. iv, 14; etc.) The idea of a baptism, hence, could not at all be realized in such gifts; but it can at once be recognized in the impartation of the Spirit himself—in the fact that the believer who received the Spirit was at once placed under its guidance, and subjected wholly to its government. There is in this point, and in no

other, a sufficient resemblance between a baptism in water and the impartation of the Spirit to sanction the metaphor of a "baptism in the Spirit." (See "Office of the Spirit," pp. 116-124.)

Were it possible to suppose, even upon plausible reasonings, that the impartation of spiritual gifts constituted this baptism, it would be necessary to extend it far beyond the two cases to which it is attempted to confine it. For spiritual gifts continued to be imparted to the Church, and exercised in it, until some time in the second century. Paul exhorts the Corinthians to "covet earnestly the best gifts;" and if these could be considered a "baptism," then there must have been *two* baptisms in the Church—one in Spirit and one in water. But Paul expressly tells the Ephesians that there was but "*one* baptism"—one literal and real baptism—the baptism in water. The impartation of spiritual gifts, then, was not, in those days, considered a baptism; and that which was really so termed the gift of the Spirit, is thus also shown to have been such only in a metaphorical, and not in any literal sense.

The fact that, in Scripture, the "baptism in the Spirit" is used interchangeably with the "gift of the Spirit" bestowed upon all, shows at once that all believers are alike baptized in the Holy Spirit. It is incorrect teaching, then, for any one to attempt to show that the "baptism in the Spirit" was restricted to the two occasions of Pentecost and Cornelius's household. It is an attempt to establish a distinction where there is no essential difference; and to introduce into the Scriptures a proposition which they neither contain nor justify. They afford, on the contrary, the clearest evidence that the "baptism of the Spirit" was for all believers; and, hence, the expression may be as appropriately used now, in the same metaphorical sense, as in the days of primitive Christianity. It were, indeed, a happy thing if all its modern professors experienced this "baptism" in its true sense; if all would "ask that it might be given, would seek that they might find, would knock that it might be opened to them." It would be a happy day both for the Church and for the world, if every believer were indeed fully under the control of that blessed Spirit promised to all that are afar off—"even as many as the Lord our God shall call." We should see then manifested the fruits of righteousness in the life, and a complete and unreserved submission to the teaching of the Holy Spirit in the Sacred Scriptures.

Among other evidences to show that the "baptism in the Spirit," so-called, was, in primitive times, common to all believers, may be adduced,—

1. The fact that an inspired apostle, in referring to the cases on Pentecost and at Cornelius's household, makes no allusion to any essential difference between these and ordinary cases of the impartation of the Spirit. Thus, when Peter addressed the convention at Jerusalem, he said: "Men and brethren, ye know how that a good while ago God made choice among us, that Gentiles by my mouth should hear the word of the Gospel, and believe. And God, which knoweth the hearts, bare them witness, giving them the Holy Spirit, even as he did unto us; and put no difference between us and them, purifying their hearts by faith." (Acts xv, 7-9.) When these words, and the circumstances under which they were spoken, are considered, they must, in fairness, be considered as decisive of the question. They could never have been uttered if the disciples on Pentecost and at Cornelius's had *alone* received the "baptism of the Spirit," as this is often understood. So utterly foreign to Peter's mind was such a notion, that he does not even distinguish the particular case of Cornelius's household. He merges it at once in the general term, "the Gentiles." He takes the few assembled in the house of Cornelius as the representatives of all the Gentile nations, and embraces these all as occupying the same ground—all alike admitted to equal privileges through the hearing of faith, and all alike receiving the Holy Spirit as did the Jews. He says, expressly, that "God put no difference between us and them, purifying their hearts by faith." There was no difference either in the privileges or blessings conferred, or in the common principle of faith through which all hearts were alike purified and prepared for the reception of the Spirit. "He gave them," says he, "the Holy Spirit, even as he did unto us, and put no difference between us and them."

Let the amplitude of the pronoun "us" be considered in its application here, and there can be no rational doubt as to the absolute identity of the gift bestowed upon all believers. The assembly addressed by Peter, at Jerusalem, was composed of Jewish converts—of the apostles and elders, and of the Church at Jerusalem. We are told it consisted of a "multitude." (Verse 12.) PAUL also was there; and when Peter uses the pronoun "us," he necessarily includes all

the Jewish brethren assembled to consider the requirements to be made of the Gentiles. Now, it is not probable that *twenty* individuals of that large assembly had been numbered with the one hundred and twenty disciples who, on Pentecost, were "baptized in the Holy Spirit." Paul had not been there; the great multitude included in "us," had not been there; yet Peter here affirms of all a perfect identity as to the gift bestowed. He gave to "the Gentiles," said he, "the Holy Spirit, even as he did unto us, and put no difference between us and them." Hence, if Peter had been "baptized in the Holy Spirit," so had been Paul and all the rest who may have received the Spirit through the laying on of hands, and the difference in the *mode* of impartation in these cases did not indicate or create the slightest difference as to that which was imparted.

The difference in the mode of giving originated in the necessity of the case. It was necessary that the Holy Spirit should be given in the first instance *directly*, without any human intermediation. This Divine gift was required for the enlightenment and vivification of the Church, which, without its aid, could neither know nor accomplish its duties. It was necessary, also, that this gift should be imparted *directly* to the first Gentile believers, in order to convince the Jews, blinded by their prejudices, that God had equally accepted the Gentiles. The only difference between these two cases and others consisted in the *mode* of giving. In these, it was direct; in others through the laying on of hands, except Acts iv, 31, and individual cases outside of the immediate field of apostolic labor. As to the gift itself, it was the same always. The *mode* of giving, which could be in no sense a baptism, differed as circumstances required. It is clearly evident, therefore, that there was nothing to distinguish, as to the actual and essential fact, the cases of Pentecost and Cornelius's household from any other cases of the impartation of the Spirit. Had there been, Peter could never have used the above language, and have not only failed to make a distinction where there was really a difference, but have positively affirmed the absence of any difference. He could not have said this, had there been a "baptism in the Spirit" in some cases, and no "baptism in the Spirit" in other cases.

2. Paul positively affirms the fact in 1 Cor. xii, 13, where he says, "In one Spirit are we all baptized into one body." When these words are taken in their strict grammatical relations, they can

have no other meaning. Some, I am aware, think *water-baptism* referred to here, and endeavor to get rid of the emphatic first clause, either by asserting "Spirit" here to be the human spirit, or by imagining an ellipsis, and adding a supplement, so as to make the passage read: "By the direction of one Spirit," etc. Here it is necessary also to take the proposition *ἐν* instrumentally, and as equivalent to *διὰ*—a sense which it seldom bears. It may be so rendered possibly in Gal. i, 6; Eph. ii, 13; vi, 14; 1 Thess. iv, 18; but even here the action of the verbs in construction may be conceived as existing *in* the means specified by the words under the direct regimen of the preposition. Avoiding all doubtful liberties, however, and taking the words in their natural and proper grammatical signification, the passage reads: "In one Spirit we were all baptized into one body," etc. The sense here is perfect without any supplement, and precisely in accordance with the promise of Christ. The whole connection, too, in which the passage occurs demands this interpretation, since the apostle is showing that, notwithstanding the diversity of the spiritual gifts, the body of Christ was one, being animated and controlled by "one Spirit."

The great importance justly attached to water-baptism as the public evidence of discipleship to Christ, and as the prescribed form of making a confession of Christ before men, and of "putting on Christ," undoubtedly lends color to the idea that it is here referred to; and it seems proper to consider briefly its relations to the gift of the Spirit. As it is undoubtedly associated with this gift, some suppose that both the literal and the metaphorical baptism may be included in the expression here. Baptism immediately preceded the descent of the Holy Spirit upon Christ. It is placed by Peter in immediate connection with the gift of the Spirit, in his answer to inquiring penitents on Pentecost. It can not be denied that it was the usual and appropriate outward evidence of purified and prepared hearts in the case of those who heard and obeyed the Gospel in primitive times. The apostles laid their hands upon the baptized, and prayed for them, that they might receive the Holy Spirit, for whose reception they had been prepared by faith and the emblematic washing or purification of baptism. Paul, hence, does not hesitate to say, "He saved us by the washing of regeneration [baptism] and the renewing of the Holy Spirit." Water-baptism being thus closely

connected with the reception of the Spirit, it is thought that Paul, in the passage under consideration, designed to include in it the entire process through which there was effected a spiritual union with Christ; in other words, that baptism in water is here taken as including both its antecedents, faith and repentance, and its consequents, pardon and the gift of the Spirit,—all of which were required in order to a vital union with the body of Christ. Thus both the literal and the metaphorical baptism are supposed included.

When we consider, however, that the phrase "baptized in the Spirit" was one familiar to the disciples, and that the impartation of the Spirit, in the regular ministration of the Gospel, always *succeeded* water-baptism, it would be more reasonable to suppose the former referred to here as inclusive of the latter, than the reverse. Water-baptism is often spoken of as involving its antecedents, faith, etc.; but does not necessarily imply the gift of the Spirit. Upon the whole, when we take into view the point under discussion in this chapter, and the precision of the apostle's language, we are confined to the conclusion that he here employs the metaphor used by Christ himself to denote the impartation of the Spirit to his body—the Church. Paul's language here, "in one Spirit," does most unequivocally denote the sphere or element in which the baptism took place; and the fact that this is associated with the "drinking of the Spirit"—another metaphor used by the Savior—at once clearly indicates the figurative character of the passage. It is this conclusion, alone, which can establish harmony and connection with the context, where we have a subjective view of the unity of the Spirit, and where the introduction of the merely outward and formal would seem irrelevant. For, of the two baptisms, the metaphorical and the literal, the former only would seem to be in place here, where the spiritual unity of the body of Christ was alone under discussion. It is not to be denied that the fact of having but one baptism in water, one Lord, one faith, etc., might have been adduced as illustrative of the statement that there was but one body. The apostle does this in his more discursive presentation of the same subject in Eph. iv. But in 1 Cor. xii, 13, he is not dwelling on the characteristics of an admitted or asserted unity, but proving the fact itself that there is unity, upon the ground that the entire body is animated by "one and the self-same Spirit." He does not, therefore, adduce

uniformity as illustrative of unity, and speak of "one faith" or of "one baptism," but of baptism "in ONE SPIRIT:" the essential means of a vital connection with the "one body."

It ought not to be thought strange that Paul should here employ the metaphorical phrase, "baptized in one Spirit," instead of the literal expression. Having been used by Christ himself, it was not only familiar to the disciples, but was peculiarly suited to the purpose here, as implying that entire subjection of the body to the one Spirit as the element in which the baptism occurred, all being thereby spiritually united with the one body, and having a joint participation in the one Spirit, which guided and controlled all the members in their different offices. To make water-baptism the means of the real union of which Paul is here treating, would be to exclude from the body of Christ all who, during the centuries since the institution of baptism was, in a good measure, lost to the Church, have not been immersed or buried with Christ in baptism. This difficulty is obviated at once, when we understand the apostle to refer here to that "joint participation of the Spirit" which establishes real unity in the body of Christ.

Hence, in primitive times, it was the reception of the Spirit that was the great question with apostles. When, at Ephesus, certain persons were introduced to Paul as "disciples," he immediately inquired, "Have you received the Holy Spirit since you believed?" Their baptism in water was taken for granted, since this was the appointed means of formal discipleship. But the reception of the Spirit, not being absolutely and necessarily involved in water-baptism, could not be taken for granted. When informed, therefore, that these "disciples," like some in modern days, had not heard of the reception of the Spirit, Paul at once detects a serious defect in their discipleship, and asks, "Unto what then were ye baptized?" When told that it was "unto John's baptism," which was not connected with any promise of the Spirit, he informs them that this baptism was unto repentance, and that it delivered those who received it to faith in the coming Messiah, whose office it was to baptize his people in the Holy Spirit. Accordingly, upon their discipleship to Jesus through faith and baptism in his name, Paul laid his hands upon them and they received the Holy Spirit, with supernatural accompaniments similar to those of Pentecost. Again, we can easily

see the superior importance attached to this matter, by referring to Peter's account of the conversion of Cornelius's household. He does not inform the other apostles that these Gentiles had become members of the "one body," because they had submitted to water-baptism. On the contrary, he does not mention their water-baptism at all, but confines himself to the simple fact that God had borne them witness in giving them the Holy Spirit. This was the decisive proof that they had been really united with the body of Christ, and the apostles at once acquiesced, saying, "Then hath God granted unto the Gentiles also repentance unto life." - It was God himself who here bore witness to a preparedness of heart, which could be evinced to *men* only through obedience to the institutions of the Gospel. This purification of the *heart* by faith, however, was so far from rendering water-baptism unnecessary or unimportant, that the apostle enjoined it even here, as the appropriate public manifestation of faith and discipleship to Christ. It is an institution fulfilling purposes so important, that it is, on no account, to be neglected. Certainly, if there could be at all a case where, submission to it being possible, it might appear possible to dispense with it, that of Cornelius would have afforded it. Audibly informed by a celestial messenger that his prayers were heard, conscious of the integrity of his faith, and Divinely assured by the impartation to him of the Holy Spirit with sensible, miraculous accompaniments, that he was accepted of God,—surely, if ever any one might have regarded water-baptism as "non-essential," it would have been Cornelius. Instead, therefore, of serving to diminish the importance of this ordinance, this case sets it forth in the strongest possible light, as one of the indispensable requirements of the Gospel. For it was "by the washing of regeneration *and* the renewing of the Holy Spirit" that men were to be "saved;" and the presumption that would venture to dispense with either the one or the other of these Divinely appointed instrumentalities, is but a plain indication that the heart of the individual so disposed is not right in the sight of God.

The passage just referred to (Titus iii, 5,) affords an additional proof that the "baptism in the Spirit," which occurred on Pentecost, is predicable of all the saved. Paul there affirms that God saved men by the "washing of regeneration and the renewing of the Holy Spirit," which, says he, "he shed on us abundantly," etc. The word

here rendered "shed," is the same used by Peter, in his quotation from Joel, as well as in his direct reference to the fact then transpiring; so that if there was an *outpouring* and a consequent baptism on Pentecost, all the "saved" must have shared in such a baptism when they individually submitted to the Gospel. (See "Office of the Holy Spirit," page 123.)

3. Among the various evidences, however, of the truth of the proposition before us, there is perhaps no one more forcible than the testimony of John. It was announced by him that there was ONE at hand who was mightier than he, whose shoe-latchets he was unworthy to unloose, and that this illustrious person would baptize in the Holy Spirit. "He," added he, "that sent me to baptize in water, the same said unto me, Upon whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining on him, the same is he that baptizeth in the Holy Spirit." It is this office that is announced to John by the Father himself, and by John to the Jewish nation, as the principal or distinguishing function or work of the Messiah. It was to be the characteristic of his ministry, the distinctive feature by which this was to be recognized. When John, accordingly, had before him the two classes—the righteous and the wicked, represented by the penitent and the impenitent—he emphatically declares that the former shall be "baptized in the Holy Spirit," and that the latter shall be consumed "in unquenchable fire." These declarations apply to these two entire *classes*, without any limitation or restriction. Whatever, then, was true of one member of the class, was true of all. Every one who submitted to Christ was to be "baptized in the Holy Spirit," and all who rejected him were to be "baptized," or overwhelmed, "in fire." There would be, evidently, just as much authority to restrict the "baptism in fire" to a *few* of the lost as to limit the "baptism in the Holy Spirit" to a *few* of the saved.

Now, when we consider that there were on the occasion of Pentecost, of men and women, only one hundred and twenty, and at Cornelius's house perhaps some thirty more, is it possible to suppose, in truth and reason, that the "baptism in the Spirit," affirmed of an entire class, and made so singularly prominent as the great feature in the mission of Christ, was, after all, confined to these one hundred and fifty disciples, out of the vast multitudes who received the Gospel? Would this partial—not to say, in relation to the great

multitude of the saved, this insignificant—fulfillment, at all comport with the just expectations which John's declarations were calculated to produce? Could these few cases be taken as exhausting the entire meaning of a prediction so remarkably distinct, positive, and unqualified? Certainly, no one, who will consider the matter with unbiased mind, can, for a moment, imagine that a conclusion so inadequate could be at all justified by the facts.

On the other hand, when it is seen that the baptism in the Spirit is simply a metaphor denoting the impartation of the Spirit, and that Christ's great function did not terminate with the pouring out of the Spirit on a few disciples on Pentecost and at Cornelius's, but that he continues to give the Holy Spirit to all who obey him, the utmost consistency and harmony is perceived at once to pervade the entire New Testament as to its utterances on this subject. As the true view of regeneration, presented by me in former years, explains and harmonizes all the passages of Scripture which treat of the subject, so the correct meaning of the "baptism in the Spirit" here given, like the golden thread which connects the pearls of the necklace, gives at once new beauty and meaning to the entire teaching of the Scripture upon this theme. Simplicity obtains instead of complexity; order, instead of confusion; truth, instead of error. The subject is no longer obscured by a mistaken application of terms, and religious progress is no longer hindered by narrow and unauthorized interpretations. I now leave the whole matter with the reader, being well assured that the truths set forth here and in my work on the "Office of the Spirit" will, in due time, be accepted by every intelligent disciple.

III.—REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT AND THE SUFFRAGE OF WOMEN.

KINGS no longer exist; at least not in civilized nations. An essential, fundamental idea is indicated by the word "king;" but its realization among men is no longer possible. It was never possible except in patriarchal times, or among rude and undeveloped peoples, where the essential attributes of kingship consisted in superior physical qualities, or in a crafty wisdom which could control material forces.

An ancient patriarch in the long-lived ages might be, by reason of long experience, so far superior to the individuals of the tribe or clan of which he was the head, as to give a certain propriety to the authority he exercised. And, in the early extension of the patriarchal to the royal idea, while the masses of men were yet rude and ignorant, the king might have such an actual superiority over his subjects as would properly entitle him to the prerogatives of a ruler.

Such an actual superiority was originally regarded as indispensable to the royal idea. The kings of Homer were at the same time heroes. They were "godlike" in personal qualities. They far surpassed common men in physical strength and beauty, and in practical wisdom; and they maintained their ascendancy by a constant exercise of their superior qualities. Each one of the subjects of the "wide-ruling Agamemnon," "shepherd of the people;" of the crafty Ulysses, "equal to Jove in counsel;" of the godlike, "swift-footed Achilles," or of any other of the "Jove-nurtured princes" who fought on the Scamandrian plain, might recognize something in his sovereign which gave him, as it were, a natural right to rule. These kings were supposed to be dear to the heart of Jove, who, in consequence of this partiality, endowed them with their superior mental and physical qualities. This is the true and the only true idea of kingship.

But at length this idea of the divine endowment of royalty became transferred into what is termed the divine right of kings, and was supposed to indicate that any person, however inferior or

stupid or depraved, who, by inheritance or otherwise, had come to fill the place of a king, possessed a kind of patent of authority from the Almighty, and might arbitrarily command his subjects. This idea prevailed long after the advent of Christianity, and afforded a powerful moral support to monarchy as a form of government. It, however, received an emphatic rebuke from the highest recognized ecclesiastical authority, when the son of Charles Martel inquired of the Pope whether he who possessed the power, or he who inherited the title, ought to be king.

After the days of Charlemagne came a return of the heroic ages. The chiefs of the Norsemen at least were kings after the heroic model, and the ideas of divine right which succeeded have been effectually suppressed by revolutions and Constitutional changes in the Government of England. The idea of royalty, as attaching to the person of the English sovereign, exists only in the imaginations of the superstitious and ignorant. Prince Albert may, as a figure-head, a kind of play-king, represent the idea of the sovereignty of government. But if a king of England were to be chosen with reference to truly royal qualities, there are a thousand in the realm who would be chosen sooner than he, and not one of them all would be more than a little prominent among hundreds of peers. No man in England could, by any stretch of the imagination, be regarded as so far superior to other Englishmen as to fulfill the royal idea, and be really and properly king over the rest. The same may be said of other kings and kingdoms. The test of Childeric, to say nothing of higher and nobler qualifications, would speedily uncrown most of the heads which, in Europe, are accounted royal; and not one king out of all would be left, if kingship were made to rest on its proper, essential idea.

Still, as we have said, there is an essential, fundamental truth in the idea expressed by the word "king." The principle of the realists is surely applicable to a conception so prominent and so universal in the history and relations of mankind. The idea is still prominent in the minds of men, though its realization in human government is no longer possible. There is, doubtless, a reality which answers to the conception. There *is* a true king of men, and there is but one. One only has appeared as a man on the earth in whom every other man might recognize a superior. One there has been, so far superior

to all others in goodness, in practical wisdom, in the clearness of his moral perceptions, and in all noble and manly qualities, that he might properly and rightfully assume to indicate duty and truth for all the descendants of Adam. So superior he was and is, in all the essentials of the ideal manhood, as to be the chief among ten thousand; yea, the bright morning star of humanity itself. Christ, the Anointed, alone can be king of men. In him alone all the essential attributes of royalty have been realized. In him were fulfilled the ideal glories of the royal house of David, whose lineal descendant he was; and all the illustrations of the royal idea which have appeared in the history of the nations, as figures to the times then present, pointed to him for their ultimate consummation. The lesson of the Jewish monarchy is unmistakable. The Lion of the tribe of Judah alone is king, and his kingdom is forever. The experiences of the Gentile nations with a seeming and pretended royalty illustrate the same great lesson.

This kingdom, over which Jesus, the Anointed of Heaven, is king, is not a mere visionary conception. It is a real kingdom, and Christ is a real king. He was a real person when he appeared on the earth and manifested his royal qualities among men. He is no less a real person now. He died, but arose triumphant over death, and still lives on earth and among men as a real but invisible presence. His presence is recognized and felt by the subjects over whom he rules, and they acknowledge his authority as the highest obligation which men can know.

The relation of the king to his subjects is also immediate and personal. He has appointed no lieutenants or vicegerents who can claim to rule in his name. Laws he has given, and he has appointed also ministers of his Word, but he invested them with no authority over the lives and fortunes of men. The great work he has assigned them is not to rule in his name, but to bring men into personal relations to himself, so that the rule of subordinates is not needful, and arbitrary assumptions of authority on their part impossible; and he himself seeks to rule only through the consciences of his subjects. All have the right of appeal to the sovereign against the decisions and interpretations of his ministers, and none can stand between him and the meanest of his subjects. This is a most important truth. Here is the grand line of demarkation between

Christianity and hierarchy, between republican self-government and tyranny of whatever name; and the principle is as vital in the one case as in the other.

Popery has denied this truth. The Pope claims to be the vicergerent of the King for all the earth, with right to rule over all men by virtue of the authority vested in him. He claims, also, to be the sole judge of the limits of this authority. Those who have asserted the divine right of kings have also denied it, claiming that the true King has delegated even to imbecile and vicious men the right to rule arbitrarily over his subjects.

But the fact remains notwithstanding all denials and perversions, and has, in all times, been asserted by freemen whom the truth has made free. Christ is king no less surely than he is Mediator and Redeemer; and there is no other king. It is the grand peculiarity of his government that he rules not mediately, but directly and personally. Every one of his subjects, every freeman of the truth, can say to any one who may attempt to exercise authority over him, Who art thou that I should obey thee? Thou hast not the qualities and prerogatives of a king. I acknowledge but one Master. My relations to him are direct and personal. I receive orders from him alone.

Christianity thus indicates the great lesson of ultimate human equality, and indicates republicanism as the only form of government suitable for an enlightened Christian people. In an enlightened nation there can be no such thing as a king or a kingdom. Every intelligent man knows that the person thus styled is not a king in any essential sense of the term; and the title is immensely degraded by being applied to such a mortal, for example, as Albert of England. And, looking upon matters in their practical aspects merely, and regarding government, of whatever form, as only a human contrivance to secure certain ends, it is still as well to call things by their right names, and not to build the fabric of the State upon a foundation of fraud; especially upon a fraud which can not fail to become daily more transparent. For it is evident that no mortal can be, or can long seem to be, a true king of men.

ORIGIN OF REPUBLICANISM, AND NATURE OF THE SUFFRAGE.

It is, indeed, in the failure of the idea of royalty as a basis of government, that republicanism takes its origin. Kings, so-called,

were found to be any thing but royal in their characters. They have been stupid, cruel, obstinate, selfish, depraved; in fact, generally only common men, made worse by irresponsible power. This rule has been so universal in the past that men had no reason to hope for any thing better in the future. They therefore resolved to take the functions of government into their own hands, or at least to restrict the prerogatives of a pretended royalty. This attempt would, naturally, first be made by the more prominent and powerful of the citizens, and has too often resulted in the formation of an aristocracy between the king and the common people, guarding its own rights against the sovereign, but allying itself with him, and securing its own elevation only at additional expense to the people, whose oppression would be rendered more hopeless and severe with every successive gradation of rank interposed between them and the king. And the rights of the people could never receive effectual recognition until not only the claims of royalty, but all grades of rank and all patents of nobility, were swept away by the proscriptive edict of a genuine republicanism. Such an edict was the American Declaration of Independence.

This document declares that all men are endowed by the Creator with an absolute equality of political privilege, all alike having the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It declares, also, that these rights are inalienable, and can not be contravened by any arbitrary assumption of authority, nor by any principle of political organization.

These common privileges with which the Creator has endowed all men, privileges which they have by virtue of a manhood created in the image of God, are usually termed natural rights. They constitute the basis upon which all true government proceeds. The problem of government is to secure to all men the free and undisturbed enjoyment of the rights with which the Creator has endowed them, and which he intended that they should possess. These natural rights are endangered in two ways,—first, by anarchy or general lawlessness; and, secondly, by the systematic oppressions of tyrannical government.

Monarchy and aristocracy, either alone or in combination with each other, have shown themselves able to suppress the former of these evils. But the power which can restrain, can also inflict and

oppress. Nay, such arbitrary power has rarely failed to exert itself for its own advantage, and to trespass upon the rights of those it should protect. This has been so uniformly the lesson of history that no intelligent people will willingly trust themselves or their interests to the keeping of any arbitrary, irresponsible power, of whatever name, or with whatever pretenses of Divine authority for its acts. The rights of the people will be secure only when the interests of the government and of the governed are identical; or, in other words, when the interests of the people are directly represented in the government, so that such representation shall constitute the basis of the government itself, and control it in all its practical operations.

Republicanism is the only form of government in which this idea can be successfully realized. Republican government is based upon popular suffrage. Suffrage is the only possible contrivance by which such government can be formed or administered. The position of suffrage, then, in republican government is fundamental, and ought to be clearly understood. There have been various theories concerning it; but one only seems to be tenable:

First, owing to the fact that the suffrage has been extended by the existing powers of government to one class after another of those who had not hitherto enjoyed it, it has been held that suffrage was a power conferred by the State upon those whom it regarded as wise enough and good enough to participate in the governing function. This theory was never logical, and, in the present extension of the suffrage, must be utterly abandoned. For it is certainly known that the most ignorant, as well as the most depraved, do now exercise this function; and no one expects that it can ever be taken out of their hands, except by a revolution, which would end in establishing arbitrary authority. We must therefore regard the extension of the suffrage above alluded to, as a right recognized in the progress of the republican principle, and conceded by the existing powers of the State, rather than as a privilege conferred.

Others, with a strange confusion of ideas, have declared that suffrage is, in itself, a natural right. It requires but very moderate powers of analysis and discrimination to perceive that this idea is not correct. Suffrage is not a right which any one enjoys, or tries to enjoy, in the order of nature. No one grows up in the exercise of

it, as he does of every other natural right. It is clearly not like any of those privileges with which all men are endowed, and which they exercise, and consciously have a right to exercise, without the permission of any government or of any person in authority. Government, except patriarchal government, does not arise in the order of nature, but is rather the result of human forethought and contrivance. Especially is republican government the result of experience and calculation; a contrivance designed to protect natural rights from the assaults of anarchy on the one side, and from the oppressions and abuses of arbitrary rulers on the other; a contrivance to give expression to the popular interests and the right of every man in the government which assumes to control men and define their relations to each other. The very first step toward the formation of such a government involves suffrage; for no government can be representative without it. It is called into existence with the very origin of republican government; but without government, and in natural society, where yet all natural rights exist, it does not exist at all.

Upon what, then, does the right of suffrage rest? Upon two things, clearly,—first, upon natural rights, which it is designed to represent; and, secondly, upon the position in reference to independence and material force which the subject holds in any existing state of society. A candidate for suffrage must have that divine endowment of human rights called natural rights, which suffrage is designed to protect, and of which it is itself the only effective representation; and, again, he must occupy the position of an independent power in the existing society. Suffrage is nothing merely as a moral force, even as government is nothing merely as a moral force. When, therefore, suffrage becomes government, the sum of the suffrages must be the sum of the material forces of society: otherwise the government can not rest upon any substantial foundation; or, in other words, it would have no authority at all, but only the appearance of authority. Suffrage, then, is properly the representation of natural human rights expressed through the recognized powers of an independent community.

In this view, the right of suffrage would naturally and properly be extended to one class of the people after another, according as each might, in the progress of civilization, arise to prominence and importance; and this has, in fact, been the history of suffrage in

modern times. This theory of representation will be found, in its ultimate extension, to cover the whole ground, so that no class or interest will be left unrepresented. The suffrages of the strong will represent also the dependent and weak, whom it is their duty and interest to protect, and there will be no limit to the extension of suffrage, except that of natural dependence and weakness ; but a limit of this kind there certainly is, and must be.

DOES THE SUFFRAGE BELONG TO WOMEN?

For it must be remembered that God has himself given an organization to human society—an organization which is based upon essential and unvarying principles, and which extends through it in all its forms. That organization is the family, and the family is a government complete in itself. In the organization of human government, therefore, the family must be recognized, and human government must be built upon it as an essential foundation ; or it must be set aside to make room for a basis of human invention. But the family can not be set aside. It is the indispensable basis of all civilized society. Nothing but communism has ever dared to propose such an interference with a fundamental appointment of the Almighty himself. The family must remain in every condition of human society. If it remains as a social arrangement, it must remain also as a government,—which it is and must be, if it exists at all ; and as a government it must lie at the foundation of all human government. Let us consider briefly the relation of one to the other.

Every member of the family in natural society is endowed with natural human rights ; but the power to assert and protect these rights is not vested in every member. The wife can not protect herself even against the husband ; much less against the rude forces of the external world. If her rights are to be protected at all, the husband must protect them. She is not one of the independent powers of natural society as the husband is, but is in her essential nature dependent. He is on an equality with the other powers of the society in which he lives, for they are only men like himself. Associated with other men, or a sufficient majority of them, he can rule the whole society. Woman, either alone or associated with other women, has never been formidable as a material force. Her powers, by no means

to be despised, lie altogether in a different direction. She is oftentimes a controller of force, but is not a force in herself.

The boy at five years of age, in this family of ungoverned society, is also endowed with human rights; but he can not protect them himself. He might be kidnapped or killed but for the protection of his father. As he grows up to manhood, he becomes himself an independent power in the community. He has the strength of two or three women, and a courage and resolution which women, in whatever numbers, are not wont to exhibit. His sister, at five years of age, is also endowed with human rights; but she can not protect herself in the enjoyment of them, either at that age or when she arrives at physical maturity. She will be kidnapped, enslaved, degraded, unless her father and brother protect her until she finds the protection of the man whose wife she becomes.

When, therefore, representative government takes the place of the ungoverned order of natural society, not all of those who are endowed with natural, inalienable human rights can be vested with the suffrage. If this were attempted, it would never be certain that the preponderance of the material forces of the community, which is really the governing power, would coincide with a majority of the suffrages given. The government would thus lack that prestige of authority and power which alone could cause its mandates to be respected, and would constantly be exposed to defiance and rebellion and revolution. In order, therefore, to place the government on a sure foundation, the suffrage must be placed in the hands of those only who represent the natural independent forces of society, and must itself represent natural force as well as natural rights; and the rights of women and children must be left where the Creator has placed them—that is, under the protection of the husband and father. He defends them in ungoverned society, and his vote must represent their interests together with his own, and as inseparably connected with his own, when representative government takes the place of the ungoverned order of nature. The mature man, therefore, is properly the integer of political organization in representative government.

But will not the interests of women and children, especially the former, suffer under such an arrangement of the suffrage? Possibly, but surely not as the result of such arrangement. Men who deny

the right of rulers, of whatever name, to exercise arbitrary authority, are so far the less inclined to insist on any right of arbitrary authority over those dependent upon them. The very atmosphere in a genuine republic, and among genuine republicans, is pervaded by the spirit of liberty and respect for personal rights; and woman profits by these influences no less than man. Woman, in all ages and under every form of government, has undoubtedly suffered from her dependence upon man, as man has often suffered from his relation with woman. Still such dependence and relation was doubtless the best arrangement possible to the fallen condition of the race. The relations of love, dependence, trust, are doubtless better both for the man and the woman, and for all the purposes of the family institution, than conditions of equality and independence between the two, where there could be only independent copartnership instead of union.

If there be any fault in the divinely appointed relation of woman to man, it is not the fault of republican government, and republican government can not correct it. Government can not create force. It can only organize and direct the forces which already exist. It can not make the weak strong, nor make independent those who in their essential nature are dependent. Giving the suffrage to woman would not make her stronger; it would only make the government weaker by placing it upon a false basis, an unreliable foundation. The votes of a thousand men represent the force of a thousand muskets, which can, if necessary, be used to enforce the decree of the suffrage against the lawless and rebellious; and recent events have shown that the necessity of appeal to the actual force which the suffrage represents is by no means impossible. The votes of a thousand women which would counterbalance and defeat the will of the thousand men, as expressed by their suffrage, would represent no independent material force whatever. The decrees of government would often have merely an advisory authority if the suffrage were extended to women. It could not generally be known on which side of a contest thus decided the real power might lie. Sometimes it would be known to be on the side of the lightest vote; and it is not difficult to imagine cases in which natural independence and strength would be slow to recognize an obligation of submission to natural dependence and weakness, though the commands of the

latter were expressed in numerical majorities. It would be easy to predict the fate of the republican government which should attempt such a method of ruling.

The position of those who are demanding suffrage for women would be more logical and reasonable if they should first demand for them a course of gymnastic discipline and military drill, so that their suffrage might mean force when they get it. The demand for suffrage on their behalf, under present circumstances, is simply asking that they be counted in as having a force which they have not, and, we may add, never can have. The only Amazonian warriors we have ever heard of belong to antehistoric times; and, whether fortunately or not, the tendencies even of the strongest-minded women of the present day, in respect to physical development, are any thing but Amazonian.

But let us anticipate the cry of indignation and horror which we seem to hear coming up all over the land from voices raised in indignant protest against the barbarous principle we have announced; namely, that mere force is the principle upon which government should rest: for does not every body know, in this enlightened age, that intelligence and virtue are the principles which ought to control society? Does might make right? we are indignantly asked. Ought the destinies of a free and enlightened Christian people to be decided by mere brute force?

Not by brute force, certainly, we answer; for, so far as government is concerned, brute force doesn't happen to be any force at all. But if we are asked whether government ought to rest on a foundation of material, actual force—such force as can repress rebellions, enforce laws, and punish crimes—we answer, Certainly it ought; for that is just the place where it does rest, and the only place where it ever has rested, or ever can rest. Without such a basis of physical force, it can not be said to rest at all. There is always anarchy and revolution where such a basis is wanting. Take away armies and navies and all military equipments; abolish the civil militia, police, sheriffs, constables, judges, courts, and prisons,—and what would any government be worth? In case of actual resistance to the authority of government, it will always be well to have a decided majority of the strong men of the country on the side of order and law, whatever be the sentiments of the women. The danger of rebellion will be infinitely increased whenever the opinion prevails that this is not the case.

It is perhaps true that the women would generally be divided with and like the men, so that a majority of all would generally include a majority of the men. On this supposition, by which they would make no difference with the result, it is difficult to see the advantage of their suffrage. It could only relieve the minds of the few who seem to need relief on this point. But there could not generally be any certainty that the decision of the suffrage upon this basis would correctly represent the will and force of the people; and it is not difficult to imagine cases in which a preponderance of the votes of the women, upon one side or the other, would decide the question at issue, even against a decided majority of the votes of the men. Such a condition of things could not fail to be demoralizing, or to unsettle the only natural, reliable foundation of republican government. The prestige of power, by which alone it can command obedience and respect, would be sure to decline. Republican government is already sufficiently burdened, without exposing it to an additional cause of weakness, which would be at once radical and ineradicable. Let us strengthen and establish the structure as it is. It is not yet so far beyond the possibility of failure that we can afford to undermine the central pillar of its strength.

But, we are asked, if a vote should always represent force, why do you not disfranchise the infirm and those who have passed the military age? Because, we reply, the infirm are not always and uniformly infirm. The man who is weak this year may be strong the next; and because the *men* who are invalid constitute so small a fraction of the whole male population, and are so evenly distributed between parties that their votes can not disturb the ratio between suffrage and force; because experience and practical wisdom are, in themselves, elements of force; and mainly because such disrespect of age and misfortune would be an outrage on humanity without necessity or reason. No parallel can be drawn between these exceptional classes and women, who are always unfit for military and police service, who always need support and protection, and who always outnumber the men.

TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION.

But, we are asked again, was it not laid down as a great fundamental principle by the fathers of the Republic that there ought to

be no taxation without representation? If so, then the said fathers did not understand their own idea; for women, who have had property have always been taxed, and have seldom or never been permitted to vote. The principle as applied to a whole country, self-defending and self-supporting, differs decidedly from that which the woman suffragists assert.

The colonies received no real assistance from the British Government. They maintained and defended themselves. There was no reason why they should be taxed by a government which afforded them no protection. An adequate representation in Parliament would have made them part of the great English nation. But to tax them without defending them, and without allowing them such representation, was to make them mere tributaries.

Can the woman suffragists see no difference between the case of the American colonies and the case of the defenseless women whom the ruthless tax-gatherers of the present day are supposed to plunder? Do these women receive no benefit from the government which presumes to tax them? Are they independent and self-supporting? We had supposed that women who have no husbands or other natural protectors, were even more indebted to good government than any other class in the community. What would be the condition of these women who are so disposed to declare independence, if the Government should take them at their word,—remit their taxes, and give notice that it would not interfere in their behalf; thus making them and their property the lawful prey of such as might choose to prey upon them?

There are some women who are troubled about this idea of taxation without representation, in the grand old Commonwealth of Connecticut; maiden ladies, we believe, named Smith,—Abby and Nancy Smith, of Glastonbury, near Hartford. They have much property which the Government interferes to protect, besides protecting the ladies themselves from all insult and outrage, except that of the tax-gatherers. But these women seem to have a small opinion of a Government which denies them the suffrage. They do not think much of being ruled over by men. Ruling over people, especially women, seems to be the idea which some persons entertain of the functions of government.

Well, the Smith sisters have asked the suffrage which the law

and the Legislature deny them. They, therefore, adopt the supposed motto of the Revolutionary fathers—"No taxation without representation"—and refuse to pay their taxes; and the inhuman sheriff sells one or two of their cows upon one occasion, and threatens to sell real estate upon another, to satisfy the rapacious demands of the law; and the attention of the whole people is drawn to the monstrous inconsistency of taxing people who are not allowed to vote, in contradiction to the great fundamental principle of the American Revolution; and there are many persons who are really puzzled by the specious sophistry.

Here is what Mr. Amos A. Lawrence, who is no doubt a very respectable gentleman, thinks about it. Writing from the vicinity of Boston to Miss Abby Smith, he says:

"MY DEAR MADAM,—The account of your hardships is interesting, and your action will be highly beneficial in bringing the subject to public notice, and in leading to the correction of a great injustice. The taxation of the property of women without allowing them any representation, even in town affairs, is so unfair that it seems only necessary to bring it to public view to make it odious, and to bring about a change. Therefore, you deserve the greatest honor, not only because you have suffered in a good cause, but because you have set an example that will be followed, and will lead to happy results.

"Your case has its parallel in every township of New England. In the town where this is written, a widow pays into the town treasury \$7,830 a year, while six hundred men, a number equal to half the whole number of voters, pay \$1,200 in all. Another lady pays \$5,042. Yet neither has a single vote, not even by proxy. That is, each one of six hundred men who have no property, who pay only a poll-tax, and many of whom can not read or write, have the power of voting away the property of the town, while the female *owners* have no power at all.

"We have lately spent a day in celebrating the heroism of those who threw overboard the tea; but how trifling the tea-tax, and how small the injustice to individuals, compared with this one of our day! The principle, however, was the same,—that there should be no taxation where there is no representation. And this is what we ought to stand by.

"Please to accept the sympathy and respect of one of your fellow-citizens. No doubt you will have it from all in due time; or, at any rate, from all who love to see fair play.

Very truly, yours,

AMOS A. LAWRENCE."

The facts stated by Mr. Lawrence show what he considers to be the monstrous injustice of denying the suffrage to women. Here is a woman who pays \$7,830 per annum into the town treasury, but having no vote at all; while six hundred men, who pay only a poll-tax of two dollars each, have six hundred votes. But how does Mr. Lawrence propose to remedy this striking inequality? Why, by letting

the women vote, of course. But how much? Six times as much as the six hundred men, because she pays six times as much as they all? O no! Mr. Lawrence does not mean that. He would allow the woman who pays \$7,830 one single vote against the six hundred votes of the men who pay only \$1,200. Well, Mr. Lawrence, we do not see that you have done much to relieve this monstrous injustice, after all; for a majority of five hundred and ninety-nine is, for aught we can see, about as good as a majority of six hundred. But your illustration might, we should suppose, convince such of the woman suffragists as are troubled with habits of reflection, that you and they have altogether mistaken the basis of the suffrage, which clearly does not and can not rest upon property or taxation at all; so that a man may be taxed and yet not have the right to vote, or have the right to vote and yet have no taxes to pay.

The fathers of the Revolutionary period doubtless understood their own principle well enough; but, as often happens in the first enunciation of great principles, they did not define it so accurately and carefully as to guard it against misconception and perversion. The two principles which Mr. Lawrence regards as identical are entirely distinct, though they may be loosely enunciated in the same terms. It will be enough for our present purpose to say, or rather to repeat, that to tax a whole country and a whole people that are independent, self-defending, and self-supporting, without allowing them any representation in the government is one thing. To tax women who have property, and who can not themselves protect either their property or their persons, but must depend entirely upon the government for protection, is a very different thing. The one is manifest tyranny, the other entirely just and reasonable.

But let it not be supposed that we favor the indiscriminate taxing of women, even of those who have property. The considerate law-givers of Connecticut have made abundant provision for those who, for any reason, ought not to be taxed. At the same time with the assessors of taxes, there is elected also a Board of Relief, whose duty it is to hear and decide upon the applications of those who, by reason of sickness or misfortune, or the unproductiveness of their property, or for any other cause, think their taxes ought to be abated. This was the place for the Smith women to apply, if there was really any trouble about paying their taxes. But doubtless the

Board of Relief of the town of Glastonbury would have rejected their petition if they had preferred it upon the ground that they could not vote, and therefore received no benefit from the Government, but were only ruled over by the same. The sisters are evidently making martyrs of themselves in a bad cause, and are encouraged in their course by men who seem to understand the case no better than they do themselves.

The difficulty complained of by Mr. Lawrence, that those who have no property and no taxes to pay can vote away the property of the town or State *ad libitum*, is doubtless a real difficulty, and one which has been brought into prominent notice by the course of events in some of the Southern States. This difficulty, however, would be increased rather than diminished by the suffrage of women; for women, as a rule, have unquestionably less property than men, without being more disposed than the latter to the practice of a rigid economy in the expenditures of the household or State. An amendment to the Constitution of any State, providing that, for the legalization of taxes beyond a certain per cent, a vote representing a majority of the property of the town or State should be required would, it would seem, remedy the difficulty and danger here brought to view; and the property of women would then be counted on the conservative side, without any suffrage on their part.

SOCIAL CHANGES IMPLIED IN WOMAN'S SUFFRAGE.

But we have still other objections to the proposed extension of the suffrage. We have endeavored to show that the suffrage of women would prove an element of weakness, of inconsistency and instability, in representative government. We believe, further, that the introduction of such an element would evolve a positively destructive principle, tending not only to subvert good government, but social order as well.

The position of the Woodhull and Claflin party, quondam leaders of the woman-suffrage movement, is by no means an illogical or unnatural consequence of principles they once held in common with the rest. We would not for a moment, however, be understood to indicate that any considerable number of the excellent women who have joined in the mistaken cry for suffrage have even the remotest

sympathy with the Woodhull communism ; but we believe that the legitimate tendency of the movement is in that direction, though its advocates do not intend nor perceive it.

Let us consider. The demand for the suffrage of women proceeds on the assumption that the woman has as good a right to the authoritative expression of her will in matters of government as her husband. She would then have the same right in the household, which even the opponents of woman's suffrage admit to be peculiarly her sphere. If she is the equal of her husband in framing the laws which regulate all social and domestic relations, then surely she should and will be his equal at home, in the family, the primary institution upon which all good government is based, and for which it is administered. If she is not his equal in authority at home, in her own peculiar sphere, then surely she can not be his equal in the external world.

Marriage, then, is a perfectly even yoke, a joint stock with equal partners. The wife does not belong to the husband in any sense that the husband does not belong to the wife ; and is under no more obligation to obey the husband than the husband is to obey her. Marriage is an association for particular purposes on such terms as the parties could agree upon, and is by no means a fixed and final union ; for, in that case, there would be danger that one party might have to submit to the other, and the "rights" of one party or the other might be violated without remedy. Physically, man is associated with woman in marriage as the strong with the weak, and there is absolutely no relief for the woman from the tyrannical disposition of man, should he choose to manifest such a disposition, unless she may, at any time, and without the delay and expense and uncertainty of courts and trials, assert her original freedom.

Let us next consider how far the proposed reform would change our long-descended social order in another respect.

Mr. James Brown marries Miss Elizabeth Wilkins. According to our present social custom, Miss Wilkins is no longer Miss Wilkins, nor even Mrs. Wilkins. The two are known as Mr. and Mrs. James Brown. Her identity is, in a manner, sunk in his, as the result of this ancient system of social and domestic bondage ; and she has been so long educated in this system of self-abnegation, that she seems well content with the implied degradation. Call the lady

Miss Wilkins, or Mrs. Wilkins after her marriage, and she will feel insulted. Her maiden name, her *own* name, is repudiated and ignored. She is known only as Mrs. Brown. She is never even mentioned in society except with reference to her husband. She is constantly called Brown's wife, for that is what Mrs. Brown means. Surely, this does not look much like an equal copartnership in marriage, nor like the equality and independence of woman.

But, says the woman suffragist, all this might be changed. The man might be called Mr. Brown Wilkins, and the woman Mrs. Wilkins Brown; or the two might agree during their courtship which name should have the precedence in the family joint-stock.

We admit that a change might be made. We even go further, and say that a change in this regard would have to be made if the suffrage were extended to women. For how could women, who regard themselves as the independent integers of political organization, as the equals of their husbands in domestic and political authority, endure to be spoken of constantly as the mere appendages of their husbands, to whom they no more belong than their husbands belong to them? The very continuance of such a ridiculous and injurious, not to say insulting, custom would be a constant menace to the newly acquired "rights" of women, and said "rights" could never rest on a sure basis so long as such a custom were tolerated. Such a stigma of inferiority would have to be removed on a principle similar to that upon which the Government of the United States abolished titles of rank and nobility.

THE BIBLE AND WOMAN'S SUFFRAGE.

But these are not the only changes which would have to be made. The proposed reform is no more consistent with ecclesiastical law and the divinely inspired indications of the status of woman, than with the civilization and culture of our times. Especially would the language of Paul have to be abolished out of the Sacred Canon as the blundering utterances of one who, being himself unmarried, could know but little of women or their proper relations to man. Such expressions as the following, at least, could no longer be tolerated in the law and gospel of the age of reform: "The husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the Church." "Therefore, as the Church is subject to Christ, so let wives be to

their own husbands in every thing." "Let every one of you love his wife even as himself, and the wife see that she reverence her husband." "The head of every man is Christ, and the head of the woman is the man, and the head of Christ is God." "The man is the image and glory of God, but the woman is the glory of the man." "The man was not created for the woman, but the woman for the man."

These expressions indicate not only the intimacy of the union which should exist between the husband and wife, but also, and as clearly, the superior authority of the former, and the duty of submission and obedience on the part of the latter, without which no such intimacy of union could exist. The relative position of woman is also indicated by Paul in those passages in which he says that her head ought to be covered in the public assemblies of the Church, in modest recognition of subordination on her part; and in which he forbids women to speak at all in such assemblies, if there are men present wanting to speak; and in which he forbids her to teach, on the ground that, by assuming the authority implied in the relation of the teacher to the learner, she would seem to transcend the limits of her proper position, and usurp authority over the man. It would certainly be difficult to mistake Paul's position on the question of woman's rights.

But Peter, also, though a married man, is in the same condemnation; for he says: "Likewise, ye wives, be in subjection to your own husbands. Let your adorning be the ornament of a meek and quiet spirit, which is, in the sight of God, of great price. For after this manner, in the old time, the holy women also, who trusted in God, adorned themselves, being in subjection unto their own husbands, even as Sarah obeyed Abraham, calling him lord."

It will hence be evident that, in the progress of the woman's suffrage reform, these utterances of the apostles will have to be expunged from the sacred canon as the voices of a barbarous age: unless, indeed, it is proposed to proceed upon what seems the absurdest of all principles; namely, subordination at home and in the Church, but independence and equality abroad. We call this proposition absurd, because it would seem that if woman can be equal to man in authority anywhere, it must be at home and in the Church; and that her equality here, if indeed that ought

to be her position, must be the foundation of her equality in external affairs.

IS THERE ANY NEED OF WOMAN'S SUFFRAGE?

But we do not believe these changes are desirable, whatever may be thought of their practicability. There is really no demand for the so-called woman's suffrage reform, and it would accomplish no good results, even if it could be effected without the disorder it would be sure to bring. We do not believe there are any evils to which women are subject, and which are within the reach of legislation at all, which may not be easily redressed with the suffrage on its present basis. Wherever wrong is done to woman, the sympathies of men are always with her. Let it be shown that any existing law in any State bears unjustly upon women, and it will be promptly amended. Let it be shown that the rights of women with respect to inheritance, control of property after marriage, or in any other respect, are not sufficiently guarded by the common law, and there will not be, as there has not been, any difficulty in passing special laws to meet the demands of the case. This has already been done to such an extent by the legislation and suffrages of men, moved only by a sense of justice, and that chivalrous sentiment toward women which all true men possess, that in many of the States women have a decided advantage in these respects.

It is true that, upon the principle we have asserted, the rights of women in a republic must be represented by the suffrages of their husbands, brothers, sons—who would also be their protectors in natural society. But such representation is real and substantial; for the interests of women are so interblended with those of their husbands, brothers, and sons, as to be inseparable from and identical with them. It is true, also, that there are occasionally women who have no immediate male relatives, and who, therefore, can not have any immediate representation. But these exceptional classes have the full benefit of precisely the same laws which are enacted for the protection of other women and men, and are thus placed on an entire equality with other citizens. No republican State has ever legislated against its unmarried women, or its widows and orphans. If any difference is made, it is always in their favor.

But if women, through the efforts and arguments of the woman

suffragists, should become dissatisfied with the protecting love of husband, father, and brother, should conclude that she is wronged, and, finding her demands for redress and for the ballot unheeded, should decide to declare independence, and take care of herself as other oppressed parties have done, what could she do? Why, nothing at all, of course. There are, indeed, reasons why we could almost wish for a return of the fabulous days of the Amazons: but that is neither to be hoped nor expected; and women, as a body, will never undertake to declare independence, though some may refuse to pay taxes. What, then, would be the position of the women of this country, supposing that any considerable number of them were woman suffragists?—which, thank God, they are not, and are not likely to be! Why, simply this: They would be demanding that a power which God has not seen fit to give them, which they have not attained, and could never attain, be placed in their hands by men,—a power not to execute (the Almighty alone could confer that); but a power to control those who do execute. She would ask that men be compelled by other men to respect her will, exercised against man's will, if she chooses, just as if she had power to enforce it herself.

A modest request this would be, surely. She has not made nor invented the musket; she could never make, nor invent, nor even use it, except where there is no danger or hardship. But she might level and fire a piece already loaded and placed in her hands, as in the peaceful encounters of the ballot, if men would accommodate her so far; and the bullet or ballot, thus discharged, would be just as effective as if discharged by a veteran warrior, who could prepare his own weapon and endure the hardships of a campaign. No doubt she might thus do infinite mischief, not so much by the skill or want of skill in her firing, as by the fact of her firing at all. We have, of course, no fear that men could ever be brought into subjection to women either by voting or fighting. The play of Ninus and Semiramis will never be re-enacted. The men might, perhaps, be silly enough to act the part of Ninus, but the women could never sustain the part of Semiramis. But we should certainly fear anarchy and revolution to see republican government placed on a basis so utterly fictitious. By the simple force of her false position she would disturb the indispensable balance between suffrage and

power, and thus undermine the walls of protection which man has so laboriously constructed around himself and her; and, in the general ruin which would follow, she would doubtless soon be glad to renounce the mocking phantom of independence, and find her way back to her normal relation to man. For our own part, we believe that normal relation would be instantly and seriously disturbed by placing the ballot in the hands of woman, and that woman as well as man—nay, infinitely more than man—would suffer in the change. Trust in her natural protector is safer and more becoming to woman than attitudes or arms of defense. She is strongest as well as loveliest in her dependence and trust. She can not wield the sword in her own defense, and her nature is unfitted for the rough duties of external life. But so long as she gracefully accepts the dependent relations in which Providence has placed her, and cheerfully, lovingly fulfills her heaven-imposed duties of helpfulness, submission, trust, she will find in these duties and relations her surest protection and her most resistless strength, as well as her highest joy. More and more, in the progress of Christianity and civilization, is man learning to yield a generous response to the fidelity and trustfulness, the submission and helpfulness, the love and the loveliness, of woman; and less and less, every day, is the need that she shall undertake to vindicate her own rights, and defend herself, either by the bullet or the ballot.

But there is a certain class of woman suffragists who will meet us at this point by saying: It is not for the sake of woman especially that we demand that the ballot shall be placed in her hands. It is on our own account, more than hers, that this reform is so urgently needed. We want the *assistance* of woman to help us purify our politics, and carry forward certain great measures for the benefit of the whole race. The best work of humanity can not be done by either sex alone. We must have a union of the efforts of both for the highest success. The assistance of woman has proved to be of the greatest value in society and in religion. Now, we want her assistance in politics by the same rule.

We freely admit, in reply, all that is claimed for the assistance of woman in society and religion. In fact, woman is as necessary to the existence of society as of the family; for society, in the modern sense, is made by the association of women and men. But neither in society, nor in the family, nor in the Church, does woman hold a

position of identity and equality with man. Her position may be higher and more sacred than that of man. In the family and in society we gladly accord her such a pre-eminence, and the deference which belongs thereto.

But in the family she is subordinate in authority to man, however superior she may be in other respects. In the Church she is forbidden to discharge those functions which even imply an assumption of authority over men. In society she has authority, if anywhere. Here, however, her authority is not of compulsion, but is rather the result of the deference paid her through the politeness and gallantry of men. It is the privilege of men to pay deference to women in society; and the charm of society is due, not to any identity or equality of the sexes, but rather to the fact that the difference between them is brought into the greatest possible prominence,

In politics alone it is proposed to place woman and man in positions of identical equality. If woman comes into the governing function at all, she must come in on an equality with man. Her ballot may be printed with fancy type, on tinted and perfumed paper; she may be escorted to the polls by her husband or lover, or a handsome electioneering committee, with the most delicate and deferential politeness; and she may deposit her vote with a smile of angelic sweetness. But when the ballot is deposited, it is no longer courtesy, nor coquetry, nor charm, nor sweetness. It stands rather as an expression of will and power. It must be counted as will and power, the same as the vote of a man. But it is not will and power—not the latter, at least; and by counting it such, we should be false to the fundamental principle of republican government. Here is precisely our objection; namely, to the false reckoning. We may not carry our gallantry so far as to undermine the central pillars of the State. We may not make nor reckon as identical what God has seen fit to create essentially different; for the distinctions between the sexes are divinely appointed, fundamental, and constant: and those who presume to ignore or confound them will be likely to learn their folly at their cost.

While, therefore, we freely admit the truth of the general proposition, that the best work of the race can not be accomplished by either sex alone, but must be achieved by the united efforts of both, we say that in politics, no more than in the family or society or the

Church, should the work and position of the two sexes be made identical. Woman has a place in politics distinct from that of man, as her place in the family, in society, and the Church is different from his. Her sphere in politics is the realm of moral influence, not the assertion of positive force. The two spheres are co-ordinate, and either is indispensable to success. The importance of moral force to the successful working of representative government has not been, we believe, sufficiently appreciated; and the possibilities of reforms and improvements are conditioned largely upon its further development. Laws, especially ethical laws, calculated to restrain prevalent vices, can not be executed in a republic, unless there is a decided preponderance of moral sentiment in their favor. There seems to be no great difficulty in passing good laws; laws, for example, to restrain licentiousness and intemperance, the vices from which women most suffer. In fact, laws against these vices do exist throughout the country. Prohibitory laws have been passed in many of the States. They have failed, not because they were unconstitutional or wrong in theory, but because the moral sentiment of the people was not strong enough to sustain them.

What is most needed, then, is a great increase of the moral force of the people and of the Government, so that laws against vice can be enforced and sustained. Here, then, is the place for the political efforts of woman. Here is room for the exercise of all her powers, and her work and influence here can not fail to be productive of good results.

Her suffrage, on the other hand, would add nothing to the executive power of the Government, while it would decidedly weaken its moral force. It is now an accepted fact that all respectable women are opposed to all vices. Give them the ballot, and thousands would be found voting, indirectly at least, in favor of vice. All women would then be obliged to vote. The rivalry of parties would not permit the suffrage to lie idle in their hands; and the manner of their voting would be largely determined by the influence of men. To give woman the suffrage, or to thrust it upon her, would be to cause her to descend from the realm of moral power, where her influence is always right and always effective, to contend with material weapons in the arena of human passions and strife, where she would be influenced, guided, managed, hoodwinked by men, who

would respect her only as demagogues respect the masses they mislead. Thus, without adding at all to the effective force of the Government for any good purpose, her moral influence would be largely annulled. There may, indeed, be some way in which the moral sentiment of woman may be more effectively asserted than at present;* but it can not be done by the suffrage. Let her, therefore, confine her efforts to the sphere in which her influence will be altogether good, and where there is no danger that it will be canceled by being divided between the good and the bad.

We are opposed, then, to the proposed extension of the suffrage, because such extension would violate a fundamental principle of nature,—the principle which gives harmony to our households, and makes marriage a complete and permanent union, rather than a voluntary copartnership to be dissolved at the will of either party; because it would violate a fundamental principle of republican government, depriving the suffrage of its proper authority and prestige as an index of the determining power of the nation; because it would degrade woman from the high position in which her influence is purest and most effective, to make her the tool of demagogues, and

* We learn from Dr. Babb, of California, in a recent number of the *Herald and Presbyterian*, how the influence of woman was made effective at a recent election, in which the temperance, or "no-license," party was triumphant in many of the towns and cities of that State. In the towns opposite San Francisco, on the other side of the bay, the ladies managed the canvass, we are told, displaying great energy and tact. They pitched tents as near the voting places as they were permitted by the law, in which they spread a free lunch in the interest of temperance. Their committees patrolled the streets in quest of voters, who were invited to the tents, and treated to the best of viands, as well as to tea and coffee sweetened with smiles as well as with sugar. Then they offered to each voter a "no-license" ballot and a bouquet. Hundreds of toppers are said to have been thus induced to vote against the rum-sellers. They felt, degraded as they were, the purifying and ennobling influence of woman.

The facts here related show that the suffrage is not necessary to an effective expression of the influence of woman in politics. But what shall we think of the logic of those who imagine that they find in these very facts an argument for woman's suffrage? "These elections," says Dr. Babb, "have converted thousands who have hitherto opposed female suffrage to believe in it and work for it. They say if we can have such elections as this always, it will be a blessed improvement upon the coarseness and rowdiness of the past. The presence of the women on the scene would purify the atmosphere, strengthen the virtuous, and restrain the vicious."

Why, Dr. Babb, if we understand your statements, all these results were accomplished by the moral and social influence of woman, without her voting at all; and if there is any argument to be drawn from the case, it is that if woman is encouraged to exert her legitimate influence upon politics in her own proper sphere of moral and social power, she will not need nor desire to go beyond it. Let her be careful, however, to confine her efforts to moral influence and to the moral side of every question, and not allow herself to be used, even in this way, by demagogues and politicians who seek only plunder and place.

the subject of degrading passions and boisterous strifes ; because the proposed reform is as needless as it would be useless to woman herself, who will be better defended and cared for by the chivalrous sentiment of manhood, and the protecting love of husband, brother, and son, than she can be by asserting her independence and attempting to maintain her own rights ; because, in a word, the suffrage of women would be contrary to right reason, to our established social order, to the Word of God, to the principles of republican government, and contrary to the interests of all concerned, especially the interests of woman.

Let woman, therefore, be content to remain within the charmed threshold of home, as the guardian genius of domestic love and peace ; in the circles of a pure and refined society, of which she is herself the best purifier and refiner, as well as its chief ornament and charm ; in the atmosphere of a pure and unmixed moral influence, above the arena of human passions and strife, in which men are forced to contend with material weapons. There she can assist us most in the promotion of every good cause. There our esteem for her will be highest and truest, and our love for her fondest and purest.

IV.—SACRIFICE AND ATONEMENT.

[WITHOUT indorsing all the positions of this paper, we submit it as a thoughtful contribution to a difficult subject.—EDITOR.]

THE atonement is, confessedly, a subject of great intricacy, but yet of transcendent importance. It is intricate, because it pertains to the Divine government, and it is difficult for man, with his limited understanding and fallible reason, to comprehend a subject at once so vast, so lofty, so profound; intricate, because it involves the fundamental principles of God's moral government—his infinite justice and holiness on the one hand, and his boundless love and mercy on the other—in a scheme of redemption for sinful man. A government that does not punish the disobedient is worthless, and can not stand. A government that admits no forgiveness, that executes its laws with inexorable justice, and punishes without mercy, drives the guilty to despair, and, where all are guilty, ends in universal destruction, in utter ruin. How, then, God can meet the demands of law and justice, and yet exhibit his love and mercy in the pardon and salvation of the sinner, is the great problem that is solved in the atonement of Christ.

Difficult, however, as it is, and "hard to be understood," it is yet exceedingly important that it be understood, especially by the Christian teacher. Important, because it must be measurably understood by every sinner who accepts the gracious offer of pardon and life as the result of a clear and intelligent conviction of his need of salvation and the sufficiency of Christ to save him. Important, because the subject lies at the basis of the whole plan of salvation; and a correct understanding of it is necessary to a clear, comprehensive, and Scriptural view of the Gospel of Christ in its God-ward and man-ward relations.

Many persons, eminent for piety, learning, and knowledge of the Scriptures, have perceived the importance of the subject, and have not only endeavored to master it themselves, but have given to the world the fruit of their investigations. As a result, many theories of the atonement have arisen, each of which has its share of adherents.

Each of these will be found to possess a portion of truth with some admixture of error. Persons, also, in treating of the subject, in order to bring it within the comprehension of the popular mind, resort to various incidents for illustration. Among these may be mentioned the famous one related of Zaleucus, the King of the Socrians, who decreed that whoever should violate a certain law should lose both his eyes. The first offender was the king's own son. In order to maintain his authority as king, and to show mercy as a father toward his son, he ordered that one of his own eyes should be put out, and one of his son's eyes. Thus his government was maintained, and his son spared the doom of total blindness. While this incident illustrates some features of the subject, it is confessedly imperfect, as are all that can be adduced from human history; and, in so far as it is imperfect, it is unsatisfactory and misleading.

How, then, can we illustrate the subject so as to make it clearly understood? and where will we find facts suitable for illustration? are questions at once pertinent and important. "The Scriptures are their own best interpreters," is an acknowledged canon of interpretation. "Compare Scripture with Scripture," is the same principle in another form. It would seem, therefore, that in the Scriptures themselves we shall find the best, the most apposite, and the most complete illustrations of the themes of revelation.

The Jewish religion was a religion of types and shadows, typifying and foreshadowing "good things to come;" and the "image" or reality is to be found in the religion of Christ. The Jewish economy had its altar, its priests, and its sacrifices. So has the Christian. The one is typical of the other. The "sacrifices for sins" offered by the Jews typify the great sacrifice which was offered, in "the fullness of time," for the sins of the world, "when Christ offered up himself." In other words, the system of sacrifice which God gave to the patriarchs and Jews, and held up for four thousand years before the wondering gaze of angels and men, is the Divine illustration of the atonement of Christ.

Now, in order to understand correctly the reality in the light of this symbolical sacrificial system, it is necessary not only to theorize, but to lay aside opinions, theories, and prejudices, and come to the investigation with that spirit of inquiry and teachableness which

characterizes the "little child," and to receive the teachings of the Scriptures with a child-like faith and trust. The theme is too vast to be comprehended, too lofty to be grasped, too profound to be fathomed, too mighty to be mastered by the human mind unaided. We can only understand it as "God has revealed it to us by his Spirit."

It is not the purpose of the writer to propose any theory of the atonement; he has none to propose, none to defend. His purpose is simply to present the teaching of Scripture with respect to sacrifices, to ascertain their typical import, and from them to unfold the Scriptural view of the atonement. Attention is directed, therefore, first to the subject of

SACRIFICES FOR SINS.

The Jewish offerings are variously classified as bloody and bloodless; required and voluntary; regular and special; daily, weekly, monthly, yearly, and occasional. The only classification that is of especial importance in the present investigation is the first, which corresponds to Paul's division into "gifts and sacrifices for sins." (Heb. v, 1; viii, 3.) This indicates a distinction between offerings and sacrifices,—the former being the genus; the latter, with the "gifts," constituting the two species. The subject under consideration includes only one species,—*"sacrifices for sins."*

The words used to express the idea of sacrifice clearly indicate its meaning. The Hebrew word is *zebach*, which means a slaughtered animal. The Greek word is *θυσία*, from *θύω*, *to offer sacrifice, to slay or burn a victim, to kill in sacrifice*. Hence, sacrifice is *the infliction of death, as a religious rite, upon an innocent and unoffending victim, usually by shedding its blood*.

The history of sacrifice before the time of Moses will first be briefly considered; then the sacrifices of the Jewish law, with their typical import.

I. The first account we have of sacrifice is recorded in Genesis iv, 3-5. Although there is no record of a Divine command for the institution of sacrifice, yet it is held to be of Divine origin, for the following reasons:

First. It seems inconceivable that man should originate the idea that the offering of a slain animal upon an altar would be accepted by God as an atonement for sin.

Second. The universal tradition and practice with regard to sacrifice can not be satisfactorily explained upon any other hypothesis.

Third. Had it been uncommanded, it could not have been offered "*by faith.*" (Heb. xi, 4.) To act *by faith* is to act in obedience to Divine command.

Fourth. It could not have been accepted unless commanded. For neither would have been acceptable unless commanded; for "without faith it is impossible to please God:" and both would have been alike acceptable, had not the kind of offering been specified. Sacrifice had, therefore, a Divine origin.

In this passage it is declared that "the Lord had respect unto Abel and to his offering, but unto Cain and to his offering he had not respect." Evidently, the ground of distinction between the two offerings was this: Abel, by his offering, recognized the necessity of the shedding of blood in order to expiate sin; while Cain, by his offering, failed to symbolize this truth. The one was a "sacrifice for sin," the other a "gift" or thank offering.

This is the only account given of sacrifice before the Deluge. But it is evident that sacrifices were offered by the antediluvians, from the fact that Noah erected an altar and offered burnt-offerings upon it, when he and his family went forth from the ark. (Gen. viii, 15-22.) Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob also erected altars where they dwelt, manifestly for the purpose of sacrificing upon them. (Gen. xii, 7, 8; xxvi, 25; xxxiii, 20.)

It seems, however, that the burnt-offering was the only bloody offering known previous to the time of Moses. (Gen. viii, 20; xxii, 1-13; Job i, 5; xlii, 8.) Peace-offerings are first mentioned in connection with the ratification of the Mosaic covenant. (Ex. xxiv, 3-8.) And the sin-offering is not mentioned previous to the fourth chapter of Leviticus, except in the instructions concerning the consecration of priests (Ex. xxix, 14), and in the directions with regard to the altar of incense (Ex. xxx, 10). It would seem, therefore, that the burnt-offering in the time of the patriarchs answered all the purposes, and embodied, in a general way, the leading ideas that were afterward represented by the several classes of bloody sacrifices.

II. When the children of Israel, under the leadership of Moses, took on a national character, their religion also assumed a national form. Instead of every man acting as his own priest, an order of

priests was established, consisting of the family of Aaron, of whom Aaron and his successors were high-priests. From this time, therefore, their worship was more elaborate, and their ritual laid down with great minuteness, which necessitated a punctilious observance. We shall accordingly find in the law of Moses the directions pertaining to sacrifice explicitly and minutely delineated. To this law attention is now directed.

The first seven chapters of Leviticus contain instructions with regard to the different kinds of offerings. Five classes are specified,—the burnt-offering, the meat-offering, the peace-offering, the sin-offering, and the trespass-offering. (Lev. vii, 37.) All of these, except the meat-offering, were bloody offerings. The meat-offering was a vegetable offering expressive of thanksgiving, and does not come within the scope of this investigation. The trespass-offering was a species of sin-offering, having reference more especially to sin as committed against man, or sins against justice; such as admitted of estimation and reparation. Accordingly, with this offering, a fine was imposed, and restitution required. (Lev. v, 14; vi, 7.) As the general typical import of this offering will be the same as that of the sin-offering,—with this notice of it, it may be dismissed from further consideration.

There remain to be considered the three classes of offerings,—the burnt-offering, the sin-offering, and the peace-offering, which are included under “sacrifices for sins.” Their relative position and importance may be more clearly seen by the following classification:

Offerings.	{	1. Sacrifices for sin.	{	1. Burnt-offering.
				2. Sin-offering—Trespass-offering.
				3. Peace-offering.
	{	2. Gifts.	1. Meat-offering.	
			2. Drink-offering.	
			3. Incense.	

These three classes of “sacrifices for sins” will now receive especial attention:

1. The burnt-offering. The law describing this is found in the first chapter of Leviticus. The victim offered was to be a male without blemish—either a bullock, ram, goat, or, in case of poverty, a turtle-dove or young pigeon. As in all cases of animal offerings, the offerer was to bring his offering to the door of the tabernacle, to put his hand upon its head, and kill it on the north side of the altar

of burnt-offering. The priest who officiated, then took of the blood, and sprinkled it round about upon the altar. The fowls were not divided; but in the case of the other victims, after the sprinkling of blood, the offering was to be flayed, cut into pieces, the parts arranged upon the altar, and entirely consumed by fire. From this last fact, it is sometimes called the "whole burnt-offering." (Ps. li, 19; Mark xii, 33.) The officiating priest was to have the skin as his portion. (Lev. vii, 8.)

This sacrifice was offered twice every day (Lev. vi, 8-13; Ex. xxix, 38-42; Num. xxviii, 1-8); hence called a continual burnt-offering. On the Sabbath a double burnt-offering was required. (Num. xxviii, 9, 10.) Additional burnt-offerings were required at the beginning of each month, at the several feasts, and on the Day of Atonement. (Num. xxviii, 11-29, 40.) Besides these regular burnt-offerings, there were special burnt-offerings at the consecration of the priests (Ex. xxix, 15; Lev. viii, 18); for purification (Lev. xii, 6-8; xiv, 10-32; xv, 15, 30); at the completion of the Nazaritic vow, or for a violation of it (Num. vi, 10-21). Besides these required offerings, voluntary offerings could be made on any solemn occasion, as at the dedication of the tabernacle and altar (Num. vii), and of the temple (1 Kings viii, 64).

A subsidiary meat-offering and drink-offering was presented in connection with the burnt-offering and peace-offering. The quantity of flour, oil, and wine, for these, varied according to the victim offered. (Num. xv, 1-10.)

2. The sin-offering. The directions for this are given in Lev. iv, 1-5, 13. Here a sin-offering is appointed for a priest, for the whole congregation, for a ruler, for one of the common people. If the sin-offering was for the whole congregation, the elders of the congregation, as their representatives, were to lay their hands upon the head of the victim. In all other respects, the directions for the first two cases are the same. They are as follows: "And the priest that is anointed [that is, high-priest] shall take of the bullock's blood, and bring it to the tabernacle of the congregation; and the priest shall dip his finger in the blood, and sprinkle of the blood seven times before the Lord, before the veil of the sanctuary. And the priest shall put some of the blood upon the horns of the altar of sweet incense before the Lord, which is in the tabernacle of the

congregation ; and shall pour all the blood of the bullock at the bottom of the altar of burnt-offering, which is at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation. And he shall take off from it all the fat of the bullock for the sin-offering: the fat that covereth the inwards, and all the fat that is upon the inwards, and the two kidneys, and the fat that is upon them, which is by the flanks, and the caul above the liver, with the kidneys, it shall he take away, as it was taken off from the bullock of the sacrifice of peace-offerings: and the priest shall burn them upon the altar of burnt-offering. And the skin of the bullock, and all his flesh, with his head, and with his legs, and his inwards, and his dung, even the whole bullock shall he carry forth without the camp unto a clean place, where the ashes are poured out, and burn him on the wood with fire: where the ashes are poured out shall he be burnt." (Lev. iv, 5-12. See also verses 13-21.)

If the sin-offering was for a ruler, it was to be "a kid of the goats, a male without blemish." (Lev. iv, 23.) If for one of the common people, it was to be "a kid of the goats, a female without blemish." (Lev. iv, 28.) In any of the cases mentioned in Lev. v, 1-4, if the sinner was not able to bring a lamb or kid, he was to bring two turtle-doves, or two young pigeons, one for a sin-offering, the other for a burnt-offering. (Lev. v, 6, 7.) And, in cases of extreme poverty, a sin-offering of fine flour was accepted instead. (Lev. v, 11-12.)

In the case of a sin-offering for a ruler or an individual, the blood was put upon the horns of the altar of burnt-offering, and the remainder was poured out at the bottom of the altar. (Lev. iv, 25, 30, 34.) The fat was burned on the altar, and the flesh given to the priests, to eat in the holy place. (Lev. vi, 24-29.) The law required that, if the blood of a sin-offering was brought within the tabernacle, the flesh should not be eaten, but should be burned without the camp. (Lev. iv, 12 and 21; vi, 30.)

The sin-offering on the Day of Atonement consisted of two goats. (See Lev. xvi.) One goat was for the Lord, the other for Azazel, or the scape-goat. (Verse 8.) The high-priest was first to take a bullock for a sin-offering, and offer it for himself. He was to sprinkle the blood of it upon the mercy-seat, and before the mercy-seat, seven times. (Verses 11-14.) Then he was to kill the goat of the people's sin-offering, upon which the Lord's lot fell, and sprinkle its

blood in like manner. (Verses 15, 16.) While this was being performed, no one was permitted to be within the tabernacle. (Verse 17.) Then the high-priest was to make atonement for the altar of incense, by putting some of the blood of the bullock and the goat upon its horns, and sprinkling the blood seven times upon it. (Verses 18, 19.) After this was done, he was to lay both hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess over him all the sins of the people, "putting them upon the head of the goat," and was then to send the goat away into the wilderness, where the goat was to be set free. The live goat thus bore the iniquities of the people to "a land not inhabited," or "a land of separation." (Lev. xxi, 22.)

The regular sin-offering was offered at the beginning of each month, and at the feasts (Num. xxviii and xxix), and at the consecration of the priests and Levites (Lev. viii and ix; Num. viii, 5-12). Special sin-offerings were made whenever occasion required, for transgression or ceremonial defilement. (Lev. iv, 1-5, 13; xii, 6-8; xiv, 19-31; xv, 30.)

3. The peace-offering. The directions concerning this are given in the third chapter of Leviticus. This offering could be either a male or female of the herd or flocks; but must be without blemish, except when presented as a free-will offering. (Lev. xxii, 21-23.) After the victim was slain, the priest who officiated "sprinkled the blood upon the altar round about." (Verses 2, 8, 13.) The fat was then burned upon the altar. (Verses 3-5, 9-11, 14-16.) The children of Israel could eat neither fat nor blood. (Verse 17.) The blood represented life (Lev. xvii, 11 and 14), and hence could not be eaten; and the fat, as the richest part of the animal, was devoted to the Lord (Lev. iii, 16; vii, 22-25).

The breast of the peace-offering was to be waved as a wave-offering before the Lord, and was then given to the priests. The right shoulder was also to be taken for a heave-offering, and given to the priest who officiated at the altar. (Lev. vii, 28-34.) The remainder of the flesh was then eaten by the offerer and his friends: if a peace-offering for thanksgiving, on the same day; if for a vow, or a voluntary offering, on the same day and the day following. (Lev. vii, 11-18.) The offerer was enjoined especially to remember the Levite, the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow. (Deut. xii, 18; xvi, 11.)

Peace-offerings were presented at the consecration of priests (Ex. xxix, 19-28), at the completion of the Nazaritic vow (Num. vi, 13-21), at the feast of Pentecost (Lev. xxiii, 19), at any solemn dedication, as of the altar (Num. vii), and at any time, at the will of the offerer, as a thank-offering (Lev. xix. 5; xxii, 21-25). It would seem, from Num. x, 10, that peace-offerings were offered at all their festivals. Peace-offerings were offered in great abundance at the dedication of the altar (Num. vii) and of the temple (1 Kings viii, 63).

We have, in these three offerings, the "sacrifices for sins" which were offered by the Jews to obtain forgiveness. We see that, while they have certain features in common, there are others which are peculiar to the different kinds of sacrifices. It seems, therefore, that while they all represent the idea of atonement in general, each one presents, in addition, some particular feature of it. It remains yet to consider what these special features are, which are symbolized by these three great classes of Jewish sacrifices.

III. The general meaning of sacrifice is, atonement for sin by the death of an innocent victim accepted in the stead of the transgressor's death. The shedding of blood, and sprinkling it upon the altar of sacrifice, the altar of incense, and mercy-seat, and upon the priests at their consecration, signifies cleansing from sin by blood. (Heb. ix, 22.) The putting of the offerer's hand upon the head of the victim symbolically represented the confession of his sins, and their transference to the victim which was slain in his stead. Death by substitution, to expiate sin, is thus clearly foreshadowed in all the sacrifices that were offered by the Jews. But, besides this generic signification, there was also a specific one pertaining to each particular sacrifice. Let us see if we can ascertain, in each case, what this is.

I. Smith, in his "Bible Dictionary," speaks of the burnt-offering as "self-dedicatory." Of the burnt-offering he says:

"The idea of expiation seems not to have been absent from it, for the blood was sprinkled round about the altar of sacrifice; but the main idea is the offering of the whole victim to God, representing (as the laying of the hand on its head shows) the devotion of the sacrificer, body and soul, to Him. (Rom. xii, 1.) The death of the victim was, so to speak, an incidental feature. (Smith's Bib. Dict., Art. "Sacrifice.")

Franklin Johnson, in "Moses and Israel," speaks of the burnt-offering as follows :

"While it is probable that the primary meaning of the burnt-offering was the dedication of the offerer to the service of Jehovah; that hence it was usually preceded by a sin-offering, since we should dedicate ourselves, recognizing our sins, and invoking pardon; and that hence, also, the victim was to be without spot, since we should endeavor to present ourselves to God not only justified by the blood of Christ, but sanctified by his grace,—there was still in the burnt-offering, as in all others, a minor recognition of sin: for he who presented it was required to lay his hands on the head of the victim, an action symbolical of confession; and it was accepted for him to make atonement." (Moses and Israel, page 122.)

Eminent as these authorities are, I am compelled to differ with them. The death of the victim, so far from being "an incidental feature," was an *essential* feature in all sacrifices. How, then, could it be incidental, especially in an offering that was *entirely consumed* upon the altar? Surely, if the death of the victim was an essential feature in any sacrifice, it was such in the whole burnt-offering.

Nor does the laying of the hand upon the head of the victim represent the devotion of the sacrificer. Besides the confession of sin expressed by it, it represents the devotion of the victim to death in the place of the offerer. (Lev. i, 4.) I fail to find any warrant in the Scriptures for regarding the idea of dedication or consecration as typified by the burnt-offering, but do find a warrant for regarding it as expressed by another offering, as will appear presently. These writers seem to hold that the burning of the entire victim upon the altar, by which the greater part of it ascended toward heaven (expressed by *olah*, ascension), expresses the idea of the dedication of the offerer. But I do not understand that to be the meaning of it. The altar is God's representative to receive the offerings. What is offered upon the altar, therefore, belongs to God, as his portion of the offering. Says Paul, "Do ye not know that they who minister about holy things live of the things of the temple? and they who wait at the altar are partakers with the altar?" (1 Cor. ix, 13.) The only sharing, in the case of the burnt-offering, is the giving of the skin of the victim to the priest. The altar, as God's representative, receives the entire victim. Hence, the idea expressed by the whole burnt-offering, as it clearly seems to me, is that the offering belongs and relates wholly to God. The bearing of this we will now consider.

These writers concede that the burnt-offering expresses the idea

of atonement besides the one they give as the main idea. And that the burnt-offering is propitiatory, is certainly taught in the Scriptures. When Job's children were away feasting, he "offered burnt-offerings according to the number of them all: for Job said, It may be that my sons have sinned, and cursed God in their hearts." (Job i, 5.) Here, the propitiatory character of the burnt-offering is clearly recognized. The same idea is implied in Job xlii, 8, and Ex. v, 3. And in the directions concerning the burnt-offering it is declared, "And he [the offerer] shall put his hand upon the head of the burnt-offering; and it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him." (Lev. i, 4.) Here, God's *acceptance* of the offering in the place of the offerer, as an atonement for his sins, is distinctly affirmed. Sacrifice, *as it relates to God*, seems, therefore, to be the leading idea. Are we not justified, then, in considering *propitiation* as the *special* or *characteristic* idea of the burnt-offering? If so, then the *whole* burnt-offering expresses the *completeness* of God's favor toward the pardoned sinner, and the *continual* burnt-offering represents his *perpetual* favor.

2. The sin-offering had especial reference to sin, as the name indicates. It is, therefore, universally regarded as expiatory. This is its prominent and characteristic feature. The sprinkling of blood upon the mercy-seat and the altar of incense especially indicates this. The language with regard to the sin-offering, in the different cases specified, is substantially the same for all of them: "And the priest shall make an atonement for his sin that he hath committed, and it shall be forgiven him." (Lev. iv, 35. Compare also verses 20, 26, and 31; and Num. xv, 25.)

The meaning of the sin-offering is more fully expressed in the directions to be observed on the Day of Atonement. (Lev. xvi.) The laying of the high-priest's hands on the head of the goat, and confessing over him all the sins of the people, was symbolically "putting them upon the head of the goat" (verse 21); and the sending the goat away into the wilderness symbolized the complete separation of the sins from the transgressor. The death of the goat that was slain, and the burning of the remains, indicated that the sinner could be forgiven only through the death of his substitute. (Verse 27.)

"According to the law, almost all things are cleansed by blood;

and without the shedding of blood there is no remission." (Heb. ix, 22.) "For the life of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it to you upon the altar to make an atonement for your souls: for it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul." (Lev. xvii, 11.) The reason that the blood makes atonement for the soul is, that the blood represents the life: "The life of the flesh is in the blood." "For the blood is the life of all flesh." (Lev. xvii, 14.) The reason that shedding of blood is necessary to pardon is, that "shedding blood" signifies *taking life* (Gen. ix, 4-6), and the life of the victim must be taken in order to the expiation or purification of sin (Num. xxxv, 33); and the cleansing from sin is the thing essential to forgiveness.

3. The typical meaning of the peace-offering is expressed by the word used to designate it. It signifies peace with God. But between parties who are alienated, peace can only exist after reconciliation is effected. Hence, this offering expresses the fact of the sinner's reconciliation to God.

In the ritual of the peace-offering, it was observed that the offering was shared by the altar, as God's representative, the priests, the offerer, and his friends, whomsoever he chose to invite. This social feast beautifully symbolizes the communion of the reconciled sinner with Jehovah, and his willingness and desire to share with his fellow-beings the abundant mercies of God. Hence, the sinner enjoys peace and communion with God through reconciliation.

Besides these ideas, it is the judgment of the writer that the dedication or consecration of the sinner to God is expressed by the peace-offering rather than the burnt-offering. In support of this conclusion, the following reasons are adduced:

(1.) The meat-offering was a thank-offering, regarded as expressive not only of thanksgiving, but also of the consecration of property to Jehovah. (Lev. xxiii, 9-17; Num. xv, 17-21.) Naturally, therefore, we should expect that the bloody sacrifice, which was also called a thank-offering—namely, the peace-offering (Lev. vii, 12)—would be the appropriate one to express the consecration of *person* to the Lord.

(2.) The idea of consecration is more naturally associated with the ideas of reconciliation and communion expressed by the peace-offering, than with the idea of propitiation expressed by the burnt-offering.

(3.) In the consecration of priests, the ram for the peace-offering is called "the ram of consecration." (Ex. xxix, 19-28; Lev. viii, 22-32.) Now, the consecration of the Jewish priests is typical of the consecration of the Christian, who is a priest in the "true tabernacle." Paul has reference, therefore, to the peace-offering, when he says, "I beseech you, therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God." (Rom. xii, 1.)

These three great classes of Jewish sacrifices, therefore, typify the propitiation of God, the expiation of sin, and the reconciliation of man by means of the death of Christ as the great sacrifice for sins, by whom also we enjoy peace and communion with God, and are led to consecrate our lives to his service.

With the Divine illustration of the subject before us, and in the light of its teachings, let us now consider

THE ATONEMENT.

Campbell, treating in his "Christian System" of the subject of Sacrifice for Sin, makes a lengthy extract from Mr. Watson, which is well worthy the study of all who desire to investigate this subject. Mr. Watson states the problem thus:

"The question proposed abstractedly, How may mercy be extended to offending creatures, the subjects of the Divine government, without encouraging vice by lowering the righteous and holy character of God and the authority of his government, in the maintenance of which the whole universe of beings are interested? is, therefore, at once one of the most important and one of the most difficult that can employ the human mind." (Christian System, page 43.)

"How can God be just, and justify the sinner?" is Paul's way of putting it in his Epistle to the Romans. (Rom. iii, 26.) The problem is too difficult for man's finite and fallible faculties to solve. God, however, has given us the solution. The problem is typified and illustrated by the Jewish sacrifices, and is solved and demonstrated by the death of Christ. Let us now consider the subject of sacrifice as it relates to Christ's atonement for the sins of the world.

I. It will be necessary to consider the conditions of the problem a little more fully. We must ascertain what was necessary to be accomplished in the Divine government by the sacrifice of Christ.

1. God, the governor and ruler of the universe, as the offended party, was to be propitiated. By this, I do not mean that God was

to be appeased in the sense in which the heathen seek to appease the wrath of their gods. For while God manifests anger, it is only that holy indignation which is consistent with virtue and holiness. God has always been willing, and has always desired, to save the sinner (Ezek. xxxiii, 11; 2 Pet. iii, 9); and the scheme of redemption which is offered to sinful man is not the *cause*, but the *effect*, of this willingness and desire. It is the gracious offer of his boundless love. (John iii, 16.) When I say, therefore, that God must be propitiated, I mean simply that such a satisfaction must be rendered to God for transgressing his laws as shall make it consistent with law and justice for him to pardon and save the transgressor.

As Lord of heaven and earth, it is necessary that his authority be maintained and respected; that his law be magnified and made honorable in the eyes of his subjects. (Is. xlii, 21.) To do this, there must be a penalty affixed for transgression of law; some satisfaction must be rendered for disobedience.

Not only so, but such a course must be pursued toward the disobedient, such a punishment inflicted, or such provisions for pardon be made, as shall be just on the part of God, and shall do justice, not only to the disobedient, but to all the subjects of his dominion. There are angels in heaven who never sinned; these have a right to ask that such a course be taken with the sinner as shall not do injustice to them as loyal subjects. There are fallen angels in hell; and these have a right to ask that the sinner shall be saved on conditions which shall not render God unjust in punishing them for disobedience. And, if other worlds are inhabited by responsible beings, they have similar claims upon the justice of God. Besides, the sinner himself has a right to demand that the punishment shall not exceed what is proportionate to the offense; since, for God to punish with undue severity, would make him cruel and unjust. Since "justice and judgment are the habitation of God's throne" (Ps. lxxxix, 14), in the administration of the Divine government, these ends must be secured at the same time that the love, mercy, and compassion of God are displayed. The complete and perpetual efficacy of the sacrifice of Christ to propitiate God in the sense herein defined, is typified by the whole burnt-offering, offered "day by day continually." Hence, Paul says, "God has set forth Christ as a propitiatory sacrifice, through faith in his blood, in order to manifest his

righteousness, in passing by the sins that were formerly committed through the forbearance of God; in order to manifest his righteousness at the present time, that he might be just, while he justifies him who believes in Jesus." (Rom. iii, 25, 26, Anderson's Translation.)

2. It was necessary that sin should be expiated, that its guilt be washed away, that the Divine government be purified from the stain thus brought upon it by the transgression of its laws. "Sin is transgression of law," or lawlessness—*ἀνομία*. (1 John iii, 4.) This disregard of law and authority must be punished, in order to atone for the disorder which it has created in the universe of God.

It is necessary, moreover, that the heinousness of sin shall be evinced. Men and angels, the whole universe of God, must know that sin is odious to God (Jer. xlv, 4); that it is "exceedingly sinful." (Rom. vii, 13.) What punishment is due to sin, what penalty is proportionate to the offense, what is necessary to secure all the ends of law and justice, what must be done to cleanse the Divine government from the guilty stain of sin,—these are questions too profound for man to answer. It behooves him humbly and submissively to accept the answer which God gives: "The wages of sin is death." (Rom. vi, 23.) Blood must be shed therefore, life must be forfeited, to atone for the guilt of sin. To do this, and yet save the guilty, death must be suffered by a person who is not guilty—by a substitute. The Jewish sin-offerings, especially those offered on the Day of Atonement, foreshadow the perfect and eternal removal of the guilt of sin by the death of Christ. Hence John says, "And he is the expiation for our sins; not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world." "And you know that he was manifested that he might take away our sins." "The blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanses us from all sin." (1 John ii, 2; iii, 5; i, 7.) It was in view of the "new covenant" which should be ratified by the blood of Christ, that the prophet declared, "I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more." (Jer. xxxi, 34; Heb. viii, 12.)

3. In order to save the sinner, it was necessary that he be reconciled to God, that the enmity of his heart be destroyed and supplanted by the principle of universal benevolence (*ἀγάπη*), which "is more than all whole burnt-offerings and sacrifices." Mark xii, 28-33.) Sin separates the sinner from God. The law says, "The

soul that sinneth it shall die." (Ez. xviii, 4.) "Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." (Gen. ii, 17.) These declarations are true, not only because God has uttered them, but they are true *in the very nature of the case*. Spiritual death ensues as the necessary result of disobedience. And so, sinning man is "dead in trespasses and sins;" dead to God, but alive to sin. He must become "dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God." (Rom. vi, 11.)

It is a law of our nature that we hate those whom we have injured; we become enemies to those we have wronged. And so when we sin against God, that act creates hatred and enmity toward God in our heart. Hence, Paul says of the Colossians, that they "were once alienated and enemies in their minds by wicked works." (Col. i, 21.) In this state of enmity and alienation of mind, the sinner comes to look upon God as a being of hate, wrath, vengeance, and cruelty. This explains why the heathen sought by their sacrifices to appease the wrath of their gods.

Now, in order to reconciliation, this alienation of the sinner must be removed, the enmity of his heart must be destroyed, these false conceptions of God, the product of his "heart that deviseth wicked imaginations," must be cast out, so that he may be "in his right mind." He must be convinced that his Creator is not a God of hate and cruelty, but of love, good-will to all his creatures, and that his wrath and vengeance are ever exercised within the bounds of love or benevolence. He must see that God does not delight in his destruction, but desires his salvation.

How could God accomplish this better than to give his only begotten and well-beloved Son to die for the sinner? The death of Christ, the just for the unjust, displays God's love to man, destroys the enmity of his heart, removes his alienation of mind, gives him correct views of God, and influences him (John xii, 32,) to return to God by complying with the conditions which God has appointed by which he may appropriate to himself the benefits of Christ's death. Hence, Paul says: "God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. Much more, then, being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him. For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to

God by the death of his Son; much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life. And not only so, but we also joy in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received the reconciliation." (Rom. v, 8-11.) And Peter says, "Christ hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God." (1 Peter iii, 18.) Thus the sinner is reconciled to God.

But reconciliation has communion with God as a concomitant. Also, belonging to God by creation, and especially now by redemption, it is but meet that the sinner, upon reconciliation, should consecrate himself wholly to the service of God, in willing, loving, grateful obedience. (Rom. xii, 1; 1 Cor. vi, 20; 1 Thess. v, 23.) This reconciliation, peace, and communion with God which the sinner enjoys, and the consecration which he makes to his service, are beautifully and expressively symbolized by the peace-offering which was a free-will offering of thanksgiving shared by God, the priest, the offerer, and his friends. Hence, "we have peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ" (Rom. v, 1), "who is our peace" (Eph. ii, 14), having made peace through the blood of his cross" (Col. i, 20).

II. Having seen what were the conditions of this great moral problem, let us next consider, in the light of this sacrificial system, what was required to effect the solution. Every sacrifice was offered upon an altar by a priest. These terms—sacrifice, altar, and priest—are correlative, the one implying the others. The altar represented God. The priests—and the high priest pre-eminently—were mediators between God and the people. They "drew near to the Lord" (Ex. xix, 22; xx, 19,) for the people. Their work of mediation consisted in offering sacrifice and in teaching the people the law of God. (Deut. xxxiii, 10; Heb. v, 1.) High-priests offered sacrifices to make atonement for the sins of the people. (Heb. ii, 17; viii, 4.) In order, therefore, to forgiveness of sins, a perfect sacrifice must be offered by a perfect high-priest. Under the law, the high-priests "had infirmities" (Heb. vii, 28); and the sacrifices could not "take away sins" (Heb. x, 4). There must be something better. There must be a perfect substitute and a perfect mediator, therefore, to make complete atonement for sin. This is fully and clearly set forth in Paul's Letter to the Hebrews. In the first seven chapters, Christ is presented in the character of a high-priest. In the next three chapters he is considered a sacrifice for sins.

1. We are ready now to inquire, What are the requisites of a perfect high-priest? Without attempting an exhaustive examination, the following points may be specified:

(1.) In order to be a perfect mediator, the high-priest must partake of the nature of both parties. In order to mediate for God, he must understand perfectly the claims of the Divine government, and what will satisfy those claims. To do this, he must be divine. Moreover, to intercede for man, he must understand fully man's needs and condition. Hence, he must have a human nature. (Heb. ii, 10-18; iv, 14; v, 2.)

(2.) The high-priest must be acquainted with both parties. It would be of little use to appoint a stranger to reconcile parties at variance. He must know the parties, their history, the causes of their alienation, and the forces necessary to be brought into action to effect a reconciliation.

(3.) The high-priest must be a friend of both parties. In a feud, it would avail nothing for an enemy to both parties to attempt to reconcile them. Both parties would at once reject the mediation. And if the mediator were a friend to one party, and an enemy to the other, the party to which he was hostile would not accept the mediation. In both cases the mediation would be unjust and ineffectual. The mediator between God and man must, therefore, be a friend of God and of the sinner.

2. It is proper, also, to consider the characteristics of a perfect sacrifice. Under this head, the investigation will be confined to four points:

(1.) The animals slain for sacrifice were required to be without blemish. (Deut. xvii, 1.) So the sacrifice that taketh away the sins of the world must be "without spot;" that is, it must be sinless. (Heb. ix, 14.) Otherwise it would need an atonement for its own sins, and could not be accepted to atone for our transgressions.

(2.) It must be a human sacrifice. "It is not possible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sins." (Heb. x, 4.) It is not possible, because these animals are inferior to man, are of different natures, and do not furnish an adequate substitute which God could accept in the stead of the transgressor. Otherwise, a traitor or murderer could atone for his crime, and save his life, by offering a horse or an ox to die in his stead. Hence, to expiate

human transgressions, the sacrifice must have a human nature. "Sacrifice and offering thou wouldst not, but a body hast thou prepared me." (Heb. x, 5.)

(3.) In order that the sacrifice may be accepted as an expiation for sin, it must have an uncreated nature. For all created beings, angels as well as men, belong to God as the work of his creation, and owe to him allegiance and obedience. A sinless creature can only say of his perfect obedience, "I have done that which it was my duty to do." (Luke xvii, 10.) No created being, whether human or angelic, has *any thing of his own* to offer to God to render satisfaction for the sins of another. The sacrificial victim must, therefore, have an uncreated, that is, a divine nature.

(4.) The offering must be voluntary. Even with our limited understanding, we can see that it would be unjust to compel an innocent person to suffer in the place of a guilty one; but we can see, also, that it would not be wrong for God to accept the voluntary substitution of a person in the place of the guilty, if the ends of justice could be secured, and mercy could be shown in sparing the guilty. "Lo! I come (in the volume of the book it is written of me) to do thy will, O God." (Heb. x, 7.) "I lay down my life, that I might take it again. No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again." (John x, 17, 18.)

Having now seen the conditions of the problem, and what was necessary to solve it as it was foreshadowed in the sacrificial system of the law of Moses, it yet remains to consider more fully the solution itself as it is demonstrated by the death of Christ.

III. This solution remained a mystery for four thousand years. Angels desired to look into it. (1 Peter i, 12.) Men sought in vain to understand it. They beheld only the shadow which but obscurely outlined the real image in the dim and distant future. "But when the fullness of time was come, God sent forth his Son" (Gal. iv, 4), who "now once in the end of the world appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself" (Heb. ix, 26). And Christ, as our High-priest, having "offered up himself" (Heb. vii, 27) "without the gate" (Heb. xiii, 12), "one sacrifice for sins forever" (Heb. x, 12), "by his own blood he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us" (Heb. ix, 12). "For Christ is not entered

into the holy places made with hands, which are figures of the true; but into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God for us." (Heb. ix, 24.) And he, "when he had by himself made expiation for our sins, sat down on the right-hand of God." (Heb. i, 3.) "We have then a great High-priest, that is passed into the heavens, Jesus the Son of God" (Heb. iv, 14), who "in all things was made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful High-priest in things pertaining to God, to make expiation for the sins of the people" (Heb. ii, 17). "For we have not a High-priest who can not be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin." (Heb. iv, 15.) "This man, because he continueth ever, hath an unchangeable priesthood." "For such a High-priest became us, who is holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners, and made higher than the heavens," "who is perfected forever more." (Heb. vii, 24, 26, 28.) Thus has Christ, our perfect High-priest, "through the Eternal Spirit, offered himself without spot to God" (Heb. ix, 14), a perfect "sacrifice for sins" "once for all," and "by one offering he has made a perfect and perpetual expiation for the sanctified" (Heb. x, 10-14).

So, then, by the death of Christ, the great sin-atonement sacrifice, God is propitiated, sin is expiated, man is reconciled to God, and permitted to enjoy peace and communion with him while on earth, and eternal life in his presence in the unending hereafter. Truly, "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him. But God hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit." (1 Cor. ii, 9, 10.)

"Thanks be unto God for his unspeakable gift!" (2 Cor. ix, 15.)

"O, the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments, and inscrutable his ways! For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counselor? or who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again? For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things: to whom be glory forever. Amen." (Rom. xi, 33-36.)

V.—THE OTHER SIDE OF A GREAT SUBJECT.*

[THE unusual interest excited by the article on "Mosaism and Christianity," published in the January number of the *QUARTERLY*, justifies, we think, the following notice of that article. The author's name, at his own request, is not given to the public.—EDITOR.]

IT is a well-known law of the pendulum, that if it is drawn out to one side of the vertical line on which it will remain at rest, it will swing off as far on the opposite side. The same law seems to hold true of the human mind, as exhibited in the history of the race. God made man a being possessing the ability to perceive and understand the truth, and also possessing the power to use aright the truth and all the means it places in his grasp; or to reject the truth, or to pervert it, and misuse it and the means it reveals to him. Men are very differently constituted. Hence, some will readily receive one class of truths, and reject others. Other men will receive the truths rejected by the first class, and reject what they receive. Both parties are prone to exaggerate and push to an extreme the truth they accept. When men discover a truth or detect an error, because the discovery is theirs they are apt to dwell on it, and magnify it, and it becomes more and more important in their eyes, until finally it becomes the only truth in the universe, and covers their whole horizon; and they make a hobby of this idea, and ride it off into error and fanaticism. Certain classes of truths and exaggerations of them prevail in one generation, and other truths seemingly opposed to them in the next. When men have been led into error, or to an extreme in one direction, when convinced of it, they are apt to rush off into error on the opposite extreme, fully as erroneous. Instead of stopping on the medium safe ground of truth, they swing off as far into error on the opposite side. Thus the human mind has, like the pendulum, been vibrating ever between opposite extremes of error, instead of stopping on the medium safe ground of truth, in which all truth is accepted, and each truth is shorn of error and extravagance, and given its proper position and proportions. When convinced of error, in rejecting it men are apt, in their

* "Mosaism and Christianity," *CHRISTIAN QUARTERLY*, January, 1874.

zeal, to reject errors, to cast to one side vital truth; and they injure themselves as much by discarding what is essential as they did in adopting what was pernicious.

In mental philosophy, two opposing schools have been contending for mastery from the infancy of human thought,—the sensational and ideal, or the materialistic and spiritual. Both have rejected vital truth held by the other, and both have pushed the truth they held to such an extreme of extravagance as to make of it positive error and folly. Sometimes one of these schools predominated in human thought; and in the next generation the opposing school has, for a time, triumphed. So in the religious thought of the world, two extremes have ever been contending for the ascendancy. Sometimes it is termed a struggle between idealism and legalism; then a contest between mysticism and rationalism; again, a conflict between ritualism and spiritualism, or, perhaps, a war between conservatism and progression. These conflicts arise from the differences in the mental and moral constitutions of men. One man will be attracted by the dogmas or doctrines of the Christian religion; another by its worship, or acts of religious adoration and devotion; still a third by its acts of benevolence and good works. One will make of religion a system of dogmas or truths to be believed; another a series of acts of religious devotion and emotion; the third a system of universal benevolence and charity. These generally separate into two parties. One makes of religion a system of truths concerning worship adoration, and the feeling of this emotion; the other makes it a system of truths concerning certain duties, and the performance of these duties. The truth is, that religion is neither of these exclusively, but is all of them, and includes each and all. But each party overlooks this, and rejects the truth held by the other party, and exaggerates the truth it holds, and pushes it into an extreme of error. The legalist makes of religion a system of dogmas concerning duty and the performance of duty. The idealist makes of it a system of truth concerning worship and emotion, and the exercise of such emotion. Both parties rush into extravagance and fanaticism, and the struggle is perpetuated from generation to generation, through every movement and reform.

This tendency to extremes is clearly seen in our own ranks, and has embarrassed our movements in reforming the religious thought

and action of the age. We have two tendencies of thought and action, which tend to divide our brethren into two classes—idealists and legalists; or, as some express it, “sound and true” men on the one side, and “progressives” on the other. Both of the parties have part of the truth, but not all of the truth. Both are inclined to exaggerate the truth they hold, and pervert it into error; make a hobby of it, and push it into an extreme of error and fanaticism. Both are inclined to reject vital truth that does not harmonize with this hobby. We are sorry to say, also, that both parties are inclined to denounce and persecute each other. This has seriously retarded the success of our efforts. While we would deprecate all persecution and denunciation, we can not go to the extreme of Lecky, in his “History of Rationalism,” and assert that theories and opinions are harmless. False theories and incorrect opinions necessarily tend to produce error and evil in life and conduct. Other influences may check and overrule this tendency, but this is their only natural result. We can see this demonstrated in the two extremes we are considering. Legalism tends necessarily to formalism and mechanical routine, in performance of outward duty alone. Idealism tends to extravagance and lawlessness. The true ground is found only by combining in a sensible statement both partial truths. We need all of the love of law and respect for authority demanded by one party, and all the love for abstract truth and appreciation of the genius and spirit of Christianity evinced by the other. Without such union in Christianity of what God has indissolubly joined together, and man has ever striven to tear asunder, extravagance and error will always lead to evil and wrong.

In the January number of the *QUARTERLY* appeared an article entitled “Mosaism and Christianity.” Probably no article has ever appeared in its columns that has aroused more thought and discussion, and been hailed with as widely different feelings. One party hailed it as, if not a new Gospel, at least a new statement of the old Gospel. The other regarded it as the embodiment of error and departure from the faith. While much has been written in reply to it, there has not as yet been an exhaustive review of the article, although all parties concede such a review is needed. Although there is much beautiful truth admirably stated in the article, the truth has often been partially stated, or perverted into error, or

warped out of position and proportion, and in some cases suppressed. Not intentionally, of course; but such was the result of the author's bias, and style of reasoning and thought. We propose, then, in this article, as exhaustive a review as space will permit. The author, in the very outset, bases his article on an error often perpetrated by polemic writers. Like the author of "Our Creed," in the January number of the second volume of the *QUARTERLY*, he forgets that he is not a legislator concerning the use of words, but a subject, bound to conform to established usage. Instead of using the word *law* as prevailing usage (which, Quintilian says, is the authority in such cases) demands, he undertakes to tell us how the word *law* should be used. Or, rather, he assumes that the inspired Paul—or, in other words, the Holy Spirit, through Paul—committed this violation of the fundamental law concerning the use of words, and used the word in a sense peculiar to himself. It is certain that the meaning that our author says Paul gave to the term *law*, is not that of common usage.

In our English lexicons, *law* is defined thus: "A rule of action. An established or constant mode of process. The manner in which any person or thing invariably acts, or should act. A statute. An edict. A decree. A custom established by common usage or consent. A judicial process." The reader will observe that the author of "Mosaism and Christianity" uses the word only in its narrowest sense: "A statute, edict, or decree;" or, in his broadest use, it means only municipal law, as defined by Blackstone: "A rule of civil action prescribed by the supreme authority of the State, prescribing what is right, and forbidding what is wrong." He does not even use it in its moral sense: "A rule of action prescribed by God or proper authority, prescribing what is morally right, and forbidding what is morally wrong." In Greek lexicons, *nomos*, the word of which our English word *law* is the invariable translation, is defined precisely like its English equivalent, *law*. Our lexicons of New Testament Greek give the following definitions of *nomos*, as used in the New Testament: "Law, decree, edict, statute. A rule or standard of acting or judging. A mode of education, discipline, or life. An express statute or written law. In Hebrew usage: The Mosaic code of laws. The Pentateuch, or books of Moses. The books of the Old Testament. The Mosaic Dispensation, or economy.

The Christian Dispensation. The Christian code, precepts, doctrines." The reader will observe that our author rejects all of the above uses of the word *law*, or *nomos*, except that of statute law. All New Testament lexicographers disagree with him, and they refer to Paul's writings for instances for all of the above meanings of the word.

The key-note of our author's article is, the assertion that Paul never applies the term *law* to the Gospel. In this he flatly contradicts all New Testament lexicographers and commentators; for they give, as meanings of *nomos*, "The Christian Dispensation, the Christian code, precepts, and doctrines," and they refer to Paul for instances of such use of the word. He contends, however, that, by an induction of the cases where Paul uses the term *law*, he can establish his position, his assumed Pauline usage of the word *law*. We could wish that his examination had been more complete. Let us, then, remedy his deficiency in this work. The word *nomos* occurs in the Gospels and Acts fifty-one times—fifty-two times, if we follow the Sinaitic manuscript. Forty-seven times, it clearly refers to the law of Moses. Five times, it means law in a general sense, or simply Jewish law; and in such cases its applied meaning must be the law of Moses, or the Old Testament. Such, then, was the Hebrew use of *nomos*, when Paul began to use it in his writings. Let us now analyze Paul's use of the word, beginning with his Roman letter. To understand his use of the word, and his argument, in which he uses it, let us get a clear conception of the purpose and scope of this masterpiece of inspired logic and eloquence. Paul's thesis, or proposition, is this: "The Gospel is God's power unto salvation unto all who believe and obey it; for in it is revealed God's plan of justifying men by faith in order to produce faith in those who hear, in accordance with the declaration of the Old Testament revelation: 'The man justified by faith shall live.'" His first work is to show that all men need salvation. He convicts all men of sin. He shows that the heathen had a knowledge of God, and did not retain it, but voluntarily went into idolatry. He shows that God's works in creation make manifest his existence and natural attributes, so that they are without excuse in their idolatry. He shows, also, that the heathen in their laws condemn certain crimes, and yet were guilty of them, thus proving by their own laws that they were sinners. He then appeals to this condemnation of these practices by the

Gentile, and shows that he condemns himself, and that God must do the same thing; and that He will render life to the good, and punishment to the wicked, in the day of judgment, according to the light he enjoyed; and each will be rewarded according to his works, by the light he had, and not according to the privileges he enjoyed, as the Jew supposed.

Here occurs his first use of *law*, Romans ii, 12: "For as many as have sinned without law [God's revealed will] shall also perish without law [God's revealed will]. And as many as have sinned under law [God's revealed will] shall be judged by law [God's revealed will]. For not the hearers of the law [God's revealed will] are just before God, but the doers of the law [God's revealed will] shall be justified. For when the nations that have not the law [God's revealed will] do by nature the things contained in the law [God's revealed will], these not having the law [God's revealed will] are a law [rule of action or life—law of nature] unto themselves; who show the work the law [God's revealed will] requires written in their hearts, their consciences bearing testimony, and their reasoning with each other accusing or making excuse." This law written in their hearts, that makes them a law unto themselves and responsible, is the law, or light, of nature. The apostle has now proved the Gentile to be a sinner, and that he needs salvation from sin. He now turns to the Jew, and addresses him, and overthrows the Pharisaic self-righteousness of the Jew who boasted of his descent from Abraham, and claimed justification because he obeyed the law of Moses; and, by an appeal to the Old Testament, the Jew's own authority, convicts him of sin: "Behold you are called a Jew, and rest in the law [God's revealed will], and make your boast of God, and know his will, and approve of the things that are best, being instructed by the law [God's revealed will]. You that make your boast of the law [God's revealed will], do you dishonor God by breaking the law [God's revealed will]. For circumcision indeed profits you if you keep the law [God's revealed will]; but if you transgress the law [God's revealed will], your circumcision becomes uncircumcision. Therefore if the uncircumcised keep the righteousness of the law [God's revealed will], shall not his uncircumcision be regarded as circumcision? And shall not uncircumcision which is by nature, if it fulfill the law [God's revealed will], condemn you who by the

letter [mere mechanical obedience to the letter] and circumcision transgress the law [God's revealed will]?" The reader's attention is particularly called to the apostle's thought that mere mechanical obedience of the Jew to the letter of the law, mere obedience to the law as a statute, is not meeting the demands of the law. The law demands the obedience of the heart, or must be in the heart. He condemns the Pharisaic obedience and self-righteousness of the Jew.

In the third chapter, the apostle shows that the Jew had not kept the law, God's will as revealed in the Old Testament. He was not, and could not be, saved by righteousness of law; for he had not kept the law inviolate, even when tried by his own standard of mere mechanical obedience. "Now we know that whatever the law [God's revealed will] says, it says to those who are under the law [God's revealed will]. Therefore, by deeds of law [God's revealed will] shall no flesh be justified in the sight of God, for by the law [God's revealed will] is the knowledge of sin." That is, God's revealed will reveals what is sin, and gives to man a knowledge of sin; and no one can be justified before God by mere obedience to his revealed will, for no one obeys his revealed will in all things, or meets all the requirements of his revealed will. "But now, God's plan of righteousness [plan of making men righteous] without law [his revealed will] is revealed, being attested by the law [his revealed will—the law of Moses] and the prophets, even God's plan of righteousness through Jesus Christ. Where is boasting, then? It is excluded. By what law [rule or principle]? By the law [rule or principle] of works? No; but by the law [rule or principle] of faith." That is, boasting is not excluded by the rule or principle of works, but the rule or principle of faith. "For we conclude that man is justified by faith without deeds of law [God's revealed will]. Do we make void the law [God's revealed will]? No, indeed. On the contrary, we establish God's law [God's revealed will]." The apostle does not say that men are justified by faith without any obedience to the law of God, nor that obedience to the law of God is not a part of the ground of their justification; but rather that mere obedience to the law can not justify men: for no one can or does meet all its requirements. This he has proved in the previous context. Faith, then, must be the principal ground of justification,

and no man can be justified without it. He does not make void the law of God ; for that requires faith as its chief requirement, and a faith that produces obedience, or the work the law requires.

The apostle, then, in the fourth chapter, proceeds to show that if righteousness or justification came by mere obedience to God's revealed will, it would not be by grace, but God would owe it to man as a debt. But when God justifies a man who does not rely on his obedience alone, but believes, although he has not kept the entire law (God's revealed will), faith is the ground of justification, he does, not have any reference to the man who rejects the law, or the man who refuses to obey, or who disobeys it ; he has reference to the man who has, to the utmost of his ability, met the requirements of the law. He shows that such obedience can not be a ground of justification ; for, as our Savior declares, when we have done all that is commanded, we are unprofitable servants, for we have merely done what we ought to do ; and, above all, since no one has or can meet all the requirements of the law, obedience to law can not, as the Jews claimed, be the ground of justification. He then shows the Jew that God can, and does, justify men without obedience to the law of Moses ; for he justified Abraham before the law was given, or even the law of circumcision, afterward incorporated into the law of Moses ; and, of course, without works of obedience to the law, for the law was not given. The Jew, in appealing to the law for justification, did not go back to the real ground of Abraham's justification. Abraham was justified by faith, and those who had like faith were his children, heirs with him to the promise given before the law, and were justified with him and as he was. But Abraham's justification was not without law and obedience, or law and works of law ; for he was to leave his kindred, and to go out into a land God would give him. He believed God, and obeyed him, and went, and was justified for faith and the obedience of faith, as James most positively declares. The same holds true in regard to the offering of Isaac, as James teaches. But he was justified without the law of Moses, or any act of obedience to it, in each case. Then, as he was justified by faith and the obedience of faith, before the law of Moses was given, so man can be now, after it has been abrogated by Christ. Such is Paul's argument with the Jew.

The apostle says, "For the promise to Abraham, that he should

be the heir of the world was not to him through the law [law of circumcision—law of Moses] nor to his posterity through the law [law of circumcision—law of Moses]." It could not be, for it was made before the law of circumcision, or law of Moses, was given. The promise was to Abraham through faith, and to such as become his posterity by having like faith. "For if those who are his posterity by law [law of Moses] be heirs of the promise, then is faith made powerless, and the promise without meaning, for the law [law of Moses] inflicts punishment; for where there is no law [rule of conduct—knowledge of rule of conduct], there is no transgression. Therefore, the inheritance is by faith, that it may be according to grace, in order that the promise may be sure to all his posterity: not to those only who are his posterity through the law [law of Moses], but to those who are his posterity by having the faith Abraham had, who is the father of us all."

Romans v, 13: "There was sin in the world before the law [God's revealed will], but sin is not charged unto men where there is no law [no rule of conduct—no knowledge of a rule of conduct]." Verse 20: "But law [God's revealed will] came, that offenses might abound." That is, where there is no revelation, no revealed will of God, there was sin, as Paul proved in his arraignment and condemnation of the heathen. When revelation was given, men had more light and knowledge, and sin abounded, or there was more sin, just as the man sins more than the child. Romans vi, 14: "Sin shall not have dominion over you, because you are not under law [in the condition you were in when under the law of Moses], but under grace. Shall we sin because we are not under law [in the condition we were in under the law of Moses]? No, indeed." That is, we are not controlled by law alone, and judged by law alone, but also judged by grace, and under a government of favor and grace. We now come to the most difficult part of this letter, the seventh chapter. The apostle addresses himself to his Hebrew brethren, and makes his final reply to their position. He does not, in this chapter, judge the law, as God designed it to be used; but he examines it from the Jews' stand-point. He uses the law as the Jew uses it. He shows that such a use must condemn the Jew instead of justifying him. His seeming condemnation of the law is not a condemnation of the law, but of the use the Jew made of the law. "Know you not,

brethren, for I speak to you who are acquainted with the law [God's revealed will], that the law [God's revealed will—law of Moses] has dominion over a man as long as he lives [is alive to the law or lives by it—acknowledges it as the supreme rule of his life]?" "For the woman that has a husband is bound by the law [law in general] to her husband, as long as he lives. But if her husband die, she is free from the law [law in a general sense]. If, while her husband lives, she is married to another man, she is an adulteress; but if her husband dies, she is free from the law [law in a general sense], so that she is not an adulteress if she be married to another man. So, my brethren, you have also died to the law [law of Moses or, in its broadest sense, God's revealed will], that you may be married to another, to him who was raised from the dead, that we should bring forth fruit unto God. For when we were in the flesh, the sinful passions that were excited by the law [God's revealed will] were active in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." That is, the evil propensities of man's nature were in rebellion against God's revealed will, and rebelled against its restraints, and violated it. "But now are we free from the law [God's revealed will] being dead to that by which we were bound, so that we serve in newness of the spirit, and not in the oldness of the letter." That is, we are no longer under such control as we were when controlled by our Jewish ideas of the law. We are free from such bondage; for we obey the spirit of the law, and not slavishly and mechanically the letter, as we did when Jews.

He now takes up the Jewish idea and use of the law, and shows that it could only produce condemnation. His seeming condemnation of the law is not a condemnation of the law, but of the Jewish misuse and perversion of it. He places himself in the position of the Hebrew nation. He personates the Hebrew nation, and shows how the Jewish idea and use of the law would condemn him. He places himself in the condition the Hebrew people were in before the law was given. He shows how the use of the law must result in condemnation. "What shall we say, then? Is the law [God's revealed will] sin [the cause of sin]? No, indeed! Although I had not known sin, except through the law [God's revealed will]; for I had not known evil desire unless the law [God's revealed will] had said, Thou shalt not have evil desire." That is, he had not known

that such desire was sin, unless God had revealed that it was evil, and forbidden it. "But sin [a sinful nature], taking occasion through the commandment, rendered active within me every evil desire. For without the law [God's revealed will] sin was dead." That is, man's sinful nature rises in rebellion against God's revealed will, and excites every evil propensity in opposition to God's revealed will; and without this knowledge or restraint of God's revealed will, this sinful nature would not be so active, and there would not be the knowledge of what was sinful, and the sense of guilt arising from such knowledge.

"Indeed, I was alive once without the law [God's revealed will]; but when the commandment came, sin became alive, and I died." That is, I was once without knowledge of sin and sense of guilt, when I knew not God's law; but when I had this knowledge of God's will, then my sinful nature rose in rebellion, and I sinned, and I had this knowledge of sin and guilt. "And the commandment which was for life, I found to be for death." That is, although the commandment was for life, although God designed it to lead me to righteousness—and such is its proper object, and the result of a right use of it—yet in the way indicated above, the way in which the Jews used it, it led to sin and guilt and condemnation. "For sin, taking occasion of the commandment, deceived me, and by it slew me." My sinful nature led me to misuse the commandment (as the Jews did), and deceived me as to its real use, and how it should be used; and through knowledge of God's will, which was all the Jewish use of the law could give, brought me into guilt and condemnation. "Therefore, the law [God's revealed will] is holy, and the commandment is holy and just and good." The apostle here defends the law from any condemnation or charges that may be brought against it, such as are urged by the author of "Mosaism and Christianity," and pronounces it holy and just and good. This declaration of the apostle overturns entirely the strictures of that writer on the law, and shows that the apostle was not condemning the law, but the Jewish misuse of it; and he was showing that such a use would not, as the Jew contended, justify him, but condemn him. The author mistakes Paul's reasoning on the law, as the Jew reasoned concerning it, for his real estimate of the law; and his conclusive proof that such a use would

lead to condemnation, for a proof that the law necessarily leads to condemnation; and that its legitimate use would produce such result—that such was the natural and intended result of the law.

“Has, then, that which is good become death unto me? No, indeed; but sin, that it might appear sin [my sinful nature, that it might show its sinful character] was causing death unto me [bringing me unto condemnation], through that which is good; in order that sin, through the commandment, might become exceeding sinful.” The law did not become evil, nor was it the real cause of condemnation; but my sinful nature so perverted it, showing how sinful it was. “For we know that the law [God’s revealed will] is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under bondage to sin. For what I do I know not; but that which I hate, this I do. If, then, I do not that which I wish to do, I give assent to the law [God’s revealed will], that it is good. Now, then, it is no longer I [my better judgment] that do it, but sin [my sinful propensities] that dwells in me. For I know that in me [that is, in my flesh,] dwells no good; for to will is present with me, but to perform that which is good, I find not. For the good I wish to do, I do not; but the evil I wish not to do, this I do. Now, if I do that which I wish not to do, it is no longer I [my better nature] that does it, but sin [my sinful propensities] that dwells in me. I find this law [custom—course of life or habit], that when I wish to do good, evil is present with me. For, in the inward man I delight in the law of God [his revealed will], but I perceive another law [governing principle, prevailing habit, disposition,] in my members, at war with the law [governing principle, prevailing habit, or disposition,] of my mind, making me a captive to the law of sin [the sinful disposition, governing principle,] in my members. Wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? I thank God that I shall be delivered through Jesus Christ our Lord. I, therefore, with my mind serve the law of God [his revealed will], but with the flesh the law of sin [sinful disposition or propensity]. There is now no condemnation to those who are in Christ Jesus. For the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus [the Gospel as a law of life, the rule of life,] has made me free from the law of sin and death [sinful disposition]. For what the law [God’s revealed will] could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh [or because the Jews misused or perverted it as

the apostle showed above], God has done; who, sending his own son in the likeness of sinful flesh, condemned sin in the flesh, that the righteousness of the law [the righteousness God's revealed will was intended to produce, and would have produced, had not the Jew perverted it] might be fulfilled in us who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. The mind of the flesh is enmity against God, for it is not subject to the law of God [his revealed will], nor indeed can it be." Thus the apostle shows that the Jew's use of the law led only to condemnation; that he was helpless under such condemnation according to his own use of the law; that the mission of Christ and his Gospel alone could accomplish such release, for it alone fulfilled the end of the law. The Gospel was the perfection of the law, and accepting the Gospel was the only proper use of the law by the Jews. There is not the slightest idea of antagonism or incongruity between the law as God gave it and designed it to be used, and the Gospel suggested in the apostle's writings. The antagonism is between the Gospel and the Jewish misuse of the law.

Romans ix, 31, 32: "But Israel, that sought after a law [law in a general sense] of righteousness, has not attained unto a law [law in a general sense] of righteousness. And why? Because they sought it not by faith, but, as if by works of law [God's revealed will]. Israel being ignorant of God's method of making men righteous, and seeking to establish their own method of making men righteous, have not submitted themselves to God's method of making men righteous. For Christ is the end of the law [God's revealed will] for righteousness to every one that believes. Moses describes the righteousness which is by law [God's revealed will]. The man that does these things shall live by them." The apostle here points out the mistake of the Israelites, and their perversion of the law. The law did not make them righteous, because they did not use it right. The Gospel is the fulfillment of the law, and the method that the law enjoins on men to obtain righteousness. They were ignorant of the manner in which God designed them to use the law, and misused it. The apostle clearly establishes the harmony in character and design that exists between the law and the Gospel, and most positively negatives the central thought of "Mosaism and Christianity." Romans xiii, 8-10: "He that loves another has fulfilled the law [God's revealed will]. Love is fulfilling the law [God's

revealed will]." The reader's attention is called here to Paul's estimate of character, and the purpose of the law.

The word *law* occurs but a few times in Paul's Corinthian Letters. 1 Corinthians vii, 39: "The wife is bound by law [law in a general sense], as long as the husband lives." 1 Corinthians ix 8, 9: "Say I these things as a man? or does not the law [God's revealed will] say the same? For it is written in the law of Moses," etc. Verse 20: "And to the Jews I became a Jew, that I might gain the Jews; to those who are under law [God's revealed will], as under law [God's revealed will—law of Moses], not being myself under law [law of Moses], that I might gain those who are under law [law of Moses]; to those who are without law [God's will], as without law [law of Moses], not being myself without law to God [God's revealed will]; that is, not free from all law], but under law to Christ [that is, under the law of Christ, the Gospel], that I might gain those who are without law [God's revealed will]." 1 Corinthians xiv, 21: "In the law [the Old Testament] it is written," etc. Verse 34: "Women are to be in subjection, as also says the law [Books of Moses]." 1 Corinthians xv, 56: "The strength of sin is the law [God's revealed will]," as explained in Romans vii.

Let us now examine the Galatian letter. We need not tell the intelligent reader that this letter was written to correct an error into which the Galatians had been led by Judaizing teachers,—that they must obey the law of Moses. The Gospel is contrasted with the law of Moses throughout the entire letter. Galatians ii, 14: "I said to Peter, If you, being a Jew, live after the manner of the Gentiles, and not after the Jewish customs, why do you compel the Gentiles to observe the Jewish customs? We who are Jews by birth, and not Gentile sinners, know that a man is not justified by works of law [law of Moses], but by faith in Christ Jesus, even as we have believed on Christ Jesus, that we may be justified by faith in Christ, and not by works of law [law of Moses]: because by works of law [law of Moses] shall no flesh be justified." Verse 19: "For, through the law [the Gospel—the law of Christ], I died unto the law [law of Moses]." That is, by obeying the law of Christ, I became free from the law of Moses; or by the fulfillment of the law of Moses by the death of Christ, and by obeying the Gospel (the law of Christ—the perfect development of the law of Moses), I died to the law of Moses. "If

righteousness be by law [the law of Moses], then Christ died in vain." Galatians iii, 2: "Did you receive the Spirit by works of law [the law of Moses], or by the hearing of faith? He that supplies to you the Spirit, and works mighty deeds among you, does he this by works of law [law of Moses], or by the hearing of faith? For as many as are of the works of the law [law of Moses] are under the law [law of Moses]: for it is written, Cursed be he that continues not in all the things written in the books of the law [law of Moses] to do them. But that no one is justified by law [law of Moses] in the sight of God, is evident; for the just by faith shall live. The law [law of Moses], indeed, is not of faith, but he that does these things shall live by them. Christ has brought us from under the curse of the law [law of Moses], becoming a curse for us. The law [law of Moses] which was four hundred and thirty years after the covenant, which was confirmed by God concerning Christ, can not annul the covenant so as to make the promise of no effect. For if the inheritance be by law [law of Moses] it can not be by promise. What then is the purpose of the law [law of Moses]? It was added on account of transgressions till the offspring should come to whom the promise was made. Is the law [law of Moses], then, against the promises of God? It can not be. For if a law [law in a general sense] had been given that could have given life, surely righteousness would have been by the law [law of Moses]. Before the faith [the Gospel] came, we were kept under the law [law of Moses], being shut up to the faith [the Gospel], which was to be revealed. So then the law [law of Moses] was our pedagogue to lead us to Christ, that we might be justified by faith." Galatians iv, 4: "But when the fullness of time came, God sent his son, born of a woman, born under the law [law of Moses], that he might buy off those who were under the law [law of Moses], that we might receive the adoption. Tell me, you that desire to be under the law [law of Moses], do you not understand the law [law of Moses]?" Galatians v, 3: "I testify to every man that is circumcised, that he is bound to keep the whole law [law of Moses]. You that are justified by law [law of Moses] have withdrawn from Christ, and fallen from grace. For all the law [law of Moses] is fulfilled in one precept, even this: Love your neighbor as yourself. But if you are led by the Spirit, you are not under law [law of Moses]. Against the works of the Spirit there is

no law [law in a general sense]." Galatians vi: "Bear with the weakness of one another, and so fulfill the law of Christ [the Gospel]. For even those who are circumcised do not keep the law [law of Moses]."

Ephesians ii, 15: "Christ has abolished in his flesh the law of commandments [the law of Moses]." Philippians iii, 5: "Paul was, as respects the law [law of Moses], a Pharisee; and as respects the righteousness which is by law [law of Moses], blameless." Verse 9: "Not having my own righteousness, which is by law [law of Moses], but the righteousness which is by faith in Christ Jesus." 2 Timothy i, 8, 9: The apostle is condemning persons for turning aside to fables (Jewish traditions), and to endless genealogies (also Jewish). He gives the end, or design that the law was designed to attain. He then speaks of persons perverting the law from this purpose, and missing this end, and says: "We know that the law [law of Moses] is good if any one use it lawfully, knowing that law [law in a general sense] is not for the obedient, but for the lawless." Although the Hebrew letter may not be the work of Paul, it is clearly Pauline in its reasonings. Let us, then, examine it. Hebrews vii, 5: The sons of Levi took tithes according to the law (law of Moses). Verse 12: A change of priesthood requires a change of law (law in a general sense.) Verse 16: Christ is a priest after the power of an endless life, and not after the law (law of Moses). Verse 19: The law (law of Moses) made no perfect expiation. Verse 29: For the law (law of Moses) makes men priests who have infirmity; but the word of the oath, which was after the law (law of Moses), makes the Son, who is perfected forever. Hebrews viii, 4: There are priests who offer gifts according to the law (law of Moses). "I will put my laws [rule] of life—the Gospel] into their understanding." Hebrews ix, 19: When Moses spoke to the people every commandment of the law (law of Moses), according to the law (law of Moses), all things are to be cleansed by blood. Hebrews x: The law of Moses has a shadow of good things to come. Verse 8: Offerings for sin offered according to law (law of Moses). Verse 16: "Putting my laws [rule of life—the Gospel] in their hearts." Verse 28: "He that despised Moses' law died without mercy."

We have now examined every instance in which the word *law* occurs in Paul's writings. Leaving out the Hebrew Letter, it occurs

one hundred and thirty-one times; fifty-nine times it means God's revealed will—the Old Testament; forty-eight times it means law of Moses, nine times it means law in a general sense; six times it means habit, custom, disposition, governing principle of life; five times it means a rule or standard of judging; four times it means the law of Christ, or the Gospel as a law or authoritative rule of life. When the apostle uses law in a general sense, he refers almost invariably to the law of Moses. He has that law before him, as his references to its provisions show. When he uses it in the sense of God's revealed will, he invariably means the Old Testament, the only revelation then known to the Jew, and generally the law of Moses. Hence, we might say that one hundred and seven times he refers to the law of Moses in his hundred and thirty-one uses of the word. If we include the Hebrew Letter, he uses the word one hundred and forty-five times; one hundred and eighteen times he refers to the law of Moses or the Old Testament, ten times to law in a general sense, six times to disposition or habit, six times to the Gospel, and five times a rule or standard of judging.

We have now accomplished the following results: 1. We have shown that Paul does not invariably use the word *law* in the sense which our author assumes to be his invariable meaning. 2. The apostle most explicitly calls the Gospel of Christ law. 3. He declares that the Christian is under law, the law of Christ. 4. The apostle does not condemn works of law, but shows that they are not sufficient for man's justification. 5. Paul's apparent condemnation of the law of Moses is only a condemnation of the Jewish perversion of it. 6. In his reasonings on the law, in contrasting it with the Gospel, he views it from the Jewish stand-point, and not in its real character. Or, making another generalization, Paul speaks of four kinds of law: 1. Law of sin and death, an evil disposition, or an evil controlling habit, or evil propensities. 2. Law of nature, by which those are judged who have not revelation; as, when he says, those who have no revelation are a law unto themselves. 3. The law of the old dispensation—the Old Testament, or, more specifically, the law of Moses. 4. The law of Christ, the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus—the Gospel. He also speaks of four kinds of works, law, or deeds of law: 1. The deeds of the law of sin. These are always evil. 2. Deeds of the law of nature. These are sometimes

right in an imperfect degree; and, as far as right, are approved. Often they are erroneous. These deeds are not sufficient for man's salvation, because they are imperfect and erroneous often, and their understanding of the law was imperfect and erroneous very often. 3. Deeds of the law of Moses. These are right when performed through the right motive. The Jew could not be justified by them; because he could not keep the law in every particular; because he obeyed through the wrong motive and spirit; because he perverted and misunderstood the law; because he violated the law. 4. Deeds of the law of Christ or the Gospel. The apostle never condemns, but always approves and enjoins, these works. When used in their broadest and real meaning, these works secure man's justification; for faith, on which the apostle predicates man's justification, is an act of obedience to the law of Christ. Man is justified by faith and the obedience of faith.

These points will be more fully established as we proceed with our review of the author's reasonings. As fundamental to our review, let us have a clear definition of law in its various kinds. In our lexicons, which record established usage, law means, "A rule of action, or an established uniform method of acting; an established or uniform mode of process; the manner in which a person or thing invariably acts or should act; a decree, edict, or statute; a custom established by common usage; a judicial process." We can make another classification. Let us explain it by an illustration. In rearing our children, we at first merely take care of them, and they are without law. Then we forbid what will injure them. All else is permitted or tolerated. We rarely give any reasons for our command, because they can not apprehend them. The reasons we do give are prudential, and not moral. Then we begin to require service of them. We forbid more acts, and forbid them as wrong; because their knowledge is increased and increasing. We continue to require more service, and forbid more acts, until they are under a positive disciplinary system of commands, based largely on authority. As judgment matures, we relax this positive authority and control, and lead them to an apprehension and understanding of universal precepts, until they attain the freedom of manhood, and are controlled only by universally applicable principles. God pursued the same course in the religious education of man as a race. In the

Antediluvian, Patriarchal, Mosaic, and Christian Dispensations, he thus disciplined man, and gave to him different kinds of law. Then law is of three kinds: 1. Law of negative precepts, merely forbidding what is wrong, and all else is permitted or tolerated. 2. Law of positive precepts, commanding what is right and forbidding what is wrong, and based on authority. Such a law is disciplinary, and prescribes what shall be done, and how it shall be done; and specifically what shall not be done. 3. Law of universal truth—universally applicable principles. It is not claimed that there is any period in the life of the individual or race, when they have been controlled exclusively by either of these kinds of law, nor when the others were not, to some extent, present; but merely that there are periods in the life of the individual and of the race, when each of these kinds of law predominates. One of the fallacies of the author of "Mosaism and Christianity" is, that he makes each period controlled exclusively by one of these kinds of law. He also fails to recognize the third kind of law except in one or two instances, where he unwillingly concedes that the Gospel may, by a perversion of the term, be called law. Law may be divided into physical, mental, and moral law. Moral law determines our conduct with reference to right and wrong. Moral law can be divided into necessary moral law, and positive moral law. Necessary moral law enjoins what is right in the nature and relation of things. Positive moral law enjoins, for the accomplishment of some end, an act not obvious, in the nature of things, for the accomplishment of that end, nor necessary, in the nature of things, for the accomplishment of that end. The end is right and necessary, and demanded by reason and right, and the act is adapted to the accomplishment of the end. Neither the end nor the act are mere matters of arbitrary will or power, but are in accordance with reason and right. The difference between an act commanded by necessary moral law and one enjoined by positive moral law is, that the first is necessary and obvious in the nature of things; and the other, while reasonable and right, is not necessary and obvious, in the nature of things, for the accomplishment of the desired end. Religion is, in one sense, a system of moral law, and contains necessary moral law and positive moral law. Patriarchy was, in its prevailing feature, a system of negative restrictive commands. Mosaism was, in its prevailing features, a system of positive

disciplinary law, based on authority. Christianity is a system of universal law—a system of universal truths, universally and eternally applicable principles. But neither was exclusively of either character. As the light is ever present, and the same in the twilight, the daylight, and the sunlight; and as the same individuality is ever present in all ages of the life of the individual, so the germ of the universal and eternal was in Patriarchy and Mosaism, as well as in Christianity. There has been change; but it has been the change of growth, progress, and development. God has ever been the same; but he has revealed himself more fully. His truths have been the same; but he has developed them more completely. His law has been the same in nature; but he unfolded it more perfectly. He has changed the organization, the formal, the ceremonial. The body the vessel, the husk, have been changed; but the Spirit, the contents, the kernel, have not been changed by removal and substitution of something different, but changed only by growth and development.

We are now ready to point out a fundamental error of the author of the article we are reviewing. He makes too broad a distinction between Mosaism and Christianity. He makes the difference one of kind, and not of degree; one of individuality, and not of development. This is a cardinal error of our Reformation. The religious world makes no distinction, or but a slight difference, between Mosaism and Christianity. We have exaggerated the difference, and mistaken in what it consists. They preach Church identity—the identity of Mosaism and Christianity; we deny all common features, or community of spirit or purpose. They endeavor to put the new wine of Christianity into old Jewish bottles; we have “abrogation on the brain.” The position of the author of this article is but the logical outgrowth of some of our teaching. Again, the author makes Mosaism exclusively a system of positive law, based on mere authority. He fails to recognize the fact that, although such was true of it to a greater extent than of Christianity, yet the universal and eternal was present in Mosaism, was its spirit, and that it was designed to develop the universal and eternal; and that the positive is also found in Christianity, and must ever exist in a religion adapted to imperfect man. Another error, which is the radical error of the article, and the source of all other errors in the estimate of Mosaism is, he overlooks entirely the religious phase or feature or

element of Mosaism. Mosaism was a blending of politics, in the highest sense of the word, and religion; or, as union of civil and religious systems, God was the civil legislator, ruler, or judge of the Hebrew people, as well as their God.

In his examination of Mosaism, our author confines his attention entirely to the political element of the system. It is this that he contrasts with Christianity, and not its religious element. He here contrasts things that should never be contrasted any more than we would contrast a mowing-machine and an organ as instruments of music. The political element of Mosaism may not have known mercy, forgiveness, and love, but its religious element was based on these attributes. Indeed, a religion can not be devised for sinful man that is not based on them. They are essential to its existence and character as a religion. It would be a despotic superstition if it did not contain, and was not based on, love, mercy, and forgiveness, as well as justice. Another radical error: He asserts that the Christian is not under law, in any sense. Because the prevailing feature of Mosaism is not the same as in Christianity, because the Christian is not in all respects under the same kind of law, he asserts that he is under no law at all. He mistakes being under a different kind of law, a law whose prevailing feature is different, for not being under law. The Christian is under law, but under different kind of law, in certain features—a higher law; the highest law; a law of universally applicable principles. He is under the most exacting, searching, and binding law in the universe—a law that goes with him into every sphere of human activity, and determines how he must act in every emergency of duty. He is under law in the broadest, highest, deepest, fullest, and completest sense of the word. Another error to be noticed here is, that the author seems to think that there can be no law without positive or objective penalty. The law of inheritance prescribes how an heir can inherit. The law of naturalization prescribes how an alien can become a citizen. There is no objective penalty in either case for not complying with the terms; but still it is law in both cases. Another mistake: He assumes that there is no penalty in Christianity. The Christian is punished by loss of blessings, and by positive penalty if he refuses to obey, or neglects to obey, or disobeys, the law of Christ.

Another error common in such reasonings: The author makes

of God a bundle of attributes that act separately and even in opposition to each other. Love is displayed in Christianity, and love alone; and justice, and justice alone, in Mosaism. God is a being in whom these attributes inhere, and they always act together and in perfect harmony. When his justice punishes, his love and mercy are in the punishment, and assent to it; and when his love and mercy forgive, his justice is in the act, and consents to it. There is love in Mosaism, and justice in Christianity, as basis elements. There is an idea developed by the author that is invaluable, or would have been, had he not perverted it and exaggerated it. Love, and not fear, is the ruling motive in the obedience of the Christian. But, nevertheless, there is obedience, and obedience to law; although the author says the Christian is not under law, and his acts are not works of law. Punishment may arouse fear, and fear may arrest attention; but unless these become mere stepping-stones to obedience to what is right, prompted by love, there is no obedience acceptable before God. This was as true under Mosaism as in Christianity. The prevailing principle in the obedience of the Christian is a sense of right, and the prevailing motive is love; and perfect love casts out fear. But still fear is needed to arrest attention, and punishment to cause fear. This is necessary in the case of the sinner, to lead him to become a Christian, and in the case of the Christian himself; for, although the Christian rises out of fear into love, he never becomes entirely emancipated from fear and this influence of fear: for no one becomes perfect in this life. Then the Christian is not under law in the sense of obeying it through fear, and being obnoxious to its penalties; for he obeys it through love, and is not worthy of punishment or under its penalties. But he is under law in the sense that he is under obligation to obey it, and does obey, and liable to be punished if he does not obey, and will be punished if he does not. In the same sense in which the Christian is not under law, the pious Hebrew was not under the law of Moses, nor is the author of "Mosaism," or any obedient citizen, under the law of the State; for in neither case is there obedience through fear, nor liability to punishment, nor suffering of punishment. This is what Paul means when he says, "The law is not for the obedient, but for the lawless." It *is* for the obedient, in the sense that he is under obligation to obey, and does obey it. Then the Hebrew was under law in a sense

in which the Christian is not, and the Christian is not under law in a sense in which the Hebrew was under law. The Christian is not under the law of Moses; the Hebrew was. In a still higher sense, the Christian is under a different kind of law, a higher and better law. But in another sense he is under law to a greater and higher extent than ever was the Hebrew. If we keep these distinctions before us, we will avoid the extreme that men have fallen into in reasoning and interpreting this letter.

Let us now examine more critically our author's analysis of the Pauline conception of law: "Law is governmental authority, expressing itself in the form of a statute." This would do for the political element of the Mosaic law, but is too narrow for the religious element of Mosaism. Religion can never be mere authority expressed in a commandment. The author admits that law also means a moral principle inhering in the nature of things, and arising out of it; but he contends that the Pauline conception of the law of Moses is that of the principle put into a commandment, and expressed in a statute. Now, if he will unite these ideas, and say law is a moral principle inhering in the nature of things, and growing out of the nature and relation of things, such moral principle lying in the mind of the Law-giver, and by him embodied in a revelation given as a commandment to men, he will have a complete definition of the religious element of Mosaism. Religion must have all this, to be religion. Again, this law is based on love as well as authority, and is animated by love throughout. Moses declares the substance of his law to be, Love to God with might, mind, and strength, and love to our neighbor as to ourself. (Deut. vi; Lev. xix, 18.) Our Savior declares these precepts to be the basis, the animating principle, the scope, of the law of Moses. Paul declares (1 Tim. i, 5): "The end of the Mosaic law, its object, purpose, design, or scope, is love out of a pure heart, and a good conscience, and faith unfeigned." Even if the Hebrew did not apprehend this, it does not change the character of the law, just as the failure of the child to see love in the parent's command does not prove that there is no love in the command. Again, because the Gospel is a more perfect system of law, it does not prove that there is no love in Mosaism. It could not be a religion without love.

The author's second characteristic of law or Mosaism is a correct

view of the political element of Mosaism, but does not include many of the essential features of the religious element: "It is a statute expressing obligation, and presenting a rule of life." In the religious element of Mosaism, this statute and obligation are based on right, and characterized by love, mercy, and forgiveness. Right here we meet one of the most palpably erroneous statements of this article: "It is of the nature of law that the will of those to whom it is addressed is never consulted;" and we are told, in substance, that this is one of the radical differences between Christianity and Mosaism. This statement applies to neither the political nor the religious element of Mosaism. Does the author believe that God ever gave to man a system of religion in which his will was not consulted? Such a system would be a system of slavish superstition. Religion grows out of the relations existing between God and man; and its obligations rest on these relations, and exist independent of the will of man. This is as true of Christianity as of Mosaism. But in both systems the obedience must be voluntary, from the heart. Man's will is appealed to, and must voluntarily submit. We have said that the political element of Mosaism was not imposed on those to whom it was given, independent of their will. God was the civil ruler of the Hebrews as well as their God. The Decalogue was the Hebrew National Constitution. The law of Moses was their civil, religious, and social code. In the nineteenth chapter of Exodus we have the first recognition of the principle of democracy, and the first popular election in human history. God would not act as the civil ruler of the Hebrews until he was elected as such by a popular vote of the people. Again, on no less than three occasions did the Hebrew people solemnly accept and ratify the law of Moses by popular vote. Moses declares that he placed before the people life and death, blessing and cursing, and exhorts them to choose between them. The obligation to obedience exists independent of the will of the subject, in Mosaism and Christianity alike; but the will was consulted in both. We here assert that in no dispensation was acceptable service rendered to God unless the will of the subject was consulted, and such service was based on a loving submission of the will. This is the very essence of religion, and there can be no religion without it. The obligation may be greater in one than in the other, but the will is consulted to the extent of the obligation in each. The Mosaic

Dispensation was not such an arbitrary system of slavish superstition as the above sweeping assertion would make it. Religion would be impossible under such a system; and so would justice in a Church, State, or universe. This statement is totally and radically wrong. These errors are the logical outgrowth of our exaggerated teaching concerning the distinction between the law of Mosaism and Christianity, and of our extravagant teaching concerning abrogation. The third characteristic of Mosaism we will accept, and show in its proper place that it is as true of Christianity. The fourth characteristic we totally deny: "The power of the law over those placed under it is brought to bear on them solely from without." This is as utterly untrue of the religious element of Mosaism as darkness is of light, or evil of good. Does the author believe that God gave to man a system of religion that acted on them solely from without? We state the proposition thus that it may stand forth in its naked deformity: "Law has no power to originate a new life." Does the author believe that God ever gave to man a system of religion that had *no* power to originate a new life?

Let us hear the great law-giver Moses (Deuteronomy vi, 6): "These words, which I this day command you, shall be in your hearts." David declares the law of the Lord (the Old Testament) is perfect converting the soul. He also says the entrance of God's word (the Old Testament) gives light. He also declares that the statutes, the commandments, the precepts, the law of God (the Old Testament), have quickened him, have originated a new life within him. Read in the eleventh chapter of Hebrews the sublime eulogy on the heroes, the saints, who lived and died under the law of Moses, and then ask, in the light of the above description of that law, Did they attain to such a glorious life through a power that acted on them solely from without—that had no power to originate a new life? The declaration is not true of even the political element of Mosaism. A system of political law that acts on its subjects solely from without, and does not secure the assent of reason and conscience, and the submission of the will, and the love of the subject, is a slavish despotism. God never gave to man such a system of political law, much less a system of religion. Moses, David, the prophets, and the author of the Hebrew Letter, clearly teach that the religious element of Mosaism acted on the soul as an indwelling force, and had the power to

originate a new life. We meet, in this connection, another statement equally startling in its palpably erroneous character: "Law knows nothing of mercy." If this be said of the political element of Mosaism, it is an exaggeration and erroneous; but if asserted of the religious element of Mosaism, it is utterly false. Does the writer believe God ever gave to sinful man a system of religion that absolutely knew nothing of mercy? Could such a system be a religion? We can hardly conceive what could lead a sane man into such an error.

Let us hear, Jehovah, as he uttered the law amid Sinai's thunder, the very occurrence appealed to by the writer to sustain his assertion: "I, the Lord thy God, am a jealous God, visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children, even unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me, and show *mercy* unto thousands of them that love me and keep my commandments." How could Moses speak so often of God's mercy, and invoke it for the people; how could David speak of it in hundreds of places; how could the prophets exhort persons to invoke God's mercy, if they lived under a system that knew nothing of mercy? We repeat, we can not conceive how a man can declare that Jehovah gave such a system of religion to man. How he can pen such a sentence, in view of the thousands of utterances concerning God's mercy in the Old Testament, is inexplicable.

He also asserts that there was no forgiveness under Mosaism; or, at least, God only forgave as the head of a political institution, bestowing a sort of political forgiveness. The law had its sin-offerings, and God promised forgiveness to those who, from the heart, offered them. God forgave the Israelites at the prayer of Moses, and he forgave Moses, Aaron, Miriam, and others; and it was more than political pardon. He forgave David as a contrite sinner. (Psalm ciii.) Read David's declaration: "Bless the Lord, O my soul, who healeth all thy diseases, who forgiveth all thy iniquities. As far as the east is from the west, so far hath he removed our iniquities from us. Blessed is the man whose sin is forgiven, whose iniquity is covered up." Why did the Hebrew offer sacrifices for pardon? Why did he pray for pardon? Why did the prophets pray for pardon, claim it, promise it to the people, and rejoice in it, if they lived under a system that had no forgiveness?

The author overlooks the religious element of Mosaism entirely.

If he says he has reference to the political element alone, his contrast has no relevancy. He might as well contrast Christianity with the Assyrian monarchy or law. Our author makes God a bundle of attributes that acts separately, or even in opposition to each other. Legal justice, and that alone, was seen in Mosaism, and no mercy and forgiveness. Mercy and forgiveness were seen in Christianity, but no legal justice. The truth is, his attributes acted together in both systems. We have thus followed the author through his analysis of Mosaism, and shown that it is distorted and erroneous in even those features in which there is some truth, and totally false in the rest.

We shall now show that every feature justly attributed to law and Mosaism by our author, in his analysis of them, belongs also to Christianity. In Christianity, there is governmental authority expressed in a statute. Jehovah is still Ruler of the Universe and of man; and Christianity is his revealed will and law for man's government. All authority is given to Christ. He is the King, as well as the Prophet and Priest, of men. The writer makes him Priest alone. Christ is King. He has a kingdom. He reigns. He has laws, commands, or a system of law. The law of the Lord has gone out from Zion. God, through his Son, in the Gospel, commands all men to hear, believe, repent, confess, and obey. He commands Christians to obey all things whatsoever Christ commanded them. We walk by the law of Christ. The authority so expressed is law, according to the author's own definition. We obey his commands, say John and all the apostles, in scores of cases. Penalty follows violation of law in Christianity—violation of the law and commands of Christ. Penalty is of two kinds,—*Objective*, such as loss of God's love and favor; loss of union with him; loss of the blessings he bestows on the obedient; banishment from society, and infliction of positive penalty, or evil. *Subjective*—guilt, remorse, fear of punishment; loss of purity, an injury to moral nature, cultivation of evil habits and propensities. All this follows a rejection of the Gospel, or a violation of its commands or law, as certainly as it did in Mosaism. There is an outward power and influence in Christianity as well as in Mosaism. The Church, with its authority, officers, and penalties, is a power from without, as was the religious element of Mosaism. The Gospel knows no mercy to the impenitent and

rebellious any more than Mosaism. "He that believeth not shall be damned," says the Gospel. "The wages of sin is death." "Depart from me, ye cursed." Righteousness under the Gospel requires perfect obedience to the law of Christ. Man can not attain to such righteousness, under either Mosaism or Christianity, except by and through faith. There are provisions of grace and mercy by which he is justified in both dispensations. Because Christianity is perfect in these provisions, it does not follow that Mosaism was utterly without them. Again, we call attention to the author's fallacy, that there can be no law without objective penalty. The law of naturalization is an instance to the contrary; also to his fallacy, that there is no penalty in the Gospel. There is both objective and subjective. Also to his assertion, that all of the power of the Gospel is subjective, or internal. Its first influence on the sinner, its terrors, are external. So are the ordinances and control of the Church and its penalties.

We propose to examine more fully the author's analysis of the Gospel. In the very outset, the author encounters the grand generalization of the pioneers of the Reformation: "The Gospel has facts, commands, and promises." He appears to be staggered by the fundamental truth that the Gospel has commands; commands for saint and sinner; commands uttered by Divine authority; commands to be obeyed; commands that must be an authoritative rule of life; commands that came from him who spoke with all authority in heaven and on earth; or a Divine decree, or edict, or statute, and to the disobedience of which is attached punishment by penalty, both objective and subjective: and the righteousness that is in Christ Jesus can be obtained only by obeying from the heart, to the extent of our ability, these commands. But cautiously our author evades this truth, which overthrows his entire argument, thus: "It is distinctly admitted and firmly held that the requirements [why not say commands, for they are commands as clearly as any uttered at Sinai?] of the Gospel have in them all Divine authority, and the highest possible obligation." Are they not, then, law in the highest and truest sense of the word? They are as much law, and in the same sense, as the religious element of Mosaism. "But," it is cautiously added, "it is believed, at the same time, that the nature of redemption is such as to take these commandments off the legal plane, and put them on a much higher and grander one." Why is this believed? How can

commandments or laws be placed on any plane but a legal plane? The assertion is a contradiction of terms and common sense. Commands or laws may be placed on a higher legal plane, but never on any plane but a legal one. The author's mistake is a fundamental one. He mistakes a change in the character of the law for a casting to one side all law, and passing on to a plane above law. The commands or laws of Christianity are laws of universal principles, but they are laws given to man in the form of commands or statutes to be obeyed. They are the highest kind of law; but they are as clearly law as the laws of Moses. When the author made the concession he made at the commencement of the quotation, he might as well have stopped further argument. He yielded the entire question.

In the second characteristic of Christianity, and one of its contrasts with Mosaism, we meet with the astounding statement, "It is no part of the intention of a system of law (Mosaism, or any possible system of legalism) to save sinners." Let us state this in another form. Remember, if the author is contrasting Christianity with the political element of Mosaism, there is no relevancy in the contrast. If he refers to the religious element of Mosaism, his proposition is, "God gave to sinful man a religion which had not, as any part of its intention, the salvation of sinners!" Does any one believe such a statement? The religious element of Mosaism, its sacrifices, prayers, and worship, were the worship of sinful man, and were to save sinners. It was not a perfect system; but if any Hebrew was ever saved, he was saved through the religious element of Mosaism. Each dispensation was suited to man's condition. The first three were imperfect, but just as twilight, daylight, and sunlight are for man's life, so each was for man's salvation, in its day. We are told that the "law had no power over man until it was proclaimed." Neither had the Gospel, so there is no contrast there. The religious element of Mosaism was addressed to sinners, and appealed to them as sinners, and had sacrifices, prayer, mercy, and forgiveness, as we have clearly shown; so there is no contrast in these particulars.

The religious element of Mosaism did not propose to regulate men's lives by its letter. God never accepted such obedience in religion. The prophets condemned such obedience as odious in his sight. The law of Moses did not put sinners to death in a religious sense, without mercy in a religious sense. Even Achan, when put to

death under the law of Moses, by Joshua, was exhorted to praise God. Does the author believe that if Achan was penitent, he was put to death in a religious sense (damned), without mercy in a religious sense (pardon). There is no relevancy in such contrasts. The law says, "The soul that sinneth it shall die." So does the Gospel as inflexibly, "He that believes not shall be damned." The law says, "Cursed is every one that obeys not the law." The Gospel, as uttered by Christ himself, says, "He that believes not, the wrath of God rests on him." Paul says, "The wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord." The first declaration is as much a part of the Gospel as the last. The author reasons as though the warnings of the Gospel were no part of the Gospel; as though the Gospel had no penalty and punishment, if men did not obey it; as though it had no objective power over one who sins. Paul, in preaching the Gospel, said, "Knowing the terrors of the Lord, I persuade men to repent." "The Gospel recognizes voluntariness as an element in a religious life." Yes, it is the source of a religious life; for there can be no religious life without it: and the religious element of Mosaism recognized this as clearly as the Gospel. "These laws shall be in your hearts. Thou shalt love God with all thy heart." The representative element, to which the author refers when he says, "Every Hebrew, even those who lived long after the generation who ratified the covenant had passed away, was born under the pains and penalties of the law," was no part of the religious element of Mosaism any more than it is in Christianity. Every human being in Christian lands is born under the pains and penalties of the Gospel, under the obligation to obey it, and will be punished if he does not. The representative element was not known in the service of God in religion. "Thou shalt, is the language of the law." The Gospel says, "Worship God; profane not his name; honor parents; do not lie, steal, murder, commit adultery, or covet," as clearly and positively as the law, and has its threats and penalties as certainly as did the law. "Thou shalt not," is the language of the law. "'He that believeth, and is baptized, shall be saved,' is the language of the Gospel." Does the author intend to assert that these acts are never *commanded* in the Gospel? Are not men commanded to hear, repent, believe, confess, and obey? Why does he omit the next statement of Christ, "He

that believeth not shall be damned?" That is a fearful "Thou shalt not" live. "In the law, men were driven under the lash of outward authority." We deny, *in toto*, that, in the religious element of Mosaism, men were ever driven under the lash of outward authority. Does the author believe it? Does he believe that God ever gave to man such a monstrous despotism as a religion? The life of a child of God was not that of a trembling slave, but the life of a freeman in all dispensations, as far as a religious life was concerned. It could be no other. The consent of the soul was won in the religious element of Mosaism, as in Christianity; for there could be no acceptable service of God without. If the author had any thought in his next contrast, he failed to express it; for he showed no contrast whatever. God always expressed and gave man reasons for his commands. He was their God. They owed duties to him and their fellow-men, on account of the relation they sustained to them. God did not base the Mosaic law on mere will. Nor was the Hebrew restricted to the statute as the source of obligation, nor restrained from looking back of the statute to the reasons for Jehovah's right to rule. And man's relation to God, his fellow-man, and himself, were fundamental conceptions in Mosaism, as they are in Christianity; and they are the basis of law in Christianity as they were in Mosaism.

The writer asserts that "the law or the religion of Mosaism expresses governmental authority, simply. The Decalogue would have been applicable had man never sinned. Its obligations are in the original relation of Jehovah and man." All this is true, and it is just as true that the redeemed man is under the same law and its obligations as well as the sinner; but we can not see how it affects the author's argument. It certainly does not prove that the religious element of Mosaism could not give life; that not a statute of the religious element of Mosaism looked to the recovery of man from sin, nor that it is utterly powerless in that direction. Again, we pause and ask, Does the author believe that God gave to sinful man a religion that had not a command that looked to his recovery from sin; that had not even a semblance of fitness or value in that direction? Such monstrous assertions are the legitimate result of much of our teaching concerning abrogation, and the absolute difference there is between the Mosaic dispensation and Christianity, which leads persons to declare that the Old Testament is like a last year's

almanac; that there is nothing in Christianity that existed before the day of Pentecost.

The author asserts directly, a number of times, that the Gospel is not law, and does not contain law as any part of it; and this is implied in nearly every paragraph of his article. Then he seems to be aware that he has taken too broad ground, and recedes, and says that although there may be law in the Gospel, the law is not remedial. The legal part of the Gospel is no part of its remedial element. He tells us that what is remedial can not, under any definition of law, be called law. A broad assertion; but what proof have we? Because it is of grace, there can be nothing of law in it. Grace and law are absolutely incompatible.

Can there be a remedial system without its laws, without laws prescribing how the remedy is to be obtained and enjoyed? Can grace be without law, without law prescribing how the favor can be obtained and enjoyed? The author overlooks a plain teaching of revelation. God has a general government over the universe; a moral government over all intelligences; a gracious government for those who have sinned; a providential government for his children. God's remedial system, his promises of grace (the Gospel), are based on and regulated by law; and all who avail themselves of the remedy, do so by complying with law, in obedience to law; and continue to enjoy the grace, only by obedience to law; and are regulated in their enjoyment by law. "Law, in its widest sense and widest form, was possible without Christ." Law for man, had he never sinned, would have been possible without Christ. But we totally deny that law for sinful man was possible, after his redemption had been determined in the Divine mind, without Christ as the basis idea. If we subtract Christ and redemption through him, we have not (as the author asserts) the highest form of law left. "God's relation to man gave rise to law." So also did Christ's relation to man give rise to law. "The requirements of the Gospel have their origin in the nature of a remedial system." Granted; but are they not law? Do not they spring from the nature and relation of things? Are they not obligatory? Have they not been required of man in the form of commands or laws? "But for the existence of that system, they would not exist." But for the existence of God, what he calls law would not exist. "Remove Christ, and they would be removed."

Remove God, and what he calls law would be removed. What relevance or pertinence is there in such general statements? They do not prove that the commands of the Gospel are not law. "The requirements of a remedial system are outside of the proper domain of law. They take their character from the economy to which they belong." The last remark is true, but does not prove that these requirements are not law. It merely proves that they are the law of a remedial system. They are the requirements of a different class of law, but still law in every real meaning of the term. They are the requirements of, or the law of, a scheme of redemption.

The difference between the character of the law of Moses and the requirements of the Gospel does not prove that the latter are not law, any more than the difference between the requirements of a school and a State proves that the first are not law—the law of the school. Again, we have to remind the reader that the religious element of Mosaism had mercy, prayer, forgiveness, and salvation from sin—had its remedial features. We remind him, also, that we have shown that the Gospel has every feature that the author justly attributes to Mosaism,—governmental authority expressed in a statute or rule of life, and penalty follows violation of its requirements. The relation of the Christian to the Gospel, and to the principles of Mosaism incorporated into the Gospel, is the same as the relation of the pious Hebrew (the child of God) to the religious element of Mosaism.

We propose now, by a direct appeal to the Scriptures, to prove that they call the Gospel a law. We have done this only incidentally, so far. The writer admits that the Gospel requires or commands men to hear, believe, repent, confess, and obey in baptism; and yet it is not law! It commands these acts, and yet they are not acts of obedience to law—works of law! The decree or statute of Jehovah through his Son, to whom all authority is given, is, that all men shall hear, believe, repent, confess, and obey; and yet this decree is not law! Let us hear the Scriptures: "The law of the Lord shall go forth from Zion." (Isaiah.) "I will put my laws in their hearts, saith the Lord." (Jeremiah.) In these Scriptures the Gospel is called law explicitly. Galatians vi, 2: The Gospel is called "the law of Christ." Romans viii, 2: "The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus [the Gospel] has made me free from the law of sin and

death." The Gospel did what the law of Moses could not do. Hebrews viii, 10: "I will put my laws [the Gospel] in their minds." Hebrews x, 16: The same declaration. James i, 25: "But whoso looks into the perfect law of liberty [the Gospel] being constant, not being a forgetful hearer but a doer of the work, he shall be blessed in his deed." James ii, 12: "So speak ye and so do, as they that shall, be judged by the law of liberty [the Gospel]." Hebrew vii, 12: "It is evident that when the priesthood is changed, there is, of necessity, a change of the law." In this Scripture we have affirmed, most positively, what we have been asserting all through this article. The inspired writer does not say, with the author of "Mosaism and Christianity," that when the priesthood was changed, when the priesthood of Mosaic law was laid to one side, all law was laid to one side, and the Christian has passed out from under all law under the priesthood of Christ; but he says the law was changed, and under the priesthood of Christ the Christian is still under law—the law of Christ, the Gospel; a higher order of law. Then, in no less than eight places is the Gospel called law by the Scriptures, and twice by Paul. Not a law of negative precepts only, although it forbids what is wrong; nor a law of positive commands alone, although it contains positive law as part of its requirements; but a law of universally applicable principles—a law of the highest character. The sinner is under the law of the Gospel, in the sense of obligation to obey it, and under its penalties if he does not. All men are by the Gospel commanded to hear, believe, repent, confess, and obey. If they do not; they are under its penalties. "He that believeth not shall be damned." "He that believes not, the wrath of God rests on him." "Depart from me, ye cursed [because they obeyed not the law of Christ]." The Christian is not under law in certain senses, as the apostle declares; but in another sense he is, and must be. He is not under the law of Moses, as Paul declares in 1 Corinthians ix, 20, and Romans vi. He is not under law in the sense of being under its penalties, nor in the sense of obeying it through fear. Neither the pious Hebrew, nor any child of God, was under the law of Moses, or any other law, in the last two senses. But the Christian is under law, as Paul declares in the same verse (1 Corinthians ix, 21) in which he declares he is not under law. He is under law to Christ, under the law of Christ. He is under obligation to obey the law of

Christ just as the Hebrew was under obligation to obey the law of Moses. He is under the law of Christ in the same sense in which the pious Hebrew was under the religious element of the law of Moses. The Christian is commanded to obey all things Christ commanded. If he does this, then he is rewarded. If he does not, he is punished. The author says: "Forgiveness and eternal life are not rewards for years of faithful law-keeping, but are a free boon." Paul says that, because he has kept the faith and fought a good fight, God will give him a crown of eternal life. The Hebrew Letter speaks of a recompense of reward. Paul says God will reward every man according to his work, and the reward of the righteous is eternal life. The idea of reward and punishment is a fundamental idea of the Gospel. If a man neglects the law of Christ, or refuses to obey, or disobeys it, he is punished. If he obeys it, he is rewarded. So teaches the New Testament, from the first utterance of Jesus to the last utterance of his apostles. Yet the Gospel is not law, and the Christian is not under law, and the Gospel knows nothing of rewards and punishments! The author admits man must submit to certain requirements: he must hear, believe, repent, confess and obey, before he is pardoned; yet, because he does not obtain pardon solely by these acts of obedience to the law of Christ, he is not under law.

Because salvation is not entirely human, but has a Divine element, certain religionists who reason as accurately as the writer, and just in the same way, conclude that there is nothing human in it.

"These steps are not works of law to be performed." Does not the Gospel require them? Does not Christ command them? Does not man perform them? Are they not acts of obedience to the law of Christ? works of obedience to his law? works of his law? "Each has its origin in the nature of a remedial system." Exactly; and hence the law of the remedial system must command them, and does command them, and man must perform these works of the law of the remedial system. "A system of law has no place for any of these steps." Would not a system of remedial law, the law of a system of redemption? The religious element of Mosaism had a place for faith, repentance, mercy, forgiveness, love to God, and obedience. Matthew xxiii, 22: Christ says the weightier matters of the law of Moses are mercy, justice, and faith; he also says that the substance

of the law is love to God with all our hearts, and to love our neighbors as ourselves. 1 Timothy 1, 5: "Paul says the end or purpose of the law of Moses is love out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and faith unfeigned." Read also to what the ancient saints attained, who lived under the law of Moses. Hebrews xi: We are told that faith does not come within the pale of law; and the apostle's declaration, "The law is not of faith," is quoted and paraphrased thus: "Law and faith are not the same in nature. They do not admit of being classed together at all." Now, I respectfully submit that the paraphrase is not Paul's meaning. It is this, that the Jewish works of obedience to the law of Moses, and the justification they claimed through them, was not based on faith. But even the author's paraphrase by no means proves that the law of Christ does not command faith, and that faith is not an act of obedience to the law of Christ, or a work of the law of Christ; nor that the law of Moses did not require faith, and that faith was not a work of the law of Moses. In the sense of a belief in God and his Word, and a trust and a confidence in him, and a reliance upon him, faith was a work of the law of Moses. The weightier matters of the law of Moses were mercy, justice, and faith. The end of that law was love out of a pure heart, and a good conscience, and a faith unfeigned. Read, again, the faith to which the saints attained who lived under the Mosaic law. "But faith, in the sense of faith in Christ, did not come within the pale of the Mosaic law or any system of legalism." Read the Hebrew Letter, and see how every thing in the religious element of the law of Moses was typical of Christ. Read how the ancient saints prophesied of Christ, and looked forward to him. Read how their faith looked forward to him, and they were justified by faith that they attained under that dispensation. Then the Mosaic dispensation had for its end and its weightier matter, faith; and a faith that justified. But is not faith a work of law—of the law of Christ? 1 John iii: "This is the commandment of God, that we believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and love one another, as he gave us commandment." Faith and love are commands of God and Christ. John vi, 27: "This is the work of God, that you believe on him whom he hath sent." Mark i, 15: Jesus commanded men to repent, and *believe* the Gospel. Paul commanded the jailer to believe. And we might multiply quotations; but these are enough.

These Scriptures most conclusively show that faith is an act of obedience to the law of Christ, a work of the law of Christ, and was a work of the law of Moses,—faith in the sense of faith in Christ, as our Savior's language to the Jews proves. We do not know how we can make the matter stronger.

Next, repentance. Our author says the law knows no repentance. If he means the religious element of Mosaism, he could not make a greater mistake. The children of Israel repented under Moses, and God forgave them in a religious sense. So he forgave Moses, Aaron, and Miriam, and others. David repeatedly speaks of repentance and pardon to the penitent. Would they have prayed for pardon, exhorted men to repent, and promised them pardon, or declared that they and others were pardoned, if the law of Moses knew no repentance and forgiveness? Ezekiel declares, "If an unrighteous man forsakes his sins, he shall not die: he shall live." So do Jeremiah, Isaiah, and all the prophets; yet Mosaism had no repentance! John the Baptist, under the law of Moses, commanded the Jews to repent. So did Jesus and his apostles, before his crucifixion. Repentance is an act of obedience to the law of Christ—a work of the law of Christ. Peter and all the apostles commanded men to repent. Such was the law of the Lord that went forth from Zion; yet repentance is not a work of law! It was commanded under the law of Moses, and there were sacrifices for the penitent. It is commanded by the law of Christ. Acts xvii, 30: "God commands all men, every-where, to repent;" yet there is no law requiring men to repent, and repentance is not a work of the law of God and Christ!

But now comes the climax. "Baptism is not a work of law, not a work of law at all!" Well, what next? Had the wise man lived in our day, he could not have said, "There is nothing new under the sun." Now, common sense says it is a work of obedience to law, the law of Christ; a work of obedience to positive law; a work of law, a work of obedience to positive law. It springs out of the nature of the Christian religion; hence, the law of that religion commands it. Christ commanded it in the organic law of his kingdom, the Commission. Peter, on the day of Pentecost, and at the house of Cornelius, commanded men to be baptized. The apostles did, in the case of all converts. This was the law of the Lord that was to go forth from Zion. Men obeyed it, or obeyed the law of Christ.

Romans vi, 17: "You have obeyed from the heart the form of teaching in which you were instructed." It is, then, an act of obedience to the law of Christ, or a work of the law of Christ. Holding this—that baptism is a work of the law of Christ—does not expose one to the full force of Paul's condemnation of the Jews, who sought justification on legal grounds. It is easy to escape such condemnation, and exposes no one to ridicule who understands the full force and real nature of Paul's reasoning. The Jews expected to be justified by obedience to the law of Moses. Baptism is an act of obedience to the law of Christ. Paul nowhere condemns such works, but declares when we have wrought them, or obeyed from the heart the doctrine delivered to us, or the Gospel, or law of Christ, we are justified. Paul showed that the Jew could not be justified by the law of Moses as he used that law, for he could not perfectly meet all its requirements.

The Christian does not expect to be justified by obedience to the law of Christ, or works of law alone, unless we include faith; but by faith, and the obedience of faith, he is brought into Christ, who justifies. There is no conflict, then, between calling baptism a work of law—the law of Christ—and Paul's great argument with the Jews. Baptism is a work of positive law. Every reason the writer gives for the command, and every purpose he says it accomplishes, demonstrates it to be a work of positive law. Christ commands, to accomplish a certain end, an act not necessarily obligatory for the accomplishment of that end. Hence it is a work of positive law. So is the Lord's-supper; so is much of the organization and forms of worship of the Church; and so is much of the discipline of the Church. "Faith, repentance, and baptism are not works of law, but wise and merciful appointments of an administration of favor." Such is the euphemism by which the author attempts to express their character, and avoid the odious characteristics of law. Let us see if he has accomplished this. If there is an administration of favor, is it not a government of favor? If it has its requirements and appointments, are not these requirements and appointments law? "Faith, repentance, and baptism are required by the honor of Jehovah, and are also steps on to the ground where pardon can be properly bestowed." If they are such steps, then the law of Jehovah commands men to take them; and taking them is an act of obedience to law, or they are

works of law. Can the writer, or any one, express accurately the nature of faith, repentance, and baptism, and not make them works of law?

"The expression 'law of pardon' is not in the Bible, and is Ashdodish." Is the author's euphemism, "appointments of an administration of favor," in the Bible? God commands men to do certain things to obtain pardon. This the author admits. Then such is his law of pardon. To one who understands the Scriptural declaration, "The law of the Lord shall go forth from Zion," and, "Obeying from the heart the form of doctrine," the expression "law of pardon" is admissible. Then, by the nature of the case, and by the explicit declarations of the Scriptures, faith, repentance, and baptism are works of the law of Christ. "Faith, repentance, and baptism are not mere arbitrary appointments." Nor is a single command of God; nor was a single command of Mosaism, either religious or political. This characteristic, then, does not prove that they are not works of law, especially works of the law of Christ. All the author says about the fate of those who never hear the Gospel we most cheerfully assent to. It forms no part of his argument, and certainly the negative is no part of the position he is controverting. "Law operates solely from without," we are told for the hundredth time. If he means the religious element of Mosaism, we have already refuted him as often. Religion could not be of such a character. Moses declared it was to be in the heart. David declared it converted the soul, quickened and renewed to a new life. Should it be said this refers to the religion of the Old Testament, we reply, That is what the author is contrasting with Christianity, if there is any relevance or sense in what he has written. This fallacy has appeared in nearly every paragraph he has written. To all that he says about the insufficiency of mere theories, whether concerning the positive ordinances, or first principles, or his theory of Mosaism and Christianity, we heartily assent. It is not the Gospel as a theory we want, but the Gospel as a life-power in the soul; and when we have that, we will have the works of the Gospel, or the works of the law of Christ. He then quotes the apostle's declaration: "For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has made us free from the law of sin and death. For what the law [law of Moses] could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh,

condemned sin in the flesh: that the righteousness of the law [the righteousness the law of Moses was designed to produce] might be made manifest in us, who walk not after the flesh, but the Spirit." He says the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus means the Gospel, but not the Gospel in its outward statement alone, but the Gospel in the heart, as a holy germ, out of which comes a new life, a new life force. To this we cheerfully assent, but we ask: "How can the Gospel become a new life-force in the soul without an outward statement? How can it become a holy germ of a new life unless we understand it as a Divine scheme of truth, or theory, if you please? How can it become a new life-force, controlling the life, unless it be apprehended, received, and obeyed as a Divinely authoritative rule of life, or law of life?" We must have the outward statement of the Gospel, and an understanding of it, before it can be received as a holy germ, a new life-power in the soul; and it must be obeyed as a Divine command before it can become a new life-force controlling the soul. "The righteousness of the law is in the nature of things a righteousness of works, but the righteousness of the Gospel is expressly called the righteousness of faith." The righteousness of the religious element of Mosaism was not a righteousness of works alone, in the sense in which the author uses the word *works*; for love to God was its great animating principle: so said Christ. It was to be in the heart, said Moses. The weightier matters of the law were mercy, justice, and faith. The end of the law was love out of a pure heart, and a good conscience, and faith unfeigned. The righteousness of the Gospel is not a righteousness of faith alone, or faith without works of obedience to the Gospel of Christ, or the law of Christ. James declares a man is justified by faith and the obedience of faith, or works of the law of Christ. Paul declares, when we obey from the heart the law of Christ, or have faith and the obedience of faith, we are justified. The author quotes from the Philippian Letter, where righteousness of law and righteousness of faith are contrasted. He affirms *law* does not mean the law of Moses. Had he quoted the previous verse, the error of his assertion would have been so apparent that he would not have made it: "If any man thinks he has ground of confidence in the flesh, I have more: circumcised on the eighth day, of the race of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew of the Hebrews; as respects the law [law of Moses] a Pharisee; as respects

zeal, persecuting the Church ; as respects righteousness which is by law [law of Moses, from the context it can mean nothing else], blameless." As the apostle was not talking about law in general, but the law of Moses, he does not contrast any and all legalism with the Gospel, but the law of Moses alone ; and he does not condemn the righteousness the law was to produce, the righteousness God intended it to produce, but his Pharisaic self-righteousness which, as a Pharisee, he supposed his mechanical obedience to a perverted law gave to him. The apostle proceeds : " But these things which were gain to me, I counted as loss for Christ. Yes, I counted all things to be loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord, on account of whom I have suffered the loss of all things, and do count them to be nothing but refuse, that I may gain Christ and be found in him. [Here he speaks of his loss of all the advantages his position among the Jews gave him.] Not having my own righteousness, which was by law [not having my own self-righteousness as a Pharisee, which was by mechanical obedience to a perverted law], but the righteousness which is by Christ Jesus, the righteousness which is of God by faith." The apostle, then, was not contrasting with the righteousness of faith the righteousness of any system of legalism, but the righteousness that he supposed he had by his use of the law of Moses. Above all, he does not, as the author claims, differentiate from the Gospel all works of law : for that would destroy the Gospel itself ; for its righteousness is a righteousness of faith, and the obedience of faith, as Paul and James both teach. In the author's attempt to establish a distinction here, he mistakes the entire idea of the contrast that Paul made. He quotes next from the Roman Letter : " But now, apart from law [law of Moses], the righteousness of God has been revealed, being attested by the law and the prophets [law of Moses and the prophets, or the Old Testament] ; even the righteousness of God by faith in Jesus Christ, which is for all and on all that believe ; for there is no difference : for all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God [you Jews with the rest] ; yet all may be justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus : whom God has set forth as a propitiatory sacrifice through faith in his blood, in order to manifest his righteousness in passing by the sins that were formerly committed, through the forbearance of God ; in order to manifest his righteousness

at the present time, that he might be just, and the justifier of him who believes in Jesus. So we conclude that man is justified by faith without deeds of law [law of Moses]." The apostle was not speaking of any system of legalism whatever, but of the law of Moses. He had convicted both Jew and Gentile of sin. He convicted the Jew of sin, because he kept not the law of Moses. There is no difference, then; for all have sinned, Jew as well as Gentile. Then, if men are justified, it must be by faith in Christ. Men were justified by faith before the law of Moses, for Abraham was. They were justified by faith under the law of Moses. They are now. *Faith* means faith in Christ in the quotation, because that is the thought the apostle has before him. *Law* means the law of Moses, because that is what the apostle has before him. His references to it, his reasonings on it, prove this. He has no reference to a general system of legalism, nor to the law of Christ. As we have already said, the apostle speaks of four kinds of law, and four kinds of works of law,—1. Law of sin and death, and works of that law; 2. Law of nature, and works of that law; 3. Law of Moses, and works of that law; 4. Law of Christ, and works of the law of Christ. The first he condemns as sinful; the second and third he rejects as insufficient for man's justification; the fourth he nowhere condemns, but gives as the means of man's justification. As he was speaking of the law of Moses, he means the work of that law. As he was not speaking of the law of Christ, but was enjoining faith, one of the works of that law, he does not say men are justified by faith apart from the law of Christ. Again, Paul did not condemn so much the law of Moses as the Jewish perversion and misuse of it. He reasoned concerning the Jewish use of the law, rather than on the real nature of the law, which he elsewhere pronounces holy and just and good. The writer leaves the thought for a moment, with the assertion that the righteousness of the Gospel is a righteousness apart from all law whatever; a righteousness with which any and all kinds of law have absolutely no connection whatever. We again have to reply that the righteousness of faith is not a righteousness apart from the law of Christ; for such an assertion would be absurd, as faith is a work of the law of Christ; and the assertion would mean justification by faith apart from faith. The author declares man is accounted righteous when he hears, believes, and is baptized, or when he, through faith

and baptism, enters into a covenant to walk with Christ in a new life; and yet it is a righteousness with which works of any law whatever, even the law of Christ, has absolutely nothing to do; although he enumerates half a dozen distinct works of the law of Christ that must be performed by man before he can be accounted righteous! In the quotation from Romans x, Paul contrasts the Jewish idea of righteousness with the correct idea. He does not condemn the law, but the Jewish misuse of it; nor the righteousness of the law in its real meaning, which is a righteousness of faith, and faith in Christ, but the Jew's false idea of righteousness, or his self-righteousness. He then declares, "If you shall confess with your mouth the Lord Jesus Christ, and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you shall be saved; for with the heart man believeth unto righteousness, and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation." Here we have the law of Christ enunciated, and half a dozen distinct works expressed, or clearly implied, as means of justification; and yet it is a righteousness absolutely apart from all law, even the law of Christ. If ever there was a case where a writer was so infatuated with an idea as to be unable to see the force of language, this writer furnishes such an instance.

"It is now sufficiently evident, it is believed, that the process of becoming a Christian is not one of obedience to law." The author may believe this, but no believer of the plain teaching of the Bible can. Hear Paul: "Because you have from the heart obeyed the form of doctrine delivered unto you [the Gospel-law of Christ], you are free from your bondage to sin and death." "The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus [the Gospel law of Christ] has made us free from the law of sin and death."

Will the writer answer these questions? Does not Christ command men to hear the Gospel, believe it, repent, confess him, and be baptized, as conditions precedent to pardon? Are not these commands of Christ law—his law? Is not the process of becoming a Christian one of obedience to law—this law of Christ? He says further: "God says, My son, give me your heart; move forward in the life to which I have called you. Look not back. Obey me in all things." And yet the man so commanded, thus controlled, is not under law! It is hard to conceive how a man can so bewilder himself. We are told the ideal of Moses and the ideal of Christ were

totally different. Christ says, love to God and man is the sum of the law of Moses. Its weightier matters were justice, mercy, and faith. Its purpose was love out of a pure heart, and a good conscience, and a faith unfeigned. The eleventh chapter of Hebrews tells us that myriads of the ancient saints attained to the righteousness of faith under the law. They attained it by faith and the obedience of faith. It is so obtained under the law of Christ. Christ is the end, the fulfillment, the accomplishment of the law of Moses. The ideal is the same, but imperfectly developed in Mosaism, and perfected in the Gospel. Christ came not to destroy, but to fulfill the law and the prophets.

At last the author refers to James's declaration that the Gospel is a law of liberty—the perfect law of liberty. He attempts to explain it away by saying that it means the Gospel as a rule of life. That is the exact meaning of *law*, when applied to the religious element of Mosaism. If the religious element of Mosaism was law, and law because it was an authoritative rule of life—and such, the author has argued at length, was the case—then the Gospel according to James is law in precisely the same sense. The Gospel is law in the fullest and completest meaning of that word, and the qualifications of “liberty,” and “perfect,” are not appended (as our author assumes) to show that, after all, it is not law, but to indicate what kind of law,—a law for men in a state of liberty, or freemen. Not because, as our author would have it, they are not under law (notwithstanding his disclaimer), but in a state of liberty, in which they freely and joyfully obey the law of Christ. Such voluntary obedience was the only obedience acceptable under Mosaism or any dispensation. The Hebrews were minors under a law suited to minors; the Christian is a man under the law suited to manhood; but both are under law—the Christian in a higher, broader, and completer sense than the Hebrew ever was. As Paul was arguing with the Jews, when he said (Romans vi) the Christian is not under law, he meant the law of Moses; and the Jew so understood him, and it needed no explanation. He declares they obeyed from the heart the law of Christ. In 1 Corinthians ix, 20, he declares the Christian is not under law (the law of Moses); and yet he is not without all law: for he is under the law of Christ, the most searching, binding of all prevailing laws in the universe.

Let us now classify a few of the many fallacies of this article.

1. The author mistakes his province. Instead of using words as he finds them in common usage, as an obedient subject of the law of language, he assumes the *role* of legislator, and tells us how they ought to be used.
2. Neither the English *law* nor the Greek *nomus* are used exclusively, or even in a majority of cases, in the sense to which he attempts to confine them.
3. Paul does not use the word *law* exclusively, or even generally, in the sense to which he asserts Paul confined his use. He used it in various senses, and in the very sense in which he asserts Paul did not use it.
4. He overlooks the four kinds of law of which Paul speaks, and the four kinds of works of law; and, in so doing, extends the strictures of Paul on the first three kinds of law and works of law, to the fourth kind of law and works of that law; a thing Paul never does, and most positively condemns.
5. The radical fallacy of his entire article is, that in his analysis of Mosaism, and his contrast between Mosaism and Christianity, he overlooks the religious element of Mosaism, the only proper subject of contrast and examination.
6. The religious element of Mosaism had scarcely a feature he ascribes to Mosaism, and even the political element did not have all of them.
7. He commits the characteristic error of our Reformation: he makes too broad a contrast between Mosaism and Christianity.
8. He fails to see that in Paul's reasoning with the Jew, he reasons concerning the law from the Jewish stand-point, and speaks of the law as the Jew used it, or rather misused and perverted it.
9. He exaggerates the difference between Mosaism and Christianity beyond all reason and truth.
10. He mistakes Paul's condemnation of the misuse and perversion of the law for his real estimate of the law, and the real character of the law.
11. He asserts that the religious element of Mosaism had no mercy, repentance, or forgiveness. Its subjects were driven under the lash of outward authority. There could not be a religion of that character. He contradicts the entire Old and New Testament Scriptures.
12. He declares its power was solely from without. It had no power to originate a new life. God could not and would not give to sinful man such a religion.
13. Every feature he justly ascribes to Mosaism as a feature or characteristic of law, is, in a higher degree, characteristic of Christianity.
14. He asserts the Gospel is not law. It is law, in the highest and fullest sense.
15. He

asserts that Paul and the Scriptures do not call it law. They do call it law eight times, expressly and explicitly. 16. He asserts the Christian is not under law. He is under the highest and most searching kind of law. 17. He asserts that the Scriptures say the Christian is under law in no sense. They say he is under the law of Christ. 18. He confounds a release from the law of Moses with a release from all law. 19. He asserts that faith, repentance, and baptism are not works of law. They are the works of the law of Christ. The Scriptures expressly call them works of the law of Christ. 20. He makes Mosaism exclusively one kind of law. 21. He assumes there can be no law without objective penalty. 22. He asserts the Gospel has no objective penalty.

"Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter." To our brethren we say, Let us correct our mistake in making too broad a distinction between Mosaism and Christianity—in denying to Mosaism the features of a religion; in virtually denying that it was a religion; in asserting that it had no features in common with Christianity; in asserting that nothing of Mosaism was retained in Christianity—in brief, in having "abrogation on the brain." To all we say, that Jehovah is sovereign of the universe. He is the ruler of every atom and being in it, and has law and government over every atom and being. Every atom and being are under his general government and law. Sinful man is under his gracious or redemptive government and law,—the sinner as one who ought to obey, the saint as one who obeys. His children are under his providential government and law. All authority in heaven and earth is given to the Son of God, Jesus the Christ. He is the prophet, priest, and king of the human race. He is their king, and has government, laws, and subjects, rewards and penalties. The Gospel is his law for sinful man. All men are under the obligation to obey this law, and subject to its rewards and punishments. Hearing the Gospel, believing it, repentance, confession, and obedience are works of the law of Christ, conditions precedent to pardon and justification. The Christian is under law, the law of Christ. He obeys all things that Christ commanded. He is not under the law of Moses, but under the law of Christ. He obeys the law, not through fear, but love; still he is under law and obeys it, in the broadest and fullest sense.

To our legalist brethren, we say: These works, this service of

God, are not the works and service of a hireling. The reward is not the reward of a hireling. We do not believe, repent, and be baptized as work for God, and he does not pardon our sins as pay for such work. There is not merit in human work, in the sense that it makes God our debtor, or we confer a favor or benefit on him. God is not under the obligation of favor or debt to pardon us. Man is unable to save himself in the sense that he can not devise the means or plan of salvation. Salvation is not of man, in the sense that he can not devise the plan. We do not, as Christians, serve God as a hireling, nor receive eternal life as a debt God owes us for such service. To our idealist brethren, we say: The Gospel is law, law in the fullest sense: and there are works of law and service; but it is the work and service of a loving child to a beloved parent. The legalist serves as a hireling. The idealist is a spoiled child who says: "Because father loves me, I am not under law; and it makes no difference whether I do what he requires or not. I need not do it unless I am willing. I am not under law; I will do as I please." There is reward, but not the reward of a hireling; but the reward of a loving father to a loving child that obeys and loves him. There is merit in obeying the law of Christ, in the sense of doing what God commands, doing what is right, and in making ourselves such beings as God will pardon, love, and save. When we obey the law of Christ, God is not under the obligation of debt or favor to save us, but under the obligation of veracity. He has said he would save us if we from the heart obey him. When we do this, he is under the obligation to keep his word. Man is unable to devise or give the means or plan of salvation; but when God has given them, man is able to use them. Faith, repentance, and baptism are conditions of pardon. Not conditions in the sense that they make God our debtor, or confer a favor on him, but conditions in the sense that they make us such beings as God can and will pardon, fit and prepare us for pardon. The Christian is under law, the law of Christ. He obeys Christ.

There is positive law, in the law of pardon,—the Church, in its organization, services, and discipline. It would not be adapted to man if there were not. There is reward for the Christian; not the reward of the hireling, but the reward bestowed on a loving, obedient child, by a loving parent. There is law and love in the Gospel—law

based on love, a law of love. There is freedom; but it is the freedom of perfect obedience, and not freedom from law or license. Legalism tends to formalism and mechanical obedience in routine of duty. Idealism tends to lawlessness and license, and extravagance and fanaticism—to regarding God's commands as non-essentials. It makes of religion a mere emotion or sentiment. Religion has truth to be believed, acts of worship and discipline for life. If we were to take either extreme, we would prefer legalism; for that retains God's Word and law, and the means of rising up to a spiritual life. Idealism casts to one side God's law, and launches out on the sea of feeling without compass or chart. Legalism is to be preferred to idealism, just as even despotism is to be preferred to anarchy; for there is order and law in it. Let us take the inspired counsel of James, and remember that faith without works is dead. Let us have the spirit of the Gospel in the body in which God placed it,—obedience to his law. Let us, as did the pioneer fathers, preach the Gospel as the law of the Lord that went forth from Jerusalem; preach in all its fullness the creed-truth of Christianity: Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ, the only begotten Son of the living God; the Christ, the anointed prophet, priest, and king of the human race; the king, as well as the priest and prophet, and the Gospel as his law. Let us preach the grand generalization of the Gospel into facts, commands, and promises. Its three facts,—the death of Christ for the sins of the human race; his burial, his descent into hades, encountering the power of death, the grave, and hades; his resurrection, his triumphant ascension as a conqueror over death, the grave, and hades, demonstrating his Messiahship and bringing before immortality and life to light. Its three commands,—belief with the whole heart that Jesus is the Christ, and trust and confidence in him, and reliance upon him as such; repentance, or that godly sorrow for sin that works a reformation that leads to salvation; baptism, in which we submit our wills to the Divine sovereign, in which we obey from the heart the form of doctrine delivered unto us, being buried with Christ in baptism, in likeness of his death, burial, and resurrection, symbolizing our death to sin, our burial to our past sinful life, and our resurrection to walk in newness of life, obeying all things Christ commanded. Its three promises,—the remission of past sins; the Holy Spirit as the indwelling guest of every one who makes

his body fit for so holy a guest ; eternal life in the society of God and his redeemed. Its three threats and penalties,—a guilty conscience ; the wrath of God ; and endless banishment from his presence. Let us preach the Gospel of Christ to the Christian as the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus, every command of which he is to obey as the perfect-law of liberty. Then shall we have one body, one spirit, as we are called in one hope of our calling ; one Lord, one faith, one immersion ; one God and Father of all, who is over all and through all, and in us all. In living in perfect obedience to the perfect law of liberty, the Church will be perfect for the complete instruction of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the building up of the body of Christ, till we all come to the unity of the faith, and the knowledge of the Son of God, to a perfect man, to a manner of stature that fully develops the Christ ; and we shall no longer be children, tossed and carried about by every wind of doctrine through the artifice of men, through craftiness used by them, for the deliberate planning of deceit : but, speaking truthfully in love, we shall grow up into him in all things, who is the head, even Christ, from whom the whole body compactly fitted together, and united by every helping joint according to the energy in the measure of every part, makes increase of the body for the building up of itself in love.

LITERARY NOTICES.

HOME LITERATURE.

BOOKS.

[OWING to the great length of some of the articles in this number, we have been reluctantly compelled to omit our usual quantity of Literary Notices. We regret that the Foreign Notices have been entirely crowded out. We will, however, make all right in the next number.—ED.]

- 1.—*The Ancient City.* A Study on the Religion, Laws, and Institutions of Greece and Rome. By FUSTEL DE COULANGES. Translated from the Latest French Edition by WILLARD SMALL. Boston: Lee & Shepard. New York: Lee, Shepard & Dillingham. Cincinnati: George E. Stevens & Co. 1874. 12mo. pp. 529.

NOTHING perhaps more forcibly illustrates the respective civilizations of ancient and modern times than the influence of cities upon civilization. Formerly, the city was every thing; now it is only a factor in the affairs of a nation. It is unquestionably true that the cities still occupy a prominent place in all public matters, but their influence is comparatively less than in the "olden times." We have recently had an example of this declining influence. The struggle of the Commune in Paris was virtually a contest of the city against the country. The result was just what might have been expected, in view of the character of our modern civilization. The country is no longer isolated and ignorant as it once was. Railroads and telegraphs have done much to bring the people to the same degree of intelligence. Hence, it is impossible to have reproduced in this age the influence of the ancient city. Still, the study of that city is none the less interesting to us. In this study we shall find a number of facts that are very suggestive. We note a few of these,—1. The ancients knew nothing of individual liberty. The city was omnipotent, and its authority absolute. The citizen was subordinate in every thing, and without any reserve, to the city; he belonged to it, body and soul. 2. Religion was the controlling element in the regulation of municipal affairs. In fact, the city was founded upon a religion, and constituted like a Church. 3. There was no community of interest among the cities of ancient times. However near they might be to each other, they always formed completely separate societies. Their gods were not the same, or their ceremonies, or their

prayers. The worship of one city was forbidden to men of a neighboring city. The belief was that the gods of one city rejected the homage and prayers of any one who was not their own citizen.

The following concerning the omnipotence of the State, as opposed to individual liberty, will doubtless be interesting to the American people :

"There was nothing independent in man ; his body belonged to the State, and was devoted to its defense. At Rome, military service was due till a man was fifty years old ; at Athens, till he was sixty ; at Sparta, always. His fortune was always at the disposal of the State. If the city had need of money, it could order the women to deliver up their jewels, their creditors to give up their claims, and the owners of olive-trees to turn over gratuitously the oil which they had made.

"Private life did not escape this omnipotence of the State. The Athenian law, in the name of religion, forbade men to remain single. Sparta punished not only those who remained single, but those who married late. At Athens, the State could prescribe labor ; and at Sparta, idleness. It exercised its tyranny even in the smallest things. At Locri, the laws forbade men to drink pure wine ; at Rome, Miletus, and Marseilles, wine was forbidden to women. It was a common thing for the kind of dress to be invariably fixed by each city. The legislation of Sparta regulated the head-dress of women ; and that of Athens forbade them to take with them, on a journey, more than three dresses. At Rhodes and Byzantium, the law forbade men to shave the beard.

"The State was under no obligation to suffer any of its citizens to be deformed. It therefore commanded a father to whom such a son was born, to have him put to death. This law is found in the ancient codes of Sparta and of Rome. We do not know that it existed at Athens ; we know only that Aristotle and Plato incorporated it into their ideal codes. . . .

"The State considered the mind and body of every citizen as belonging to it ; and wished, therefore, to fashion this body and mind in a manner that would enable it to draw the greatest advantage from them. Children were taught gymnastics, because the body of a man was an arm for the city, and it was best that this arm should be as strong and as skillful as possible. They were also taught religious songs and hymns, and the sacred dances, because this knowledge was necessary to the correct performance of the sacrifices and festivals of the city.

"It was admitted that the State had a right to prevent free instruction by the side of its own. One day, Athens made a law forbidding the instruction of young people without authority from the magistrates, and another which especially forbade the teaching of philosophy.

"A man had no chance to choose his belief. He must believe and submit to the religion of the city. He could hate and despise the gods of the neighboring city. As to the divinities of a general and universal character, like Jupiter, or Cybele, or Juno, he was free to believe or not to believe in them ; but it would not do to entertain doubts about Athene, Polias, or Erechtheus, or Cecrops. That would have been grave impiety, which would have endangered religion and the State at the same time, and which the State would have severely punished. Socrates was put to death for this crime. Liberty of thought in regard to the State religion was absolutely unknown among the ancients. Men had to conform to all the rules of worship, figure in all the processions, and take part in all the sacred repasts. Athenian legislation punished those by a fine who failed religiously to celebrate a national festival.

"The ancients, therefore, knew neither liberty in private life, liberty in education, nor religious liberty. The human person counted for very little against that holy and almost divine authority which was called country or the State. The State had not only, as we have in our modern societies, a right to administer justice to the citizens ; it could strike when one was not guilty, and simply for its own interest. Aristides assuredly had committed no crime, and was not even suspected ; but the city had the right to drive him from its

territory, for the simple reason that he had acquired by his virtues too much influence, and might become dangerous, if he desired to be. This was called *ostracism*. This institution was not peculiar to Athens: it was found at Argos, at Megara, at Syracuse; and we may believe that it existed in all the Greek cities."

The author of this volume has given us an admirable study in ancient history. He has condensed an immense amount of material into a small compass. His generalizations are often very fine, though he is not always to be trusted where his political prejudices come into activity.

The translation may be accurate enough, but we think the style might be somewhat improved. The sentences are frequently involved, and are sometimes even inelegant; still we are glad to have the volume in this English dress, as it is certainly a valuable contribution to our historical literature.

2.—*Fetich in Theology*; or, Doctrinalism Twin to Ritualism. By JOHN MILLER, Princeton, N. J. New York: Dodd & Mead. Cincinnati: George E. Stevens & Co. 1874. 12mo. pp. 261.

We know nothing of the author of this volume; but his book is certainly a literary curiosity. The reasoning is often illogical, and the style nearly always a very poor model of good English. As a literary work it is simply crude; but as it frequently shows marked ability in detecting some of the errors of the most pretentious work on Theology that has been written by any one in this country, the book is worthy of careful study; not because its methods of treatment are always correct or its conclusions satisfactory, but because it opens up a discussion which will likely lead to important results.

The author declares that Dr. Charles Hodge's "Systematic Theology" teaches,—1. That God has made every thing for himself; 2. That the will of God is the ground of moral obligation; 3. That the will of God is innate; 4. That vindicatory justice is a primordial attribute of God; 5. That God's highest end is to display his glory; 6. That the universe is not the best possible; 7. That preserving providence, explained as a continuous creation, is unworthy of God, and makes him responsible for sin; 8. That the helplessness of the sinner is not disinclination; 9. That saving faith is not, of its essence, moral; and 10. That rationalism is an over-use of reason.

This is a somewhat fearful indictment; but we are of the opinion that our author convicts the doctor, in most cases at least, of what is here charged. Our author places himself firmly in the negative, as respects the teaching of Dr. Hodge. Much of what he says is worthy of serious consideration, though he is much more successful in refuting the positions of the "Systematic Theology" than he is in giving us any thing systematic and conclusive in their stead.

Our author affirms that the sinner's helplessness is disinclination; and

his reasoning upon this subject will give our readers a taste of the quality of his style:

"If holiness be a love for others and a love for the principle of moral right, sinfulness, which is the opposite of these, must be the same, numerically, as disinclination. If sinfulness be the same as disinclination, helplessness, which is the same as sinfulness (and I mean by that numerically—not that the words do not have a different aspect), must be the same, numerically, as disinclination. In other words, you must find some other account of a sinner's helplessness than that it is of the very essence of his sinfulness, or else you must admit his disinclination as of the very essence of his helplessness also. Please notice how, in the first view, Dr. Hodge has pushed aside the moral feature from his system.

"But, again, restoring holiness as not finding its ground by the will of the Almighty, and not belonging to a God in idea innate, we are warmed by a human conscience, and come into the region of familiar right. Thus judged, Dr. Hodge's idea of helplessness becomes impossible.

"The idea of helplessness at all is difficult; but make it moral, and bring it within the region of man's disinclination to repent, and it mingles with a thousand facts of the helplessness of crime in this world. But make it spiritual, as Dr. Hodge would see fit to call it, and make it of a nature of spiritism that is mystic and kin to the innate; and then bring down upon it a plain definition of holiness that is in the region of our race; and then, inviting after creating helplessness, and promising where there is no strength to accept, and cursing for this where the helplessness is not disinclination, appears in its true deformity. It is an outrage upon the holiness of God; and, therefore, let this distinctly appear, that it has been a leaving out of holiness that has enabled Dr. Hodge even to broach his ghostly proposition."

The book is full of strong things and weak things. It will do to study, but is very hard to read. Some of the chapters are simply ridiculous. The following specimen will, we think, make good the last remark:

"When I hear that baptism saves a man, I shudder. That felicity for eternal years, and ransom from the horrors of the pit, are to follow a little oxygen and hydrogen applied by the fingers of a priest in an earthly instant,—I shiver at being obliged to believe any thing so little. No mention of a reason can give it dignity, and no comparison with the apple in the Garden (Gen. ii, 16), or with the clay on the eyes of the blind (John ix, 6), can rob it of its look, or give it the least especial dignity. Christ has died, and I know tremendous odds have been paid for our redemption; but still, if any conditions are affixed, to be worshipful they must be proportioned to their purpose. God could convert me at his pleasure. He could visit me when asleep. I could retire accursed, and wake glorified. He could convert me by the Ten Commandments. Christ having once suffered, he could apply life as he pleased. He could use any system of truth, or use none, or save me without knowing of his sacrifice, or by psalm-singing, or circumcision, or wearing a particular coat, just as he might choose to do. That he should limit grace to those that hear of himself, I can see reasons for, but no imperative need such as should force it to be the system."

3.—*The Bible Regained, and the God of the Bible Ours*; or, the System of Religious Truth in Outline. By SAMUEL LEE. Boston: Lee & Shepard. Cincinnati: George E. Stevens & Co. 1874. 12mo. pp. 285.

It is, perhaps, too much to expect that any one man can give us a perfect system of truth. Each man looks at truth from his individual stand-

point; and, as his stand-point differs from every other man's, his view will be colored by this individuality. The aggregation of these views will give us the truth as understood by the human race.

The author of this volume has given us his view of the truth, and though he claims that he does not differ essentially from the venerable fathers, his book will be found, we think, to contain much that is different from the orthodox faith of fifty years ago. His effort is to furnish a consistent substitute for the old Calvinism which is rapidly falling into disfavor among the Protestants, as well as to give a new and more satisfactory statement of the truths that belong to Christianity. Some of the doctrines advanced are certainly heterodox enough for all practical purposes. For instance, it is affirmed, with marked emphasis, that the Gospel was preached to the dead. The arguments brought forward to sustain this view are, many of them, novel and quite ingenious, but will hardly be sufficient to convince any but superficial readers.

The author is evidently an independent thinker, and he has produced a clever book, though not remarkable for either a good style or convincing logic. Many of the subjects he discusses are of very great importance, and ought to have received a more satisfactory treatment.

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- 4.—*The Women of the Arabs.* With a Chapter for Children. By Rev. HENRY HARRIS JESSUP, D. D., seventeen years American Missionary in Syria. Edited by Rev. C. S. ROBINSON, D. D., and Rev. ISAAC RILEY. New York: Dodd & Mead. Cincinnati: Geo. E. Stevens & Co. 12mo. pp. 372.

No one is better qualified to write on the subject of this volume than Dr. Jessup. His long residence in Syria has given him a knowledge of Oriental habits and customs which enables him to throw much light upon many things concerning which the general reader is not well informed.

The chapter on the "State of Women in the Mohammedan World" is deeply interesting, and certainly very suggestive. The excellency of Christianity as a civilizing power is all the more strikingly apparent when held up in contrast with other prevailing religions of the world; and in nothing, perhaps, is its excellency more manifest than in what it does for woman. Mohammedanism has signally failed in accomplishing any thing for the elevation of woman. True, the Koran recognizes the immortality of woman, and, to some extent, her personal responsibility; but, practically, she is treated as though both of these things were false. She is, in fact, nothing more than the slave of the men, and is often treated in the most shameful and barbarous manner. Dr. Jessup sees some signs of reformation through the light that is being let in by Christianity; but it will take many years yet to bring about such a change as will give to woman even a respectable position.

The doctor's book contains much interesting and instructive matter, and ought to greatly stimulate our American women in foreign missionary work.

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- 5.—*The Teeth, and How to Save Them.* By L. P. MEREDITH, M. D., D. D. S. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1873. 16mo. pp. 271.

Is it possible to make the people, generally, give careful attention to the important subject discussed in this little volume? Dr. Meredith has made a commendable effort in this direction. His book is written in a popular style, almost entirely free from technical terms, and discusses precisely the matters which the people need to understand. As an evidence of how the book is regarded, we notice that it has been republished in England, and is highly spoken of by the English press. The style in which it is written is no less striking than the matter of the book. As a specimen of good English it is worthy of the highest praise.

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- 6.—*The History of Greece.* By Professor Dr. ERNST CURTIUS. Translated by ADOLPHUS WILLIAM WARD, M. A. Vol. IV. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1874. Royal 12mo. pp. 530.

THE period embraced in this volume is one of very great interest. It introduces us to Spartan supremacy, and closes with the rise of Thebes as the great power of Greece. Dr. Curtius has availed himself of all the latest discoveries, and is enabled thereby to correct several errors into which former writers had fallen. He is certainly giving us a history which must, in a great measure, supersede all the older histories of Greece.

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- 7.—*Prayer and the Prayer Gauge.* By Rev. MARK HOPKINS, D. D. New York: Dodd & Mead. Cincinnati: George E. Stevens & Co. 16mo. pp. 48.

WE think a good deal too much has been made of the Prayer-Gauge proposition. It never had any thing in it worthy of serious consideration; and had it not been for the notice taken of it by pugilistic theologians, the reading public to-day would be ignorant of what it was. We have, in this little volume, a well-meant effort to serve the cause of truth. What is said is all well enough in its way, but we are not sure it was needful to say it.

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- 8.—*The Christ of God.* By HORATIUS BONAR, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Bros. 1874. 16mo. pp. 216.

WHILE there is nothing particularly striking in this volume, it is full of beautiful and tender thoughts, and will scarcely fail to stimulate a more ardent love for the Redeemer of the world.

- 9.—*An Exegetical Work on Prophecy*: containing a Solution of the most Difficult Prophecies, all proved by Astronomical Facts, showing a Complete Agreement with the Bible, and a Calendar for Forty-three Months for the Meridian of Jerusalem, and one for Fifteen Months for the Meridian of Denver City. By Dr. RICHARD BARD, M. C. C., Colorado Territory. A. D. 1873. A. L. 5877. 12mo. pp. 185.

If it be true that figures will not lie, this volume ought to be a satisfactory exposition of prophecy. We are no longer left to wonder and conjecture as to days, months, and years. We have every thing here with an exactness which challenges our admiration, if not our credulity. The work is curious, and has evidently cost the author a considerable amount of labor. We could wish it had been spent to a better purpose.

- 10.—*Every-day Errors of Speech*. By L. P. MEREDITH, M. D., D. D. S. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1874. 16mo. pp. 96.

It is a noticeable fact that some of the most useful literary works have been given to the world through the literary recreations of professional men. This little volume is an example in point. Dr. Meredith has found time and pleasure in noting down, from time to time, such "errors of speech" as he has noticed in public lectures and private conversations. Of course, it would be unreasonable to suppose that the whole field has been explored. Still, we think enough has been done to abundantly illustrate the vicious habits of the American tongue.

- 11.—*Thorpe Regis*: a Novel. By the Author of "The Rose Garden" and "Un-awares." Boston: Roberts Bros. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1874. 12mo. pp. 432.

A BOOK of very peculiar power. You can not read a page without feeling you are under the influence of an artist of undoubted skill. It contains many passages of rare interest, while, as a whole, it is much above the average of books of its kind.

- 12.—*Syrian Home Life*. Compiled by Rev. ISAAC RILEY, from Materials furnished by Rev. HENRY HARRIS JESSUP, D. D., of Beirut, Syria. New York: Dodd & Mead. Cincinnati: George E. Stevens & Co. 12mo. pp. 366.

THIS volume is supplementary to the "Women of the Arabs," by the same author. It deals chiefly with certain habits and customs of Syrian life; and is highly interesting and instructive.

